Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Russogreen2 sentences2025A. Applicable Legal Principles A jury verdict in a criminal case must be unanimous and the jury must also unanimously agree that a defendant “is guilty of a specific crime.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 , citing Cal. Const., art. 2021(People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 (Russo).) “Therefore, cases have long held that when the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.” (Ibid.) “On the other hand, where the evidence shows only a single discrete crime but leaves room for disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed or what the defendant’s precise role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis or, as the cases often put it, the ‘theory’ whereby the defendant is guilty.” | 2 | 3 |
People v. Mayergreen2 sentences2020(See People v. Mayer (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 403, 418 [prosecutor’s opening and closing arguments constituted “an election for jury unanimity purposes”]; People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1455 [“Because the prosecutor’s opening argument elected what conduct by defendant amounted to the crime charged, we conclude that no unanimity instruction was required.”].) “[T]he failure to give a jury unanimity instruction (now CALCRIM No. 3500) is the most common kind of instructional error in criminal cases.” (People v. Norman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 460, 467 [the court went on to advise trial 2009As the court said in People v. Mayer (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 403, 418 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 ]: "When a defendant is charged with a single offense, but there is proof of several acts, any one of which could support a conviction, either the prosecution must select the specific act relied upon to prove the charge, or the jury must be instructed that all the jurors must agree that the defendant committed the same act or acts. [Citation.] When the prosecutor does not make an election, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on unanimity. [Citation.]" (Italics added.) The Attorney | 2 | 2 |
People v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2021In support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Thompson (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 220 , in which the court held that spousal battery is a course of conduct crime for purposes of a jury unanimity instruction. 1993He relies upon People v. Thompson (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 220, 224-225 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 516 ], holding that spousal abuse, like child abuse, is a crime of continuous conduct for purposes of a jury unanimity instruction, CALJIC No. 17.01. | 1 | 3 |
Ramos v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2025On appeal, Hill asserts section 288.5 violates the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement pursuant to Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) 590 U.S. 83 [ 140 S.Ct. 1390 ] (Ramos). 2025First, he asserts counts 1, 4, and 7 are void on the basis that section 288.5 is unconstitutional after Ramos, supra, 590 U.S. 83 held that the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement applies to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Normangreen1 sentence2020(See People v. Mayer (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 403, 418 [prosecutor’s opening and closing arguments constituted “an election for jury unanimity purposes”]; People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1455 [“Because the prosecutor’s opening argument elected what conduct by defendant amounted to the crime charged, we conclude that no unanimity instruction was required.”].) “[T]he failure to give a jury unanimity instruction (now CALCRIM No. 3500) is the most common kind of instructional error in criminal cases.” (People v. Norman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 460, 467 [the court went on to advise trial | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hawkinsgreen1 sentence2020(See People v. Mayer (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 403, 418 [prosecutor’s opening and closing arguments constituted “an election for jury unanimity purposes”]; People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1455 [“Because the prosecutor’s opening argument elected what conduct by defendant amounted to the crime charged, we conclude that no unanimity instruction was required.”].) “[T]he failure to give a jury unanimity instruction (now CALCRIM No. 3500) is the most common kind of instructional error in criminal cases.” (People v. Norman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 460, 467 [the court went on to advise trial | 1 | 1 |
People v. Diazgreen2 sentences2017In Scott , the trial court "explained the nature of a penalty trial," including the jury unanimity requirement; the defendant confirmed he had discussed the waiver with counsel; and both the prosecutor and trial court described in detail the penalty phase procedure. ( Scott , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 1208, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 .) In Diaz , the trial court explained the jury unanimity requirement; "defendant acknowledged that he had thoroughly discussed the jury waiver with his attorney"; and "when the court asked whether he had any questions regarding the waiver, or wished to disc 2017In Scott , the trial court "explained the nature of a penalty trial," including the jury unanimity requirement; the defendant confirmed he had discussed the waiver with counsel; and both the prosecutor and trial court described in detail the penalty phase procedure. ( Scott , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 1208, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 .) In Diaz , the trial court explained the jury unanimity requirement; "defendant acknowledged that he had thoroughly discussed the jury waiver with his attorney"; and "when the court asked whether he had any questions regarding the waiver, or wished to disc | 1 | 1 |
