one-year residency requirement in California

1992The court flatly stated that this objective “is not a legitimate state purpose.” (Zobel, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 63 [ 72 L.Ed.2d at p. 679 ].) The court quoted its earlier decision in Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 632-633 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 614 , 89 S.Ct. 2465 ], striking down a one-year residency requirement for receipt of welfare benefits: “ ‘Appellants’ reasoning would . . . permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax [or intangible] contributions of its citizens.

1992The court flatly stated that this objective “is not a legitimate state purpose.” (Zobel, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 63 [ 72 L.Ed.2d at p. 679 ].) The court quoted its earlier decision in Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 632-633 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 614 , 89 S.Ct. 2465 ], striking down a one-year residency requirement for receipt of welfare benefits: “ ‘Appellants’ reasoning would . . . permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax [or intangible] contributions of its citizens.

1978However, in Thompson, supra, 9 Cal.3d 96, the California Supreme Court found an entirely new and independent basis for applying the strict scrutiny test in analyzing durational residency *968 requirements—namely, the penalizing effect that such restrictions have upon the fundamental right to travel. (9 Cal.3d at pp. 101-102.) In Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. 330 , relied upon by Thompson , the United States Supreme Court made it clear that durational residence requirements directly impinge upon the personal right of travel, which has been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right.

1975If the purpose of a year's residence requirement for voting is to assure that the voter has an interest in the election outcome, that requirement is also too drastic since the state may ascertain in other ways that the voter is a bona fide member of the community. ( Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. at p. 352 [31 L.Ed.2d at pp. 289-290].) If the state wishes to determine the competence of its teachers, it cannot do so by requiring them to list all organizations to which they belong, since investigation of their competence in the classroom would be a more direct and less intrusive method of re

2001(Id. at p. 440, 78 Cal.Rptr. 260 .) Another relevant decision cited in Saenz is Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, supra, 436 U.S. at pages 390-391, 98 S.Ct. 1852 .

1992The court flatly stated that this objective “is not a legitimate state purpose.” (Zobel, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 63 [ 72 L.Ed.2d at p. 679 ].) The court quoted its earlier decision in Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 632-633 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 614 , 89 S.Ct. 2465 ], striking down a one-year residency requirement for receipt of welfare benefits: “ ‘Appellants’ reasoning would . . . permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax [or intangible] contributions of its citizens.

1992The court flatly stated that this objective “is not a legitimate state purpose.” (Zobel, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 63 [ 72 L.Ed.2d at p. 679 ].) The court quoted its earlier decision in Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 632-633 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 614 , 89 S.Ct. 2465 ], striking down a one-year residency requirement for receipt of welfare benefits: “ ‘Appellants’ reasoning would . . . permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax [or intangible] contributions of its citizens.

1974In considering the merits we must examine both the rights of the accused in the underlying criminal case and the interests of those who, after residing in the county less than one year, are excluded from jury service. (2a) The accused's right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers is not infringed by a one-year residency requirement for jurors. (3) The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 100 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 ], explained that the jury impartiality provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution require the jury selection pro

1974In considering the merits we must examine both the rights of the accused in the underlying criminal case and the interests of those who, after residing in the county less than one year, are excluded from jury service. (2a) The accused's right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers is not infringed by a one-year residency requirement for jurors. (3) The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 100 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 ], explained that the jury impartiality provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution require the jury selection pro

1974In considering the merits we must examine both the rights of the accused in the underlying criminal case and the interests of those who, after residing in the county less than one year, are excluded from jury service. (2a) The accused's right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers is not infringed by a one-year residency requirement for jurors. (3) The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 100 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 ], explained that the jury impartiality provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution require the jury selection pro

1974In considering the merits we must examine both the rights of the accused in the underlying criminal case and the interests of those who, after residing in the county less than one year, are excluded from jury service. (2a) The accused's right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers is not infringed by a one-year residency requirement for jurors. (3) The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 100 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 ], explained that the jury impartiality provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution require the jury selection pro

1974The accused’s right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers is not infringed by a one-year residency requirement for jurors. (3) The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 100 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 ], explained that the jury impartiality provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution require the jury selection process to provide a “fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community.” The process of selection must be structured to insure that cognizable classes of citizens are not systematically excluded f

1974The accused’s right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers is not infringed by a one-year residency requirement for jurors. (3) The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 100 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 ], explained that the jury impartiality provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution require the jury selection process to provide a “fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community.” The process of selection must be structured to insure that cognizable classes of citizens are not systematically excluded f

1974(United States v. Olson (8th Cir. 1973) 473 F.2d 686, 688 ; People v. Holland (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 530, 533-540 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 523 ].) We are satisfied the defendant’s right to an impartial jury is not impaired by the one-year residency requirement.

1974(United States v. Olson (8th Cir. 1973) 473 F.2d 686, 688 ; People v. Holland (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 530, 533-540 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 523 ].) We are satisfied the defendant’s right to an impartial jury is not impaired by the one-year residency requirement.

1974(United States v. Moss (9th Cir. 1972) 468 F.2d 1213, 1215-1216 ; United States v. Dupcan (9th Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 1401, 1406 , vacated on other grounds in 409 U.S. 814 [ 34 L.Ed.2d 72 , 93 S.Ct. 161 ].) Moreover, in some cases jurors will be instructed to apply a local standard (Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 419, 434-436 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 ]), making.it important to obtain persons who have had time to become familiar with the. community.

1974(United States v. Moss (9th Cir. 1972) 468 F.2d 1213, 1215-1216 ; United States v. Dupcan (9th Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 1401, 1406 , vacated on other grounds in 409 U.S. 814 [ 34 L.Ed.2d 72 , 93 S.Ct. 161 ].) Moreover, in some cases jurors will be instructed to apply a local standard (Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 419, 434-436 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 ]), making.it important to obtain persons who have had time to become familiar with the. community.