8 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Murphy v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewalgreen1 sentence2017Furthermore, petitioner’s claim that even if she was not included on the income affidavit forms, the evidence of her residency in the apartment is overwhelming, is unavailing (compare Matter of Murphy v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 21 NY3d 649, 655 [2013]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. O'HARAgreen2 sentences2016Glickman appeals and objectors -3- 523489 cross appeal.1 NY Constitution, article III, § 7 provides, in relevant part: "No person shall serve as a member of the legislature unless he or she is a citizen of the United States and has been a resident of the state of New York for five years, and, except as hereinafter otherwise prescribed, of the assembly or senate district for the [12] months immediately preceding his or her election." Election Law § 1-104 (22) defines residence as "that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home and to which he [or she], wherever tempor 2016Glickman appeals and objectors cross appeal. 1 NY Constitution, article III, § 7 provides, in relevant part: “No person shall serve as a member of the legislature unless he or she is a citizen of the United States and has been a resident of the state of New York for five years, and, except as hereinafter otherwise prescribed, of the assembly or senate district for the [12] months immediately preceding his or her election.” Election Law § 1-104 (22) defines residence as “that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home and to which he [or she], wherever temporarily loca | 1 | 1 |
Mogk v. City of Detroitgreen1 sentence2003The right to run for public office (“a person has a constitutionally protected right to be considered for public office without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications” [Mogk v City of Detroit, 335 F Supp 698, 701 (1971)]); 5. | 1 | 1 |
Robertson v. Bartelsgreen1 sentence2003The right to vote (“The fundamental right which is threatened by the one year residency requirement * * * is the combined right of persons to run for public office and the right of voters to vote for candidates of their choice” [Robertson v Bartels, 150 F Supp 2d 691, 696 (2001)]); 4. | 1 | 1 |
Corr v. Westchester County Department of Social Servicesgreen2 sentences1976(See, also, Memorial Hosp. v Maricopa County, 415 US 250 ; Matter of Corr v Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs., 33 NY2d 111 , supra; Matter of Dillingham v Lavine, 48 AD2d 657 .) Although ordinarily a patient or inmate of an institution retains the domicile he had when he entered the institution, where, as here, "the inmate pays his own way, is free to come and go, and has no other place of abode, his conduct may show an intent to establish the institution as his permanent home or domicile” (Matter of Corr v Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs., supra, p 116). 1976(See, also, Memorial Hosp. v Maricopa County, 415 US 250 ; Matter of Corr v Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs., 33 NY2d 111 , supra; Matter of Dillingham v Lavine, 48 AD2d 657 .) Although ordinarily a patient or inmate of an institution retains the domicile he had when he entered the institution, where, as here, "the inmate pays his own way, is free to come and go, and has no other place of abode, his conduct may show an intent to establish the institution as his permanent home or domicile” (Matter of Corr v Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs., supra, p 116). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ortiz v. Rhea
green
1 sentence2017Despite petitioner’s assertion that she brought the 2011 income affidavit and a permanent residence request form to her grandmother in the hospital, the fact that her grandmother passed away several weeks later precludes a finding that petitioner was able to satisfy the one-year residency requirement necessary to establish succession rights (see Matter of Ortiz v Rhea, 127 AD3d 665 [1st Dept 2015]). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Capdevilla v. Capdevilla
green
1 sentence2007Plaintiff was able to meet the one-year residency requirement (Domestic Relations Law § 230 [2]; Capdevilla v Capdevilla, 149 AD2d 312 [1989]). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Pezza v. Pezza
green
1 sentence2007In determining the amount of child support and maintenance to be awarded, the court was free to find that defendant’s actual income was greater than he had reported in documents submitted to the court (see Pezza v Pezza, 300 AD2d 555 [2002]). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Reeves v. Reeves
neutral