People v. . Scottgreen2 sentences2017In Scott , the trial court "explained the nature of a penalty trial," including the jury unanimity requirement; the defendant confirmed he had discussed the waiver with counsel; and both the prosecutor and trial court described in detail the penalty phase procedure. ( Scott , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 1208, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 .) In Diaz , the trial court explained the jury unanimity requirement; "defendant acknowledged that he had thoroughly discussed the jury waiver with his attorney"; and "when the court asked whether he had any questions regarding the waiver, or wished to disc 2017In Scott , the trial court "explained the nature of a penalty trial," including the jury unanimity requirement; the defendant confirmed he had discussed the waiver with counsel; and both the prosecutor and trial court described in detail the penalty phase procedure. ( Scott , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 1208, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 .) In Diaz , the trial court explained the jury unanimity requirement; "defendant acknowledged that he had thoroughly discussed the jury waiver with his attorney"; and "when the court asked whether he had any questions regarding the waiver, or wished to disc | 1 | 1 |
People v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2017The record does not show that Sivongxxay waived his right to a jury trial on the penalty determination " ' " 'with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' " ' " ( Collins , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 .) Because Sivongxxay was unconstitutionally denied a jury trial at the penalty phase, the penalty judgment cannot stand. 2017The record does not show that Sivongxxay waived his right to a jury trial on the penalty determination " ' " 'with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' " ' " ( Collins , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 305, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 .) Because Sivongxxay was unconstitutionally denied a jury trial at the penalty phase, the penalty judgment cannot stand. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Coultergreen2 sentences1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti 1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martinezgreen2 sentences1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti 1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim’s testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic description of appro | 1 | 1 |
People v. Winklegreen2 sentences1990(See also People v. Winkle, supra, 206 Cal. App.3d at p. 826; People v. Luna, supra, 204 Cal. App.3d at pp. 746-747; and People v. Madden, supra, 116 Cal. App.3d at pp. 217-218 [each of which mentions, but finds inapplicable, the so-called "continuous conduct" exception to the jury unanimity requirement].) Another recent line of cases has taken issue with Van Hoek and its progeny and has concluded that the due process and evidentiary concerns that troubled us in Castro and Williams do not outweigh the state's interest in fully prosecuting and convicting resident child molesters. 1990(See also People v. Winkle, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 826; People v. Luna, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at pp. 746-747; and People v. Madden, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at pp. 217-218 [each of which mentions, but finds inapplicable, the so-called “continuous conduct” exception to the jury unanimity requirement].) Another recent line of cases has taken issue with Van Hoek and its progeny and has concluded that the due process and evidentiary concerns that troubled us in Castro and Williams do not outweigh the state’s interest in fully prosecuting and convicting resident child molesters. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jeffgreen2 sentences1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti 1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim’s testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic description of appro | 1 | 1 |
People v. Avinagreen2 sentences1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti 1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti | 1 | 1 |
People v. Obremskigreen2 sentences1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti 1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti | 1 | 1 |
People v. Osunagreen2 sentences1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti 1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Adamsgreen2 sentences1989(People v. Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1014 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 237 ].) As this court observed in People v. McIntyre (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 899 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 3 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Adams (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 75, 80 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 588 ]: “The fact that a second forced oral copulation occurred within a few minutes during this sexual attack does not necessarily make this another separate crime any more than it would be true there are separate crimes of battery if the actor throws a right-hand punch to his victim and immediately follows it with a left-hand punch. 1989(People v. Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1014 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 237 ].) As this court observed in People v. McIntyre (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 899 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 3 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Adams (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 75, 80 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 588 ]: “The fact that a second forced oral copulation occurred within a few minutes during this sexual attack does not necessarily make this another separate crime any more than it would be true there are separate crimes of battery if the actor throws a right-hand punch to his victim and immediately follows it with a left-hand punch. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Richardson v. United States
green
