race-neutral reason challenge in New York

2022Initially, because the prosecutor offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge and County Court thereafter "ruled on the ultimate issue" of discriminatory intent, the issue of the sufficiency of defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination under step one of the Batson analysis is moot ( Smocum , 99 NY2d at 423 ; see People v Bridgeforth , 28 NY3d 567 , 575 n 2 [2016]; People v Jiles , 158 AD3d 75 , 78 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 31 NY3d 1149 [2018]).

2020Inasmuch as the prosecutor offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge and the court thereafter "ruled on the ultimate issue" by determining, albeit implicitly, that those reasons were not pretextual, the issue of the sufficiency of defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination at step one of the Batson test is moot ( People v Smocum , 99 NY2d 418, 423 [2003]; see People v Jiles , 158 AD3d 75 , 78 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 31 NY3d 1149 [2018]; cf. People v Bridgeforth , 28 NY3d 567, 575-576 [2016]).

2022Initially, because the prosecutor offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge and County Court thereafter "ruled on the ultimate issue" of discriminatory intent, the issue of the sufficiency of defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination under step one of the Batson analysis is moot ( Smocum , 99 NY2d at 423 ; see People v Bridgeforth , 28 NY3d 567 , 575 n 2 [2016]; People v Jiles , 158 AD3d 75 , 78 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 31 NY3d 1149 [2018]).

2020Inasmuch as the prosecutor offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge and the court thereafter "ruled on the ultimate issue" by determining, albeit implicitly, that those reasons were not pretextual, the issue of the sufficiency of defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination at step one of the Batson test is moot ( People v Smocum , 99 NY2d 418, 423 [2003]; see People v Jiles , 158 AD3d 75 , 78 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 31 NY3d 1149 [2018]; cf. People v Bridgeforth , 28 NY3d 567, 575-576 [2016]).

2003Defense counsel’s response, that the juror stated that she could make such an assessment, is not supported by the record and, thus, defendant did not meet his ultimate burden of demonstrating that the People’s race-neutral explanation was pretextual (see People v Smocum, supra at 422; People v Allen, 86 NY2d 101, 111 [1995]).

1997When a Batson challenge is raised, a three-step process is followed: (1) the party objecting to the peremptory challenge must establish a prima facie showing that the juror was struck for an impermissible discriminatory reason; (2) the burden then shifts to the proponent of the challenge to offer a race-neutral reason for the challenge; and (3) the burden shifts back to the party objecting to the challenge to persuade the court that the proffered reason was pretextual (see, People v Payne, 88 NY2d 172, 181 ; People v Allen, 86 NY2d 101, 104 ).

2020Contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that the court properly determined at step two that the People met their burden of offering a facially race-neutral explanation for the challenge ( see People v Lee , 80 AD3d 877, 879 [3d Dept 2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 833 [2011]).

2012Accordingly, we would hold the appeal in abeyance to afford the People the opportunity to establish nonpretextual reasons for the initial challenges at an evidentiary hearing (see People v Battle, 299 AD2d at 416 ; People v Ramirez, 295 AD2d at 542 ; People v Pagano, 207 AD2d 685 [1994]).

2012As the Batson challenge was timely made, Supreme Court erred in only requiring the People to provide a race-neutral reason for the challenge to the third juror (see People v Perez, 37 AD3d 152, 154 [2007]; People v Battle, 299 AD2d 416 [2002]; People v Ramirez, 295 AD2d 542, 542 [2002]).

2012As the Batson challenge was timely made, Supreme Court erred in only requiring the People to provide a race-neutral reason for the challenge to the third juror (see People v Perez, 37 AD3d 152, 154 [2007]; People v Battle, 299 AD2d 416 [2002]; People v Ramirez, 295 AD2d 542, 542 [2002]).

2004The record supports the court’s determination that defendant did not make the necessary prima facie showing (see People v Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 507-508 [2002]).

2003We conclude that the People then met their burden under step two of the Batson inquiry when they proffered a race-neutral reason for their challenge, explaining that the juror stated that she would have difficulty making a decision if the matter turned on the credibility of one witness over another (see generally People v King, 277 AD2d 708, 709-710 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 802 [2001]; People v Williamson [Maleek], 267 AD2d 487, 488-489 [1999], lvs denied 94 NY2d 882 , 886 [2000]).

2003We conclude that the People then met their burden under step two of the Batson inquiry when they proffered a race-neutral reason for their challenge, explaining that the juror stated that she would have difficulty making a decision if the matter turned on the credibility of one witness over another (see generally People v King, 277 AD2d 708, 709-710 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 802 [2001]; People v Williamson [Maleek], 267 AD2d 487, 488-489 [1999], lvs denied 94 NY2d 882 , 886 [2000]).

2001Defendant failed to present a prima facie case by establishing the existence of “facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race” (People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263, 266 ; see also, People v Cousin, 272 AD2d 477, 478 , lv denied 95 NY2d 851 ), and thus the burden never shifted to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral reason for the challenge (see, People v Childress, supra, at 266).

2001Defendant failed to present a prima facie case by establishing the existence of “facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race” (People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263, 266 ; see also, People v Cousin, 272 AD2d 477, 478 , lv denied 95 NY2d 851 ), and thus the burden never shifted to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral reason for the challenge (see, People v Childress, supra, at 266).

2001Defendant failed to present a prima facie case by establishing the existence of “facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their race” (People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263, 266 ; see also, People v Cousin, 272 AD2d 477, 478 , lv denied 95 NY2d 851 ), and thus the burden never shifted to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral reason for the challenge (see, People v Childress, supra, at 266).