Marin framework in Texas

2024Under the Marin framework, errors are placed in one of three “categories” of preservation depending on the rights involved: “(1) absolute requirements and prohibitions; (2) rights of litigants which must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and (3) rights of litigants which are to be implemented upon request.” Id. at 792 (quoting Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 ).

2024Under the Marin framework, errors are placed in one of three “categories” of preservation depending on the rights involved: “(1) absolute requirements and prohibitions; (2) rights of litigants which must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and (3) rights of litigants which are to be implemented upon request.” Id. at 792 (quoting Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 ).

2024App. 2004); see Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 794 (recognizing Marin’s subsumption of any fundamental error doctrine when re-iterating that questions of fundamental error now are considered in Marin’s framework).

2023Under the Marin framework, 47 errors are placed in one of three categories depending on the rights involved: “(1) absolute requirements and prohibitions; (2) rights of litigants which must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and (3) rights of litigants which are to be implemented upon request.” Id. at 792 (quoting Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 ).

2017See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279-80 ; see also Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 137 (Keasler, J., concurring) (explaining the history of the Marin framework).

2017See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279–80; see also Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 137 (Keasler, J., concurring) (explaining the history of the Marin framework).

2024See Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 889 (observing that under the Marin framework, a defendant’s “failure to object in a timely and specific manner during trial forfeits complaints about the admissibility of evidence[]”).

2024See Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 889 (observing that under the Marin framework, a defendant’s “failure to object in a timely and specific manner during trial forfeits complaints about the admissibility of evidence[]”).

2015App. 2000) (Keasler, J., concurring) (explaining the history of the Marin framework). 9 first time on appeal so long as the complained-of conduct was "so egregious as to deem the judge biased on the matter of punishment." Id. at 185-86 (citing Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 137 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 2000) (Keasler, J., concurring) (explaining the history of the Marin framework). 9 first time on appeal so long as the complained-of conduct was "so egregious as to deem the judge biased on the matter of punishment." Id. at 185-86 (citing Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 137 (Tex. Crim.

2015Hernandez v. State, 268 S.W.3d 176, 185 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.). 2 Applying the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's three-part Marin framework, 3 we further concluded that a defendant may raise an issue of the trial court's lack of impartiality in sentencing for the 2 At the time this Court issued its decision in Hernandez, five other courts of appeals had reached the same conclusion.

2015Hernandez v. State, 268 S.W.3d 176, 185 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.). 2 Applying the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's three-part Marin framework, 3 we further concluded that a defendant may raise an issue of the trial court's lack of impartiality in sentencing for the 2At the time this Court issued its decision in Hernandez, five other courts of appeals had reached the same conclusion.

2025J.P. responds that preservation was not required for the constitutional issues he raises on appeal, which he characterizes as “fundamental errors.” The notion of fundamental error, however, is subsumed within the Marin framework, see id. at 765–67, so the issue for us is whether J.P.’s complained-of errors were forfeitable.

2025J.P. responds that preservation was not required for the constitutional issues he raises on appeal, which he characterizes as “fundamental errors.” The notion of fundamental error, however, is subsumed within the Marin framework, see id. at 765–67, so the issue for us is whether J.P.’s complained-of errors were forfeitable.

2023See Moss, 446 S.W.3d at 789−90 (“[W]e caution individuals seeking habeas relief in a subsequent writ application that Sledge continues to bar an applicant from obtaining relief on a jurisdictional claim in a subsequent application if the applicant cannot overcome applicable procedural bars.”) (citing Ex parte Sledge, 391 S.W.3d 104 , 106−09, 111 (Tex. Crim.

2017Is an improper stacking order “in essence” the same as an unauthorized sentence—at least for purposes of deciding whether it should be subject to challenge for the first time in a collateral attack even though it could have been brought earlier on appeal?- 2 See Moss, 446 S.W.3d at 788 (explaining that a claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction is in the nature of a category one Marin issue, which can be raised for the first time in an initial post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding).

2012Id.; see also, e.g., Patterson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref'd) (deciding appellant’s accomplice-witness-corroboration sufficiency challenge under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 38.14 not subject to default under Marin framework).

2012Id.; see also, e.g., Patterson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref’d) (deciding appellant’s accomplice-witness- corroboration sufficiency challenge under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 38.14 not subject to default under Marin framework).

