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8 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1953–1986 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Oskroba
green
2 sentences1965Kuney v. Adams, supra), but “ it would seem elemental that the term contemplates notice to the probationer of the violation charged, with an opportunity to attack or deny the charge ” (People v. Oskroba, supra, p. 117 ). 1962It has been held that this section contemplates notice to the probationer of the violation charged with an opportunity to attack or deny the charge, but there is no requirement of formal procedure (People v. Oskroba, 305 N. Y. 113, 117 ). | 4 | 1959–1973 |
Matter of Long
green
2 sentences1966However, it would seem elemental that the term contemplates notice to the probationer of the violation charged, with an opportunity to attack or deny the charge (Matter of Long, 287 N. Y. 449 ; People ex rel. 1953However, it would seem elemental that the term contemplates notice to the probationer of the violation charged, with an opportunity to attack or deny the charge (Matter of Long, 287 N. Y. 449 ; People ex rel. | 2 | 1953–1966 |
People ex rel. Benaquista v. Blanchard
neutral
2 sentences1966Benacquista v. Blanchard, 267 App. Div. 663 ; People ex rel. 1953Benacquista v. Blanchard, 267 App. Div. 663 ; People ex rel. | 2 | 1953–1966 |
People v. Crimmins
green
1 sentence1986The prosecution witness’s allusion to the fact that the defendant was a probationer was also error, but, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, this error was harmless (see, People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 ). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Medina
green
1 sentence1986The defendant’s other contentions are either unpreserved (see, People v Medina, 53 NY2d 951, 953 ), or without merit (see, People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Suitte
green
1 sentence1986The defendant’s other contentions are either unpreserved (see, People v Medina, 53 NY2d 951, 953 ), or without merit (see, People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 ). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1982Cf. People v. Gilmore, 63 A.D.2d 45 , 407 N.Y.S.2d 48 (2nd Dept. 1978).” (See, also, People v Roesler, 102 Misc 2d 858 .) In People v Johnson ( 43 AD2d 878, 879 ), the court pointed out that common sense tells us that we must reject the proposition that a probationer receive credit against a subsequent jail sentence for any time served on probation, on the reasoning that once a defendant on three years’ probation committed any violation after one year he would do so with impunity since the maximum sentence he could receive is one year and the credit for probation would eliminate that year’s po | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Gilmore
green
2 sentences1982Cf. People v. Gilmore, 63 A.D.2d 45 , 407 N.Y.S.2d 48 (2nd Dept. 1978).” (See, also, People v Roesler, 102 Misc 2d 858 .) In People v Johnson ( 43 AD2d 878, 879 ), the court pointed out that common sense tells us that we must reject the proposition that a probationer receive credit against a subsequent jail sentence for any time served on probation, on the reasoning that once a defendant on three years’ probation committed any violation after one year he would do so with impunity since the maximum sentence he could receive is one year and the credit for probation would eliminate that year’s po 1982Cf. People v. Gilmore, 63 A.D.2d 45 , 407 N.Y.S.2d 48 (2nd Dept. 1978).” (See, also, People v Roesler, 102 Misc 2d 858 .) In People v Johnson ( 43 AD2d 878, 879 ), the court pointed out that common sense tells us that we must reject the proposition that a probationer receive credit against a subsequent jail sentence for any time served on probation, on the reasoning that once a defendant on three years’ probation committed any violation after one year he would do so with impunity since the maximum sentence he could receive is one year and the credit for probation would eliminate that year’s po | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Roesler
green
1 sentence1982Cf. People v. Gilmore, 63 A.D.2d 45 , 407 N.Y.S.2d 48 (2nd Dept. 1978).” (See, also, People v Roesler, 102 Misc 2d 858 .) In People v Johnson ( 43 AD2d 878, 879 ), the court pointed out that common sense tells us that we must reject the proposition that a probationer receive credit against a subsequent jail sentence for any time served on probation, on the reasoning that once a defendant on three years’ probation committed any violation after one year he would do so with impunity since the maximum sentence he could receive is one year and the credit for probation would eliminate that year’s po | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People Ex Rel. Kuney, Sauter v. Adams
neutral
1 sentence1965Kuney v. Adams, supra), but “ it would seem elemental that the term contemplates notice to the probationer of the violation charged, with an opportunity to attack or deny the charge ” (People v. Oskroba, supra, p. 117 ). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.