formal revocation hearing in California

2022Otherwise, the probationary period terminates automatically on the last day.’ ” (Id. at p. 773, italics omitted.) The second rule modifies the first: revocation of probation, “summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the running of the probationary period.” (Former § 1203.2(a).)3 The Legislature added this provision in 1977 to respond to two then-current appellate decisions construing section 1203.3 to 3 The principle remains in the current version of section 1203.2(a) but is articulated in more general terms: “revocation, summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the running of the period of

2016(Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 482 [parole revocation]; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 458 (Vickers) [probation revocation].) 3 All future dates are in the year 2015. 2 To conform to due process, revocation of conditional release requires a two-step process: (1) an initial determination of probable cause to justify temporary detention; and (2) a formal revocation hearing to determine whether the facts warrant revocation.

2022Otherwise, the probationary period terminates automatically on the last day.’ ” (Id. at p. 773, italics omitted.) The second rule modifies the first: revocation of probation, “summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the running of the probationary period.” (Former § 1203.2(a).)3 The Legislature added this provision in 1977 to respond to two then-current appellate decisions construing section 1203.3 to 3 The principle remains in the current version of section 1203.2(a) but is articulated in more general terms: “revocation, summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the running of the period of

2016(Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 482 [parole revocation]; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 458 (Vickers) [probation revocation].) 3 All future dates are in the year 2015. 2 To conform to due process, revocation of conditional release requires a two-step process: (1) an initial determination of probable cause to justify temporary detention; and (2) a formal revocation hearing to determine whether the facts warrant revocation.

2016(Id. at p. 459.) Defendant also cites to People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 for the proposition that a probationer has the right to be present at a probation revocation hearing, even if the basis for the revocation is a conviction of a new offense, “unless the probationer waives his right to a formal revocation hearing.” (Id. at p. 895, fn. 22.) The Attorney General contends defendant validly waived his presence at the August 26, 2014 hearing, through counsel.

1992“Before probation can be finally and formally revoked written notice of the claimed violation must be given to the probationer, the evidence against him must be disclosed, he must be given an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, he must be able to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, a neutral and detached hearing body must consider the matter, and a written statement of the fact finder must be prepared as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revocation.” (People v. Santellanes (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 998,1003 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 28

1975(Cf. In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 156 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 ].) Nor do we seek now to set standards for the exercise of a court’s sound discretion in deciding whether to permit probation revocation proceedings to commence in advance of the disposition of related criminal proceedings, or in deciding, once probation revocation proceedings have so commenced, how long the formal revocation hearing may be postponed due to concurrent criminal proceedings, without violating the probationer’s due process right to a reasonably prompt revocation hearing.

1975(Cf. In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 156 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 ].) Nor do we seek now to set standards for the exercise of a court’s sound discretion in deciding whether to permit probation revocation proceedings to commence in advance of the disposition of related criminal proceedings, or in deciding, once probation revocation proceedings have so commenced, how long the formal revocation hearing may be postponed due to concurrent criminal proceedings, without violating the probationer’s due process right to a reasonably prompt revocation hearing.

2013Where summary revocation is based on an alleged failure to pay restitution, if it is shown at the formal revocation hearing that probationer willfully failed to pay, “the court is authorized to revoke probation and either order imprisonment or to set aside the revocation and reinstate probation for a new term exceeding the original maximum.” (Medeiros, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.) If, however, it is determined that the probationer was unable to pay restitution, “[a]ll the court can do is modify and extend probation to the maximum term” pursuant to section 1203.3, subdivision (a).

2009Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a); Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660, 672 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 221 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 ].) “If these circumstances appear at the formal revocation hearing, the court is authorized to revoke probation and . . . order imprisonment . . . .” (People v. Medeiros (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1267 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 83 ].) Of course, then respondent would have been subject to deportation for a prison term of at least 16 months. 9 Thus, all that the court’s order was designed to achieve was the continued presence of respondent in this country in the vague hope that he would finally pay

2016(In re Winn (1975) 13 Cal.3d 694, 698 [defendant has burden of showing prejudice]; In re Moore (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 285, 294 .) Because he waived a formal revocation hearing and admitted the violations and has served the custodial sanction “there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.” (Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 523 U.S. 1, 18 .) DISPOSITION The order revoking PRCS is affirmed.

2016(In re Winn (1975) 13 Cal.3d 694, 698 [petitioner bears burden of establishing prejudice]; Woodall, at p. 1238 [same].) He requested and received a formal revocation hearing.

2022(Ibid.) Seven years later, the defendant returned to court after his arrest on the outstanding warrant (having evidently returned to the U.S.). ( Leiva, supra, 56 Cal.4th. at p. 503.) The trial court proceeded with a formal revocation hearing and concluded the defendant had violated his probation upon his return to the United States, some six years after his probation had originally been imposed.

2014Following this summary revocation the person is entitled to a formal revocation hearing within a reasonable time at which he is entitled to the assistance of counsel, the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, present his own witnesses and testify on his own behalf.” (In re Mehdizadeh (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 995, 999-1000 , fns. omitted.) The summary revocation of probation “ ‘gives the court jurisdiction over and physical custody of the defendant and is proper if the defendant is accorded a subsequent formal hearing in conformance with due process. [Citation.] [¶] Therefo

2016(See Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 2 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [voluntariness of waiver is reviewed de novo].) We are not persuaded.

