6 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Millergreen2 sentences2019The husband's presence at the hearing was waived by the judge, and the husband's counsel filed a special appearance for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction. 11"The burden is on the party asserting jurisdiction to prove jurisdictional facts." Miller v. Miller, 448 Mass. 320, 325 (2007). 8 Auburn, Inc., 366 Mass. 182, 190 (1974), we think the plain language of § 5 indicates the Legislature's intent to treat residence and domicil as distinct concepts for purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction over divorce actions.12 The concept of domicil, as it is used in § 5, has been defined i 2010The court in Miller v. Miller, 448 Mass. 320 , 325 n.9 (2007), citing Caffyn v. Caffyn, 441 Mass. 487 , 491 n.10 (2004), determined the issue of jurisdiction while noting that the plaintiff “now has satisfied the alternative one-year residency requirement” and could file a divorce complaint. | 1 | 2 |
Dunn v. Blumsteingreen2 sentences2007See Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (finding a one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits violated equal protection), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-60 (1972) (finding a one-year residency requirement to exercise the right to vote violated equal protection); Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 269-70 (holding a one-year residency requirement to receive free non-emergency medical case violated equal protection). 1985Only those statutes resulting in some significant effect on the right to travel will be deemed “penalties.” Examples of such “penalties” include a one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits (Shapiro v. Thompson, supra); a one-year residency requirement to exercise the right to vote (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 [1972]); a one-year residency requirement to receive free nonemergency medical care (MemorialHosp. v. Maricopa County, supra); a two-year residency requirement to use the *531 State’s courts for divorce (Fiorentino v. Probate Court, 365 Mass. 13 [1974]). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Figueroagreen1 sentence2019See also Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 368 (2013) ("Under well-established principles of statutory construction, 'a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated'"). 13 Whether a plaintiff has maintained an actual, | 1 | 1 |
Holmes v. Holmesgreen1 sentence2019See Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653, 659 (2014) (statutory language is clearest indication of legislative intent). 13Although the Supreme Judicial Court struck down as unconstitutional a prior version of § 5, containing a two-year 9 however, have yet to define the parameters of the one-year residency requirement under § 5. | 1 | 1 |
Shepard v. Finance Associates of Auburn, Inc.green1 sentence2019The husband's presence at the hearing was waived by the judge, and the husband's counsel filed a special appearance for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction. 11"The burden is on the party asserting jurisdiction to prove jurisdictional facts." Miller v. Miller, 448 Mass. 320, 325 (2007). 8 Auburn, Inc., 366 Mass. 182, 190 (1974), we think the plain language of § 5 indicates the Legislature's intent to treat residence and domicil as distinct concepts for purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction over divorce actions.12 The concept of domicil, as it is used in § 5, has been defined i | 1 | 1 |
Lori Noel Meyer v. Patrick W. Meyergreen1 sentence2019See Meyer, 68 A.3d at 583 ("a finding that a plaintiff . . . had resided within the [S]tate for the requisite period of time is a finding of fact"). | 1 | 1 |
Chin v. Merriotgreen1 sentence2019See also Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 368 (2013) ("Under well-established principles of statutory construction, 'a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated'"). 13 Whether a plaintiff has maintained an actual, | 1 | 1 |
Shapiro v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2007See Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (finding a one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits violated equal protection), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-60 (1972) (finding a one-year residency requirement to exercise the right to vote violated equal protection); Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 269-70 (holding a one-year residency requirement to receive free non-emergency medical case violated equal protection). | 1 | 1 |
Edelman v. Jordangreen1 sentence2007See Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (finding a one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits violated equal protection), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-60 (1972) (finding a one-year residency requirement to exercise the right to vote violated equal protection); Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 269-70 (holding a one-year residency requirement to receive free non-emergency medical case violated equal protection). | 1 | 1 |
