Practice Book rule in Connecticut

2006Practice Book rule must be strictly construed and is mandatory, compliance with its requirements does not necessarily become a prerequisite to a court's subject matter jurisdiction." Id., at 310, 610 A.2d 1147 ; see also State v. Myers, 242 Conn. 125 , 139 n. 17, 698 A.2d 823 (1997) (although motion for new trial was not filed within time permitted by rule of practice, state waived timeliness claim by not objecting to motion when filed); LoSacco v. Young, 210 Conn. 503, 508 , 555 A.2d 986 (1989) (because rule of practice is not constitutional or statutory mandate, it cannot be jurisdictional).

2006Practice Book rule must be strictly construed and is mandatory, compliance with its requirements does not necessarily become a prerequisite to a court's subject matter jurisdiction." Id., at 310, 610 A.2d 1147 ; see also State v. Myers, 242 Conn. 125 , 139 n. 17, 698 A.2d 823 (1997) (although motion for new trial was not filed within time permitted by rule of practice, state waived timeliness claim by not objecting to motion when filed); LoSacco v. Young, 210 Conn. 503, 508 , 555 A.2d 986 (1989) (because rule of practice is not constitutional or statutory mandate, it cannot be jurisdictional).

2002"The Practice Book rule `[has] been amended so that a party who files an untimely memorandum is no longer deemed to consent to the granting of a motion made under [this] section.'" Id. citing, Southport Manor Convalescent Center Inc. v. Foley , 216 Conn. 11 , 13 n. 1, 578 A.2d 646 (1990); Castillo v. Brito , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 394099 (October 28, 1991, Hennessey, J .) ( 5 Conn.L.Rptr. 201 , 202). "[T]he failure to timely file an opposing memorandum will not necessarily be fatal and the court may therefore address the merits of the

2002"The Practice Book rule `[has] been amended so that a party who files an untimely memorandum is no longer deemed to consent to the granting of a motion made under [this] section.'" Id. citing, Southport Manor Convalescent Center Inc. v. Foley , 216 Conn. 11 , 13 n. 1, 578 A.2d 646 (1990); Castillo v. Brito , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 394099 (October 28, 1991, Hennessey, J .) ( 5 Conn.L.Rptr. 201 , 202). "[T]he failure to timely file an opposing memorandum will not necessarily be fatal and the court may therefore address the merits of the

2006Co. v. Wheeler, 221 Conn. 206, 212 , 603 A.2d 385 (1992) (noting that federal court’s inteipretation of Connecticut statute is not binding on this court); State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 359 , 438 A.2d 114 (1980) (stating that this court is not required to follow cases construing federal rules of civil procedure in interpreting similar Practice Book rule), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 , 101 S. Ct. 1741 , 68 L.

2006Co. v. Wheeler, 221 Conn. 206, 212 , 603 A.2d 385 (1992) (noting that federal court’s inteipretation of Connecticut statute is not binding on this court); State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 359 , 438 A.2d 114 (1980) (stating that this court is not required to follow cases construing federal rules of civil procedure in interpreting similar Practice Book rule), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 , 101 S. Ct. 1741 , 68 L.

2006Co. v. Wheeler, 221 Conn. 206, 212 , 603 A.2d 385 (1992) (noting that federal court’s inteipretation of Connecticut statute is not binding on this court); State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 359 , 438 A.2d 114 (1980) (stating that this court is not required to follow cases construing federal rules of civil procedure in interpreting similar Practice Book rule), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 , 101 S. Ct. 1741 , 68 L.

2006Co. v. Wheeler, 221 Conn. 206, 212 , 603 A.2d 385 (1992) (noting that federal court’s inteipretation of Connecticut statute is not binding on this court); State v. Godek, 182 Conn. 353, 359 , 438 A.2d 114 (1980) (stating that this court is not required to follow cases construing federal rules of civil procedure in interpreting similar Practice Book rule), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 , 101 S. Ct. 1741 , 68 L.