2024The Marin court described a category-three right as forfeitable, which can be lost “for failure to insist upon it by objection, request, motion, or some other behavior calculated to exercise the right in a manner comprehensible to the system’s impartial representative, usually the trial judge.” Id. (citing Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 , 517 1 We note that Gomez does not clarify what evidence he believes the trial court erred in admitting; in particular, he does not explain whether he is contesting the admission of the seized narcotics or the custodial written statement.

2024The Marin court described a category-three right as forfeitable, which can be lost “for failure to insist upon it by objection, request, motion, or some other behavior calculated to exercise the right in a manner comprehensible to the system’s impartial representative, usually the trial judge.” Id. (citing Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 , 517 1 We note that Gomez does not clarify what evidence he believes the trial court erred in admitting; in particular, he does not explain whether he is contesting the admission of the seized narcotics or the custodial written statement.

2024See Hernandez, 538 S.W.3d at 622 ; Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89 .

2024See Hernandez, 538 S.W.3d at 622 ; Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89 .

2023See Fuller v. State, 363 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Fuller v. State, 363 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 644–45 (“We need not decide today whether an objection below is required to preserve an error of this nature on appeal because the record here does not reflect partiality of the trial court or that a predetermined sentence was imposed.”); see also Moreland v. State, 12-20-00200-CR, 2021 WL 3265545 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (assuming without deciding that a judicial bias claim could be raised for the first time on appeal).

2023See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 644–45 (“We need not decide today whether an objection below is required to preserve an error of this nature on appeal because the record here does not reflect partiality of the trial court or that a predetermined sentence was imposed.”); see also Moreland v. State, 12-20-00200-CR, 2021 WL 3265545 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (assuming without deciding that a judicial bias claim could be raised for the first time on appeal).

2023See Moss, 446 S.W.3d at 789−90 (“[W]e caution individuals seeking habeas relief in a subsequent writ application that Sledge continues to bar an applicant from obtaining relief on a jurisdictional claim in a subsequent application if the applicant cannot overcome applicable procedural bars.”) (citing Ex parte Sledge, 391 S.W.3d 104 , 106−09, 111 (Tex. Crim.

2021Penal Code section 3.03 “confers a Marin waiver-only right—a right that must be implemented unless affirmatively waived.” Ex parte Carter, 521 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Tex. Crim.

2019The Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Johnson, “[t]his is true because any relinquishment of the privilege need not be expressly made, and a trial judge has no independent duty to implement a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id. (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984); Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 ).

2019The Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Johnson, “[t]his is true because any relinquishment of the privilege need not be expressly made, and a trial judge has no independent duty to implement a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id. (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984); Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 ).

2019See, e.g., Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 587 (Tex. Crim.

2015If traditional claims of fundamental error are now reviewed under the Marin framework, as this Court has repeatedly said since Blue, no review of any 33 See Jasper, 61 S.W.3d at 421 (distinguishing a judge’s expression of irritation at the defense attorney from the comments in Blue). 34 See Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 130 (quoting the trial judge) (“Frankly, obviously, I prefer the defendant to plead because it gives us more time to get things done and I’m sure not going to come out here and sit.”). 35 Dissent at 3-4; 18 RR 92-93. 10 complaint should have been undertaken without categorization as an al

2015If traditional claims of fundamental error are now reviewed under the Marin framework, as this Court has repeatedly said since Blue, no review of any 33 See Jasper, 61 S.W.3d at 421 (distinguishing a judge’s expression of irritation at the defense attorney from the comments in Blue). 34 See Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 130 (quoting the trial judge) (“Frankly, obviously, I prefer the defendant to plead because it gives us more time to get things done and I’m sure not going to come out here and sit.”). 35 Dissent at 3-4; 18 RR 92-93. 10 complaint should have been undertaken without categorization as an al

2015But we need not hold that the legislature acting only by and through itself can violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.32 In Peugh v. United States, a recent Supreme Court decision that we did not have the benefit of reviewing when we decided Phillips, the Court held that a trial 29 Id. (citing Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001)). 30 Stogner, 539 U.S. at 632 . 31 Ortiz, 93 S.W.3d at 91 .

2015See also Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Tex. Crim.