1 sentence1995While the court properly dismissed the divorce action for plaintiff’s failure to meet the one year residency requirement pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 230, it retained jurisdiction to determine incidental questions of support (see, Reeves v Reeves, 57 AD2d 661, 662 , lv dismissed 42 NY2d 802 ), maintenance and other expenses, and accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to convert the action into a support proceeding under article 4 of the Family Court Act (see, Goldman v Goldman, 132 Misc 2d 870 , affd 124 AD2d 1079 ; cf., Parker v Mack, 61 NY2d 114 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Goldman v. Goldman
green
1 sentence1995While the court properly dismissed the divorce action for plaintiff’s failure to meet the one year residency requirement pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 230, it retained jurisdiction to determine incidental questions of support (see, Reeves v Reeves, 57 AD2d 661, 662 , lv dismissed 42 NY2d 802 ), maintenance and other expenses, and accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to convert the action into a support proceeding under article 4 of the Family Court Act (see, Goldman v Goldman, 132 Misc 2d 870 , affd 124 AD2d 1079 ; cf., Parker v Mack, 61 NY2d 114 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Parker v. Mack
green
1 sentence1995While the court properly dismissed the divorce action for plaintiff’s failure to meet the one year residency requirement pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 230, it retained jurisdiction to determine incidental questions of support (see, Reeves v Reeves, 57 AD2d 661, 662 , lv dismissed 42 NY2d 802 ), maintenance and other expenses, and accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to convert the action into a support proceeding under article 4 of the Family Court Act (see, Goldman v Goldman, 132 Misc 2d 870 , affd 124 AD2d 1079 ; cf., Parker v Mack, 61 NY2d 114 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Joseph v. City of Birmingham
green
1 sentence1990Further, we conclude that the one-year residency requirement is constitutional (see, Joseph v City of Birmingham, 510 F Supp 1319 ; Annotation, Validity of Requirement that Candidate or Public Officer have been Resident of Governmental Unit for Specified Period, 65 ALR3d 1048, § 22, at 1091-1093). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Campbell v. Barraud
green
2 sentences1983From a careful analysis of the decision in Campbell (supra), it is apparent that the court, in sustaining the Brookhaven ordinance which limited occupancy of the zoning district to persons 55 years of age or older, found, among other things, the following: (1) such a provision was essential in order to achieve the purpose of the planned retirement community; and (2) the restriction did not violate equal protection because age is not a “suspect” criterion and classification based upon age rationally furthers a legitimate objective of the State, i.e., providing for the housing needs of the elder 1983In the view of this court, it would be appropriate to apply a similar analysis as set forth in Campbell (supra) as affects the 55-year age limit, to the one-year residency requirement in thé North Hempstead ordinance which is under attack before this court. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Dillingham v. Lavine
green
1 sentence1976(See, also, Memorial Hosp. v Maricopa County, 415 US 250 ; Matter of Corr v Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs., 33 NY2d 111 , supra; Matter of Dillingham v Lavine, 48 AD2d 657 .) Although ordinarily a patient or inmate of an institution retains the domicile he had when he entered the institution, where, as here, "the inmate pays his own way, is free to come and go, and has no other place of abode, his conduct may show an intent to establish the institution as his permanent home or domicile” (Matter of Corr v Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs., supra, p 116). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Shapiro v. Thompson
green
1 sentence1976The implication in the decision under review that a one-year residency requirement, excluding residency in an institution, could be imposed upon the petitioner ignores the clear prohibition against any such requirement contained in Shapiro v Thompson ( 394 US 618 ). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County
green
1 sentence1976(See, also, Memorial Hosp. v Maricopa County, 415 US 250 ; Matter of Corr v Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs., 33 NY2d 111 , supra; Matter of Dillingham v Lavine, 48 AD2d 657 .) Although ordinarily a patient or inmate of an institution retains the domicile he had when he entered the institution, where, as here, "the inmate pays his own way, is free to come and go, and has no other place of abode, his conduct may show an intent to establish the institution as his permanent home or domicile” (Matter of Corr v Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs., supra, p 116). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.