Alberico-Daubert standard in New Mexico

2009The appropriate standard of review, therefore, is that which controls when the Alberico-Daubert standard is applicable. {22} In Alberico, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the requirement set forth in Daubert that the proponent of expert opinion testimony must show that the expert’s opinion has ‘“a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.’ ” Alberico, 116 N.M. at 167, 861 P.2d at 202 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ).

2009The appropriate standard of review, therefore, is that which controls when the Alberico-Daubert standard is applicable. {22} In Alberico, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the requirement set forth in Daubert that the proponent of expert opinion testimony must show that the expert’s opinion has ‘“a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.’ ” Alberico, 116 N.M. at 167, 861 P.2d at 202 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ).

2018See State v. Torres, 1999- NMSC-010, ¶ 43, 127 N.M. 20 , 976 P.2d 20 (concluding that “the Alberico-[D]aubert standard applies only to expert testimony that relies on scientific knowledge,” rather than all forms of expert testimony); see also Quintana v. Acosta, 2014-NMCA-015, ¶ 14 , 316 P.3d 912 (noting that the Alberico-Daubert standard applies “only when the district court is evaluating the admissibility of scientific testimony”). “[T]he initial determination of whether to apply the Alberico-Daubert standard entails a conclusion of law that is subject to de novo review.” Torres, 1999-NMSC-0

2018See State v. Torres, 1999- NMSC-010, ¶ 43, 127 N.M. 20 , 976 P.2d 20 (concluding that “the Alberico-[D]aubert standard applies only to expert testimony that relies on scientific knowledge,” rather than all forms of expert testimony); see also Quintana v. Acosta, 2014-NMCA-015, ¶ 14 , 316 P.3d 912 (noting that the Alberico-Daubert standard applies “only when the district court is evaluating the admissibility of scientific testimony”). “[T]he initial determination of whether to apply the Alberico-Daubert standard entails a conclusion of law that is subject to de novo review.” Torres, 1999-NMSC-0

2018“Evidence is based on scientific knowledge if it is not self-explanatory, or if it is based on a scientific or medical principle.” State v. Aleman, 2008-NMCA-137 , ¶ 6, 145 N.M. 79 , 194 P.3d 110 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Bregar, 2017-NMCA-028 , ¶¶ 32-33, 390 P.3d 212 (noting that expert testimony involving the use of physics equations is based on scientific knowledge); cf. State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 754 (Or. 1984) (en banc) (“The term ‘scientific’ . . . refers to evidence that draws its convincing force from some principle of science, mathematics and the

2018“Evidence is based on scientific knowledge if it is not self-explanatory, or if it is based on a scientific or medical principle.” State v. Aleman, 2008-NMCA-137 , ¶ 6, 145 N.M. 79 , 194 P.3d 110 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Bregar, 2017-NMCA-028 , ¶¶ 32-33, 390 P.3d 212 (noting that expert testimony involving the use of physics equations is based on scientific knowledge); cf. State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 754 (Or. 1984) (en banc) (“The term ‘scientific’ . . . refers to evidence that draws its convincing force from some principle of science, mathematics and the

2018We therefore decline to extend Duran’s rationale to the present case. {26} The State also argues that Deputy Armijo’s testimony was not subject to the Alberico- Daubert standard because it was based on his specialized knowledge, citing State v. Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007 , 147 N.M. 487 , 226 P.3d 1 (Bullcoming II), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. by Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (Bullcoming III), and State v. Bullcoming, 2008-NMCA-097 , 144 N.M. 546 , 189 P.3d 679 (Bullcoming I).

2018We therefore decline to extend Duran’s rationale to the present case. {26} The State also argues that Deputy Armijo’s testimony was not subject to the Alberico- Daubert standard because it was based on his specialized knowledge, citing State v. Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007 , 147 N.M. 487 , 226 P.3d 1 (Bullcoming II), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. by Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (Bullcoming III), and State v. Bullcoming, 2008-NMCA-097 , 144 N.M. 546 , 189 P.3d 679 (Bullcoming I).

