one-year residency requirement in Texas

1985Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), is a landmark case in which the United States Supreme Court nullified statutory provisions which conditioned eligibility for welfare benefits on a one-year residency requirement which had a chilling effect on interstate travel.

1985Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). is a landmark case in which the United States Supreme Cour: nullified statutory provisions vhich conditioned eligibility for welfare benefits on a one-year residency requirement which had a chillings effect on interstate travel.

1985In Smith v. Paulk, 705 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1983), the court held unconstitutional a requirement that private employment agency license applicants be residents of the state for one year preceding such application because it penalized the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate migration and was not justified by compelling state interest.

1985In Smith v. Paulk. 705 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1983). the court held unconstitutional a requirement that private emploment agency license applicants be residents of the state for one year preceding such epplicat~lon because it penalized the exercise of the conetitutional r<ght of $nterstate migration and vse not justified by compelling state interest.

1985In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Supreme Court struck down a one-year durational residency requirement for voting in elections because the state was penalizing persons who had exercised their constitutionally protected right to interstate travel.

1985In Dunn v. Blumeteln~ 405 U.S. 330 (1972). the Supreme Court struck d= one-year durational residency requirament for voting in elections because the state uas penalizing persons who had exercised their conetitutionally protected right to interstate travel.

1989Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F.Supp. 391 (N.D.Miss.1971), is a case not previously considered, cited in the conclusions of law and in the briefs for the proposition that any state classification in connection with the right to apply for a law license must “have a rational connection with an applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice,” holding that a one year residency requirement before an applicant could apply to take the bar examination was too long and therefore unconstitutional.

1980Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, wrote: “The State’s decision to exact a one-year residency requirement as a matter of policy is therefore buttressed by a quite permissible inference that this requirement not only effectuates state substantive policy but likewise provides a greater safeguard against successful collateral attack than would a requirement of bona fide residence alone.” ( 419 U.S. at 408 , 95 S.Ct. at 561 ) See also, Makres v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577, 579 (5th Cir. 1974), affirming 359 F.Supp. 1225 (M.D.Fla.1973).

1980Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, wrote: “The State’s decision to exact a one-year residency requirement as a matter of policy is therefore buttressed by a quite permissible inference that this requirement not only effectuates state substantive policy but likewise provides a greater safeguard against successful collateral attack than would a requirement of bona fide residence alone.” ( 419 U.S. at 408 , 95 S.Ct. at 561 ) See also, Makres v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577, 579 (5th Cir. 1974), affirming 359 F.Supp. 1225 (M.D.Fla.1973).

1980Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, wrote: “The State’s decision to exact a one-year residency requirement as a matter of policy is therefore buttressed by a quite permissible inference that this requirement not only effectuates state substantive policy but likewise provides a greater safeguard against successful collateral attack than would a requirement of bona fide residence alone.” ( 419 U.S. at 408 , 95 S.Ct. at 561 ) See also, Makres v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577, 579 (5th Cir. 1974), affirming 359 F.Supp. 1225 (M.D.Fla.1973).

1978Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).