2 sentences2025(Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 815 , quoting former 21 U.S.C. § 848 (c).) 12 where this Court has not held that the Constitution imposes a jury- unanimity requirement.” (Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 821 .) Subsequently, in Ramos, the Court did just that, expressly holding the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement “applies to state and federal criminal trials equally.” (Ramos, supra, 590 U.S. at p. 93.) Ramos addressed whether Louisiana’s and Oregon’s rules permitting convictions of serious offenses based on 10-to-2 jury verdicts violated the Sixth Amendment (as incorporated aga 2025(Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 815 , quoting former 21 U.S.C. § 848 (c).) 12 where this Court has not held that the Constitution imposes a jury- unanimity requirement.” (Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 821 .) Subsequently, in Ramos, the Court did just that, expressly holding the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement “applies to state and federal criminal trials equally.” (Ramos, supra, 590 U.S. at p. 93.) Ramos addressed whether Louisiana’s and Oregon’s rules permitting convictions of serious offenses based on 10-to-2 jury verdicts violated the Sixth Amendment (as incorporated aga | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ramos v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2025On appeal, Hill asserts section 288.5 violates the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement pursuant to Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) 590 U.S. 83 [ 140 S.Ct. 1390 ] (Ramos). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Cissna
green
1 sentence2025(See Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 821–822; Cissna, 16 supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1125–1126.) Rather, as previously discussed, the critical distinction was the difficulty of proving individual acts in cases of child sexual abuse based on generic testimony (see Richardson, at p. 821; Cissna, at p. 1126), which was the exact reason section 288.5 was enacted (Gear, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 90–92; Higgins, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 307 ).4 Further, Richardson distinguished child continuous sex abuse statutes on the basis that their “special subject matter indicates that they represent | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Higgins
green
2 sentences2025(See Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 821–822; Cissna, 16 supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1125–1126.) Rather, as previously discussed, the critical distinction was the difficulty of proving individual acts in cases of child sexual abuse based on generic testimony (see Richardson, at p. 821; Cissna, at p. 1126), which was the exact reason section 288.5 was enacted (Gear, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 90–92; Higgins, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 307 ).4 Further, Richardson distinguished child continuous sex abuse statutes on the basis that their “special subject matter indicates that they represent 2025(See Richardson, supra, 526 U.S. at pp. 821–822; Cissna, 16 supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1125–1126.) Rather, as previously discussed, the critical distinction was the difficulty of proving individual acts in cases of child sexual abuse based on generic testimony (see Richardson, at p. 821; Cissna, at p. 1126), which was the exact reason section 288.5 was enacted (Gear, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 90–92; Higgins, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 307 ).4 Further, Richardson distinguished child continuous sex abuse statutes on the basis that their “special subject matter indicates that they represent | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Jenkins
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Jenkins (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 287, 299 .) These situations are referred to collectively as the “continuous conduct” rule. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Robertson
green
2 sentences2017In Scott , the trial court "explained the nature of a penalty trial," including the jury unanimity requirement; the defendant confirmed he had discussed the waiver with counsel; and both the prosecutor and trial court described in detail the penalty phase procedure. ( Scott , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 1208, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 .) In Diaz , the trial court explained the jury unanimity requirement; "defendant acknowledged that he had thoroughly discussed the jury waiver with his attorney"; and "when the court asked whether he had any questions regarding the waiver, or wished to disc 2017In Scott , the trial court "explained the nature of a penalty trial," including the jury unanimity requirement; the defendant confirmed he had discussed the waiver with counsel; and both the prosecutor and trial court described in detail the penalty phase procedure. ( Scott , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 1208, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 .) In Diaz , the trial court explained the jury unanimity requirement; "defendant acknowledged that he had thoroughly discussed the jury waiver with his attorney"; and "when the court asked whether he had any questions regarding the waiver, or wished to disc | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2004The admission of statements by defendant’s codefendants to the police was error under Aranda-Bruton and the recent case of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ], We find the erroneous admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the sex offenses, but not as to the kidnapping charge and special allegation. 2004The admission of statements by defendant’s codefendants to the police was error under Aranda-Bruton and the recent case of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [ 158 L.Ed.2d 177, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ], We find the erroneous admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the sex offenses, but not as to the kidnapping charge and special allegation. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Aranda
red