2018“Evidence is based on scientific knowledge if it is not self-explanatory, or if it is based on a scientific or medical principle.” State v. Aleman, 2008-NMCA-137 , ¶ 6, 145 N.M. 79 , 194 P.3d 110 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Bregar, 2017-NMCA-028 , ¶¶ 32-33, 390 P.3d 212 (noting that expert testimony involving the use of physics equations is based on scientific knowledge); cf. State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 754 (Or. 1984) (en banc) (“The term ‘scientific’ . . . refers to evidence that draws its convincing force from some principle of science, mathematics and the

2018“Evidence is based on scientific knowledge if it is not self-explanatory, or if it is based on a scientific or medical principle.” State v. Aleman, 2008-NMCA-137 , ¶ 6, 145 N.M. 79 , 194 P.3d 110 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Bregar, 2017-NMCA-028 , ¶¶ 32-33, 390 P.3d 212 (noting that expert testimony involving the use of physics equations is based on scientific knowledge); cf. State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 754 (Or. 1984) (en banc) (“The term ‘scientific’ . . . refers to evidence that draws its convincing force from some principle of science, mathematics and the

2018See State v. Torres, 1999- NMSC-010, ¶ 43, 127 N.M. 20 , 976 P.2d 20 (concluding that “the Alberico-[D]aubert standard applies only to expert testimony that relies on scientific knowledge,” rather than all forms of expert testimony); see also Quintana v. Acosta, 2014-NMCA-015, ¶ 14 , 316 P.3d 912 (noting that the Alberico-Daubert standard applies “only when the district court is evaluating the admissibility of scientific testimony”). “[T]he initial determination of whether to apply the Alberico-Daubert standard entails a conclusion of law that is subject to de novo review.” Torres, 1999-NMSC-0

2018See State v. Torres, 1999- NMSC-010, ¶ 43, 127 N.M. 20 , 976 P.2d 20 (concluding that “the Alberico-[D]aubert standard applies only to expert testimony that relies on scientific knowledge,” rather than all forms of expert testimony); see also Quintana v. Acosta, 2014-NMCA-015, ¶ 14 , 316 P.3d 912 (noting that the Alberico-Daubert standard applies “only when the district court is evaluating the admissibility of scientific testimony”). “[T]he initial determination of whether to apply the Alberico-Daubert standard entails a conclusion of law that is subject to de novo review.” Torres, 1999-NMSC-0

2009The appropriate standard of review, therefore, is that which controls when the Alberico-Daubert standard is applicable. {22} In Alberico, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the requirement set forth in Daubert that the proponent of expert opinion testimony must show that the expert’s opinion has ‘“a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.’ ” Alberico, 116 N.M. at 167, 861 P.2d at 202 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ).

2009The appropriate standard of review, therefore, is that which controls when the Alberico-Daubert standard is applicable. {22} In Alberico, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the requirement set forth in Daubert that the proponent of expert opinion testimony must show that the expert’s opinion has ‘“a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.’ ” Alberico, 116 N.M. at 167, 861 P.2d at 202 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ).

2018Cf. Aleman, 2008-NMCA-137, ¶ 6 (requiring application of the heightened Alberico-Daubert standard to evidence based on scientific knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is not self-explanatory or is based on scientific or medical principles). {28} For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that application of Duran, Bullcoming, and Lopez-Juarez is inapposite here, and that Deputy Armijo’s expert testimony regarding the cause of the apparent rollover in this case is based on scientific knowledge and must be subjected to the heightened Alberico-Daubert standard.

2018Cf. Aleman, 2008-NMCA-137, ¶ 6 (requiring application of the heightened Alberico-Daubert standard to evidence based on scientific knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is not self-explanatory or is based on scientific or medical principles). {28} For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that application of Duran, Bullcoming, and Lopez-Juarez is inapposite here, and that Deputy Armijo’s expert testimony regarding the cause of the apparent rollover in this case is based on scientific knowledge and must be subjected to the heightened Alberico-Daubert standard.