2003Similarly, in State v. Luzietti , 230 Conn. 427 , 646 A.2d 85 (1995), the court held that it was error for the trial court to consider the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal made six weeks after he began serving his sentence. "[O]nce judgment has been rendered and the defendant has begun serving the sentence imposed, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify its judgment in the absence of a legislative or constitutional grant of continuing jurisdiction." Id. , 431. "[T]he court loses jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the commissioner of

2003Similarly, in State v. Luzietti , 230 Conn. 427 , 646 A.2d 85 (1995), the court held that it was error for the trial court to consider the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal made six weeks after he began serving his sentence. "[O]nce judgment has been rendered and the defendant has begun serving the sentence imposed, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify its judgment in the absence of a legislative or constitutional grant of continuing jurisdiction." Id. , 431. "[T]he court loses jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the commissioner of

1991In Brooks v. Borten, 8 Conn. Sup. 463 (1940), the court explained that: The motion for a more specific statement has for its limited purposes, the securing of a statement of the material facts upon which the adverse party bases his complaint or defense.

1980In Brooks v. Borten, 8 Conn. Sup. 463 , the court stated: “The motion for more specific statement has for its limited purpose, the securing of a statement of the material facts upon which the adverse party bases his complaint or defense.

1975Densmore v. Eyles, 32 Conn. Sup. 519 , 522 .

1975Densmore v. Eyles, 32 Conn. Sup. 519 , 522.

2025Accordingly, we first ‘‘consider the text of the . . . [rule] itself and its relationship to other . . . [rules].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mead- owbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 328 Conn. 586, 594 , 181 A.3d 550 (2018).

2025Accordingly, we first ‘‘consider the text of the . . . [rule] itself and its relationship to other . . . [rules].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mead- owbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 328 Conn. 586, 594 , 181 A.3d 550 (2018).

2022Nevertheless, we do not reach the respondent father’s claim regard- ing the reliable and trustworthy prong in light of our conclusion that the trial court incorrectly determined that the admission of the hearsay state- ments was ‘‘reasonably necessary.’’ 21 We note that § 35a-23 of our rules of practice was adopted in response to In re Taylor F., supra, 296 Conn. 524 , and provides procedures that parties and the court must follow whenever a party ‘‘seeks the admission of a hearsay statement of a child pursuant to the residual exception to the hearsay rule based upon psychological unavailabili

2017To the extent that a failure to comply with a rule of practice rises to the level of a constitutional violation, ‘‘[t]he United States Supreme Court has recognized that ‘most constitutional errors can be harmless.’ ’’ State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 444 , 773 A.2d 287 (2001), quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 , 119 S. Ct. 1827 , 144 L.

2017To the extent that a failure to comply with a rule of practice rises to the level of a constitutional violation, ‘‘[t]he United States Supreme Court has recognized that ‘most constitutional errors can be harmless.’ ’’ State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 444 , 773 A.2d 287 (2001), quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 , 119 S. Ct. 1827 , 144 L.

2017"Ordinarily, our courts apply a harmless error analysis in determining whether a violation of a rule of practice amounts to reversible error." *601 State v. Pare , 253 Conn. 611 , 636, 755 A.2d 180 (2000).

2017"Ordinarily, our courts apply a harmless error analysis in determining whether a violation of a rule of practice amounts to reversible error." *601 State v. Pare , 253 Conn. 611 , 636, 755 A.2d 180 (2000).

2017To the extent that a failure to comply with a rule of practice rises to the level of a constitutional violation, ‘‘[t]he United States Supreme Court has recognized that ‘most constitutional errors can be harmless.’ ’’ State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 444 , 773 A.2d 287 (2001), quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 , 119 S. Ct. 1827 , 144 L.

2017To the extent that a failure to comply with a rule of practice rises to the level of a constitutional violation, ‘‘[t]he United States Supreme Court has recognized that ‘most constitutional errors can be harmless.’ ’’ State v. Anderson, 255 Conn. 425, 444 , 773 A.2d 287 (2001), quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 , 119 S. Ct. 1827 , 144 L.

2014The interrelation of the statute and the Practice Book rule was first addressed in Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn. App. 262, 267 , 594 A.2d 473 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911 , 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114 , 112 S. Ct. 1224 , 117 L.

2014The interrelation of the statute and the Practice Book rule was first addressed in Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn. App. 262, 267 , 594 A.2d 473 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911 , 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114 , 112 S. Ct. 1224 , 117 L.

2014The interrelation of the statute and the Practice Book rule was first addressed in Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn. App. 262, 267 , 594 A.2d 473 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911 , 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114 , 112 S. Ct. 1224 , 117 L.

2014The interrelation of the statute and the Practice Book rule was first addressed in Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn. App. 262, 267 , 594 A.2d 473 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911 , 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114 , 112 S. Ct. 1224 , 117 L.

2014The interrelation of the statute and the Practice Book rule was first addressed in Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn. App. 262, 267 , 594 A.2d 473 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911 , 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114 , 112 S. Ct. 1224 , 117 L.

2014The interrelation of the statute and the Practice Book rule was first addressed in Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn. App. 262, 267 , 594 A.2d 473 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911 , 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114 , 112 S. Ct. 1224 , 117 L.

2014Practice Book rule must be strictly construed and is mandatory, compliance with its requirements does not necessarily become a prerequisite to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 84 Conn. App. 429, 433 , 863 A.2d 607 (2004), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Das, 291 Conn. 366, 368 , 968 A.2d 367 (2009); see also Lo Sacco v. Young, supra, 210 Conn. 508 (faitee to comply with mandatory time requirement in our rules of practice does not affect subject matter jurisdiction); Practice Book § 1-8 (“[t]he design

2014Practice Book rule must be strictly construed and is mandatory, compliance with its requirements does not necessarily become a prerequisite to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 84 Conn. App. 429, 433 , 863 A.2d 607 (2004), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Das, 291 Conn. 366, 368 , 968 A.2d 367 (2009); see also Lo Sacco v. Young, supra, 210 Conn. 508 (faitee to comply with mandatory time requirement in our rules of practice does not affect subject matter jurisdiction); Practice Book § 1-8 (“[t]he design

2014Practice Book rule must be strictly construed and is mandatory, compliance with its requirements does not necessarily become a prerequisite to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 84 Conn. App. 429, 433 , 863 A.2d 607 (2004), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Das, 291 Conn. 366, 368 , 968 A.2d 367 (2009); see also Lo Sacco v. Young, supra, 210 Conn. 508 (faitee to comply with mandatory time requirement in our rules of practice does not affect subject matter jurisdiction); Practice Book § 1-8 (“[t]he design

2014The interrelation of the statute and the Practice Book rule was first addressed in Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn. App. 262, 267 , 594 A.2d 473 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911 , 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114 , 112 S. Ct. 1224 , 117 L.

2014The interrelation of the statute and the Practice Book rule was first addressed in Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn. App. 262, 267 , 594 A.2d 473 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911 , 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114 , 112 S. Ct. 1224 , 117 L.

2014The interrelation of the statute and the Practice Book rule was first addressed in Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn. App. 262, 267 , 594 A.2d 473 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911 , 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114 , 112 S. Ct. 1224 , 117 L.

2014The interrelation of the statute and the Practice Book rule was first addressed in Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn. App. 262, 267 , 594 A.2d 473 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911 , 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114 , 112 S. Ct. 1224 , 117 L.

2012In construing the statute, the circuit courts of appeal focused on the word previously, which does not appear in our Practice Book rule. “[T]he question for § 2244 (b) (2) (B) (ii) purposes is . . . whether [the new factual predicate for the claim] could have been discovered ‘previously,’ which means at least as late as the time of the filing of the first federal habeas petition.” In re Provenzano, 215 F.3d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1256 , 120 S. Ct. 2710 , 147 L.

2012In construing the statute, the circuit courts of appeal focused on the word previously, which does not appear in our Practice Book rule. "[T]he question for § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) purposes is ... whether [the new factual predicate for the claim] could have been discovered `previously,' which means at least as late as the time of the filing of the first federal habeas petition." In re Provenzano, 215 F.3d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1256 , 120 S.Ct. 2710 , 147 L.Ed.2d 979 (2000).