Lockhart v. Attorney Generalgreen1 sentence2004See Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 780, 782-783 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Sosna v. Iowagreen2 sentences1985Id. at 76 . 7 But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 , 406-407 (1975), where the Supreme Court did not invoke the penalty analysis to uphold a one-year residency requirement for access to a State’s divorce courts, but instead applied “what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test.” Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 8 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1984, 493 & 746 (104th ed. 1983) (prices of one-family houses in northeastern United States rose by approximately 20% more than the consumer price index from 1970 to 1981). 9 The plaintiffs argue that 1985Id. at 76 . 7 But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 , 406-407 (1975), where the Supreme Court did not invoke the penalty analysis to uphold a one-year residency requirement for access to a State’s divorce courts, but instead applied “what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test.” Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 8 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1984, 493 & 746 (104th ed. 1983) (prices of one-family houses in northeastern United States rose by approximately 20% more than the consumer price index from 1970 to 1981). 9 The plaintiffs argue that | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Caffyn v. Caffyn
green
2 sentences2019L. c. 208, § 1B, occurred in Massachusetts." Caffyn, supra at 487 .3 Here, we are faced with [C]ommonwealth at the time when the cause occurred." G. 2010The court in Miller v. Miller, 448 Mass. 320 , 325 n.9 (2007), citing Caffyn v. Caffyn, 441 Mass. 487 , 491 n.10 (2004), determined the issue of jurisdiction while noting that the plaintiff “now has satisfied the alternative one-year residency requirement” and could file a divorce complaint. | 3 | 2007–2019 |
Fiorentino v. Probate Court
green
2 sentences2019The husband's presence at the hearing was waived by the judge, and the husband's counsel filed a special appearance for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction. 11"The burden is on the party asserting jurisdiction to prove jurisdictional facts." Miller v. Miller, 448 Mass. 320, 325 (2007). 8 Auburn, Inc., 366 Mass. 182, 190 (1974), we think the plain language of § 5 indicates the Legislature's intent to treat residence and domicil as distinct concepts for purposes of establishing subject matter jurisdiction over divorce actions.12 The concept of domicil, as it is used in § 5, has been defined i 1985Only those statutes resulting in some significant effect on the right to travel will be deemed “penalties.” Examples of such “penalties” include a one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits (Shapiro v. Thompson, supra); a one-year residency requirement to exercise the right to vote (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 [1972]); a one-year residency requirement to receive free nonemergency medical care (MemorialHosp. v. Maricopa County, supra); a two-year residency requirement to use the *531 State’s courts for divorce (Fiorentino v. Probate Court, 365 Mass. 13 [1974]). | 2 | 1985–2019 |
Lee v. Commissioner of Revenue
green
1 sentence2007“Any expense imposed on citizens crossing state lines but not imposed on those staying put could theoretically be deemed a penalty on travel; the toll exacted from persons crossing from Delaware to New Jersey by the Delaware Memorial Bridge is a ‘penalty’ on interstate travel in the most literal sense of all.” Lee, 395 Mass. at 531 , quoting Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 284. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County
green
1 sentence1985Only those statutes resulting in some significant effect on the right to travel will be deemed “penalties.” Examples of such “penalties” include a one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits (Shapiro v. Thompson, supra); a one-year residency requirement to exercise the right to vote (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 [1972]); a one-year residency requirement to receive free nonemergency medical care (MemorialHosp. v. Maricopa County, supra); a two-year residency requirement to use the *531 State’s courts for divorce (Fiorentino v. Probate Court, 365 Mass. 13 [1974]). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Zobel v. Williams
green
1 sentence1985Id. at 76 . 7 But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 , 406-407 (1975), where the Supreme Court did not invoke the penalty analysis to uphold a one-year residency requirement for access to a State’s divorce courts, but instead applied “what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test.” Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 8 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1984, 493 & 746 (104th ed. 1983) (prices of one-family houses in northeastern United States rose by approximately 20% more than the consumer price index from 1970 to 1981). 9 The plaintiffs argue that | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.