2018We therefore decline to extend Duran’s rationale to the present case. {26} The State also argues that Deputy Armijo’s testimony was not subject to the Alberico- Daubert standard because it was based on his specialized knowledge, citing State v. Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007 , 147 N.M. 487 , 226 P.3d 1 (Bullcoming II), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. by Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (Bullcoming III), and State v. Bullcoming, 2008-NMCA-097 , 144 N.M. 546 , 189 P.3d 679 (Bullcoming I).

2018We therefore decline to extend Duran’s rationale to the present case. {26} The State also argues that Deputy Armijo’s testimony was not subject to the Alberico- Daubert standard because it was based on his specialized knowledge, citing State v. Bullcoming, 2010-NMSC-007 , 147 N.M. 487 , 226 P.3d 1 (Bullcoming II), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. by Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (Bullcoming III), and State v. Bullcoming, 2008-NMCA-097 , 144 N.M. 546 , 189 P.3d 679 (Bullcoming I).

2009The appropriate standard of review, therefore, is that which controls when the Alberico-Daubert standard is applicable. {22} In Alberico, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the requirement set forth in Daubert that the proponent of expert opinion testimony must show that the expert’s opinion has ‘“a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.’ ” Alberico, 116 N.M. at 167, 861 P.2d at 202 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ).

2009The appropriate standard of review, therefore, is that which controls when the Alberico-Daubert standard is applicable. {22} In Alberico, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the requirement set forth in Daubert that the proponent of expert opinion testimony must show that the expert’s opinion has ‘“a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.’ ” Alberico, 116 N.M. at 167, 861 P.2d at 202 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ).

2019Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶¶ 25-26 (affirming the district court’s ruling that “the science underlying the firearm forensic and tool mark analysis techniques . . . was reliable based solely on its finding that this type of science has generally been accepted”). {5} In the case of radar technology, courts across the Unites States have for over six decades recognized “the general reliability of the radar speedmeter as a device for measuring the speed of a moving vehicle, [such] that it will no longer be necessary to require expert testimony in each case as to the nature, function or scientific pri

2019Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶¶ 25-26 (affirming the district court’s ruling that “the science underlying the firearm forensic and tool mark analysis techniques . . . was reliable based solely on its finding that this type of science has generally been accepted”). {5} In the case of radar technology, courts across the Unites States have for over six decades recognized “the general reliability of the radar speedmeter as a device for measuring the speed of a moving vehicle, [such] that it will no longer be necessary to require expert testimony in each case as to the nature, function or scientific pri

2019Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶¶ 25-26 (affirming the district court’s ruling that “the science underlying the firearm forensic and tool mark analysis techniques . . . was reliable based solely on its finding that this type of science has generally been accepted”). {5} In the case of radar technology, courts across the Unites States have for over six decades recognized “the general reliability of the radar speedmeter as a device for measuring the speed of a moving vehicle, [such] that it will no longer be necessary to require expert testimony in each case as to the nature, function or scientific pri

2019Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶¶ 25-26 (affirming the district court’s ruling that “the science underlying the firearm forensic and tool mark analysis techniques . . . was reliable based solely on its finding that this type of science has generally been accepted”). {5} In the case of radar technology, courts across the Unites States have for over six decades recognized “the general reliability of the radar speedmeter as a device for measuring the speed of a moving vehicle, [such] that it will no longer be necessary to require expert testimony in each case as to the nature, function or scientific pri

2019Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶¶ 25-26 (affirming the district court’s ruling that “the science underlying the firearm forensic and tool mark analysis techniques . . . was reliable based solely on its finding that this type of science has generally been accepted”). {5} In the case of radar technology, courts across the Unites States have for over six decades recognized “the general reliability of the radar speedmeter as a device for measuring the speed of a moving vehicle, [such] that it will no longer be necessary to require expert testimony in each case as to the nature, function or scientific pri

2018See Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 43 (concluding that the Alberico-Daubert standard applies only to “expert testimony that relies on scientific knowledge,” rather than all forms of expert testimony); see also Lente, 2005-NMCA-111 , ¶ 3 12 (noting that a district “court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion based on a misunderstanding of the law”).