2 sentences2004He contends (1) there was prejudicial Aranda-Bruton error (Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ]; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ]; (2) it was error to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior relationship with defendant; (3) the jury instructions given on the Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) special allegation were deficient; (4) the jury unanimity instruction was required for the kidnapping charge; (5) there was prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. 2004He contends (1) there was prejudicial Aranda-Bruton error (Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ]; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ]; (2) it was error to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior relationship with defendant; (3) the jury instructions given on the Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) special allegation were deficient; (4) the jury unanimity instruction was required for the kidnapping charge; (5) there was prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bruton v. United States
green
2 sentences2004He contends (1) there was prejudicial Aranda-Bruton error (Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ]; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ]; (2) it was error to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior relationship with defendant; (3) the jury instructions given on the Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) special allegation were deficient; (4) the jury unanimity instruction was required for the kidnapping charge; (5) there was prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. 2004He contends (1) there was prejudicial Aranda-Bruton error (Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ]; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 353 , 407 P.2d 265 ]; (2) it was error to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior relationship with defendant; (3) the jury instructions given on the Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) special allegation were deficient; (4) the jury unanimity instruction was required for the kidnapping charge; (5) there was prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Dellinger
green
2 sentences1993Since the jury had to agree unanimously at least on the facts required for conviction as an aider and abettor, and for application of the special circumstance findings to a person who was not the actual killer [citation], no further unanimity was required, and the unanimity instruction was not necessary.” (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 93-94.) 7 This rationale is also consistent with our earlier decision in People v. Dellinger (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 284 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 503 ], where we held a jury unanimity instruction was required when there was a question of which act constitute 1993Since the jury had to agree unanimously at least on the facts required for conviction as an aider and abettor, and for application of the special circumstance findings to a person who was not the actual killer [citation], no further unanimity was required, and the unanimity instruction was not necessary.” (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 93-94.) 7 This rationale is also consistent with our earlier decision in People v. Dellinger (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 284 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 503 ], where we held a jury unanimity instruction was required when there was a question of which act constitute | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Gordon
green
2 sentences1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti 1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim’s testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic description of appro | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Moreno
green
2 sentences1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim's testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic descripti 1990(See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1408-1416; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 786-790; People v. Avina (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 48, 52-57 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 178 ]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 506, 511-514 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 391 ]; People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1346, 1351-1354 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 715 ]; People v. Jeff (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 309, 339-343 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 715 ]; cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at pp. 742, 746-747 [finding victim’s testimony sufficiently specific to sustain 20-count conviction despite generic description of appro | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. McIntyre
green
2 sentences1989(People v. Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1014 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 237 ].) As this court observed in People v. McIntyre (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 899 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 3 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Adams (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 75, 80 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 588 ]: “The fact that a second forced oral copulation occurred within a few minutes during this sexual attack does not necessarily make this another separate crime any more than it would be true there are separate crimes of battery if the actor throws a right-hand punch to his victim and immediately follows it with a left-hand punch. 1989(People v. Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1014 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 237 ].) As this court observed in People v. McIntyre (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 899 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 3 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Adams (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 75, 80 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 588 ]: “The fact that a second forced oral copulation occurred within a few minutes during this sexual attack does not necessarily make this another separate crime any more than it would be true there are separate crimes of battery if the actor throws a right-hand punch to his victim and immediately follows it with a left-hand punch. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Baxstrom v. Herold green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Jackson v. Indiana green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.