2016(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 ]; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [voluntariness of waiver is reviewed de novo].) Appellant argues that supervising agencies need guidance on when a PRCS revocation waiver is knowing and voluntary.

2009Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a); Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660, 672 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 221 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 ].) “If these circumstances appear at the formal revocation hearing, the court is authorized to revoke probation and . . . order imprisonment . . . .” (People v. Medeiros (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1267 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 83 ].) Of course, then respondent would have been subject to deportation for a prison term of at least 16 months. 9 Thus, all that the court’s order was designed to achieve was the continued presence of respondent in this country in the vague hope that he would finally pay

2009Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a); Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660, 672 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 221 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 ].) “If these circumstances appear at the formal revocation hearing, the court is authorized to revoke probation and . . . order imprisonment . . . .” (People v. Medeiros (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1267 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 83 ].) Of course, then respondent would have been subject to deportation for a prison term of at least 16 months. 9 Thus, all that the court’s order was designed to achieve was the continued presence of respondent in this country in the vague hope that he would finally pay

2022In People v. Freidt (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 16 (Freidt), the trial court summarily revoked the defendant’s probation during the probationary period 11 for failure to pay restitution but never held a formal revocation hearing, leaving the defendant in revoked status for some two-and-a-half years, well beyond the five-year maximum of section 1203.1.

2014Following this summary revocation the person is entitled to a formal revocation hearing within a reasonable time at which he is entitled to the assistance of counsel, the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, present his own witnesses and testify on his own behalf.” (In re Mehdizadeh (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 995, 999-1000 , fns. omitted.) The summary revocation of probation “ ‘gives the court jurisdiction over and physical custody of the defendant and is proper if the defendant is accorded a subsequent formal hearing in conformance with due process. [Citation.] [¶] Therefo

2016(See Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 2 304 U.S. 458, 464 ; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [voluntariness of waiver is reviewed de novo].) We are not persuaded.

2016(Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 [ 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 ]; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [voluntariness of waiver is reviewed de novo].) Appellant argues that supervising agencies need guidance on when a PRCS revocation waiver is knowing and voluntary.

2016If the inmate rejects the "waiver offer," the inmate remains in custody until the formal revocation hearing which must be held a reasonable time after the PRCS revocation petition is filed. (§ 3455, subd. (c).) Appellant complains that the "waiver offer" procedure encourages " Alford " type admissions ( North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 , 32-39, 91 S.Ct. 160 , 164-168, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 , 168-172 ) in which the inmate protests his/her innocence but admits the alleged PRCS violation to avoid a greater punishment.

2016If the inmate rejects the "waiver offer," the inmate remains in custody until the formal revocation hearing which must be held a reasonable time after the PRCS revocation petition is filed. (§ 3455, subd. (c).) Appellant complains that the "waiver offer" procedure encourages " Alford " type admissions ( North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 , 32-39, 91 S.Ct. 160 , 164-168, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 , 168-172 ) in which the inmate protests his/her innocence but admits the alleged PRCS violation to avoid a greater punishment.

2022(See Leiva, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 512 .) The Legislature added a tolling provision because it “was focused on preserving the jurisdiction of the trial court to hold formal probation violation hearings that met Morrissey-Vickers requirements after the period of probation had expired.” (Ibid.) It is now well established that summary revocation of probation is appropriate and preserves a court’s jurisdiction over a probationer, “even if the evidentiary hearing, formal revocation and sentencing all occur after the period of probation would otherwise have been completed.” (People v. Journey (1976

2016(See e.g., People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 [prior experience with criminal justice system supports conclusion that defendant knew and waived his rights]; People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1660 [court considers relevant facts and circumstances, including the defendant's experience, conduct, and background].) Appellant had already served seven flash incarcerations and seven PRCS revocations (a total of 420 days in custody) for failure to obey all laws, drug use, failure to report to probation, failure to drug test, and changing residences without notifying probation.

2016(See e.g., People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 [prior experience with criminal justice system supports conclusion that defendant knew and waived his rights]; People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1660 [court considers relevant facts and circumstances, including the defendant's experience, conduct, and background].) Appellant had already served seven flash incarcerations and seven PRCS revocations (a total of 420 days in custody) for failure to obey all laws, drug use, failure to report to probation, failure to drug test, and changing residences without notifying probation.

2014Restitution shall be consistent with a person’s ability to pay.” (Stats. 1983, ch. 568, § 2.5, p. 2435; see Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 30.) 5 People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1096 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 , 820 P.2d 278 ] (Cookson) interpreted the 1983 amendment as codifying the holding of Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 221 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 ] (Bearden).

2014Restitution shall be consistent with a person’s ability to pay.” (Stats. 1983, ch. 568, § 2.5, p. 2435; see Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 30.) 5 People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1096 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 , 820 P.2d 278 ] (Cookson) interpreted the 1983 amendment as codifying the holding of Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 221 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 ] (Bearden).