2018See Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 43 (concluding that the Alberico-Daubert standard applies only to “expert testimony that relies on scientific knowledge,” rather than all forms of expert testimony); see also Lente, 2005-NMCA-111 , ¶ 3 12 (noting that a district “court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion based on a misunderstanding of the law”).

2018“Evidence is based on scientific knowledge if it is not self-explanatory, or if it is based on a scientific or medical principle.” State v. Aleman, 2008-NMCA-137 , ¶ 6, 145 N.M. 79 , 194 P.3d 110 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Bregar, 2017-NMCA-028 , ¶¶ 32-33, 390 P.3d 212 (noting that expert testimony involving the use of physics equations is based on scientific knowledge); cf. State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 754 (Or. 1984) (en banc) (“The term ‘scientific’ . . . refers to evidence that draws its convincing force from some principle of science, mathematics and the

2018“Evidence is based on scientific knowledge if it is not self-explanatory, or if it is based on a scientific or medical principle.” State v. Aleman, 2008-NMCA-137 , ¶ 6, 145 N.M. 79 , 194 P.3d 110 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Bregar, 2017-NMCA-028 , ¶¶ 32-33, 390 P.3d 212 (noting that expert testimony involving the use of physics equations is based on scientific knowledge); cf. State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 754 (Or. 1984) (en banc) (“The term ‘scientific’ . . . refers to evidence that draws its convincing force from some principle of science, mathematics and the

1999See State v. Meador, 674 So.2d 826, 833-34 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (noting that a minority of states have concluded that the HGN test is not based on scientific expertise, while the majority have concluded that the results of HGN testing are scientific evidence); State v. Merritt, 36 Conn.App. 76 , 647 A.2d 1021, 1026-28 (1994) (same); State v. Ruthardt, 680 A.2d 349, 355-56 (Del.Super.Ct.1996) (same).

1999See State v. Meador, 674 So.2d 826, 833-34 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (noting that a minority of states have concluded that the HGN test is not based on scientific expertise, while the majority have concluded that the results of HGN testing are scientific evidence); State v. Merritt, 36 Conn.App. 76 , 647 A.2d 1021, 1026-28 (1994) (same); State v. Ruthardt, 680 A.2d 349, 355-56 (Del.Super.Ct.1996) (same).

1999See State v. Meador, 674 So.2d 826, 833-34 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (noting that a minority of states have concluded that the HGN test is not based on scientific expertise, while the majority have concluded that the results of HGN testing are scientific evidence); State v. Merritt, 36 Conn.App. 76 , 647 A.2d 1021, 1026-28 (1994) (same); State v. Ruthardt, 680 A.2d 349, 355-56 (Del.Super.Ct.1996) (same).

1999See State v. Meador, 674 So.2d 826, 833-34 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (noting that a minority of states have concluded that the HGN test is not based on scientific expertise, while the majority have concluded that the results of HGN testing are scientific evidence); State v. Merritt, 36 Conn.App. 76 , 647 A.2d 1021, 1026-28 (1994) (same); State v. Ruthardt, 680 A.2d 349, 355-56 (Del.Super.Ct.1996) (same).

1999See State v. Meador, 674 So.2d 826, 833-34 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (noting that a minority of states have concluded that the HGN test is not based on scientific expertise, while the majority have concluded that the results of HGN testing are scientific evidence); State v. Merritt, 36 Conn.App. 76 , 647 A.2d 1021, 1026-28 (1994) (same); State v. Ruthardt, 680 A.2d 349, 355-56 (Del.Super.Ct.1996) (same).

1999See State v. Meador, 674 So.2d 826, 833-34 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) (noting that a minority of states have concluded that the HGN test is not based on scientific expertise, while the majority have concluded that the results of HGN testing are scientific evidence); State v. Merritt, 36 Conn.App. 76 , 647 A.2d 1021, 1026-28 (1994) (same); State v. Ruthardt, 680 A.2d 349, 355-56 (Del.Super.Ct.1996) (same).

1999See Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362 , 367 n. 2 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ).

1999See Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362 , 367 n. 2 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ).