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8 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1894–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clements v. Skate 9H Realty, Inc.green1 sentence2006Since the situation presented at bar falls squarely within this rule, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Marcano v City of New York, 99 NY2d 548, 549 [2002] [“(p)laintiff assumed the risk of injury when he swung on, and subsequently fell off, an exercise apparatus constructed over a concrete floor”]; Dobert v State of New York, supra at 874 [plaintiff bicyclist assumed risk of injury from slight depression in roadway which she acknowledged was “readily observable”]; LaSalvia v City of New York, 305 AD2d 267, 267 [2003] [“plaintiff assumed the risks in | 1 | 1 |
Marcano v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2006Since the situation presented at bar falls squarely within this rule, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Marcano v City of New York, 99 NY2d 548, 549 [2002] [“(p)laintiff assumed the risk of injury when he swung on, and subsequently fell off, an exercise apparatus constructed over a concrete floor”]; Dobert v State of New York, supra at 874 [plaintiff bicyclist assumed risk of injury from slight depression in roadway which she acknowledged was “readily observable”]; LaSalvia v City of New York, 305 AD2d 267, 267 [2003] [“plaintiff assumed the risks in | 1 | 1 |
LaSalvia v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2006Since the situation presented at bar falls squarely within this rule, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Marcano v City of New York, 99 NY2d 548, 549 [2002] [“(p)laintiff assumed the risk of injury when he swung on, and subsequently fell off, an exercise apparatus constructed over a concrete floor”]; Dobert v State of New York, supra at 874 [plaintiff bicyclist assumed risk of injury from slight depression in roadway which she acknowledged was “readily observable”]; LaSalvia v City of New York, 305 AD2d 267, 267 [2003] [“plaintiff assumed the risks in | 1 | 1 |
Verro v. New York Racing Ass'ngreen1 sentence2006Since the situation presented at bar falls squarely within this rule, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Marcano v City of New York, 99 NY2d 548, 549 [2002] [“(p)laintiff assumed the risk of injury when he swung on, and subsequently fell off, an exercise apparatus constructed over a concrete floor”]; Dobert v State of New York, supra at 874 [plaintiff bicyclist assumed risk of injury from slight depression in roadway which she acknowledged was “readily observable”]; LaSalvia v City of New York, 305 AD2d 267, 267 [2003] [“plaintiff assumed the risks in | 1 | 1 |
Tripler v. Mayor, Aldermen & Commonaltygreen2 sentences1995Nothing is presented here to show that plaintiffs "were wholly or partly prevented from engaging in business unless the illegal exactions were paid” (id., at 150; see also, Tripler v Mayor of City of N. Y., 125 NY, at 631 , supra). 1995Nothing is presented here to show that plaintiffs "were wholly or partly prevented from engaging in business unless the illegal exactions were paid" ( id. , at 150; see also , Tripler v Mayor of City of N. Y. , 125 NY, at 631 , supra ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morgan v. State
green
1 sentence2006The plaintiffs’ heavy reliance upon Siegel v City of New York ( 90 NY2d 471 [1997]) is misplaced, as that case is factually distinguishable from the instant dispute. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Aloi v. Board of Education
green
1 sentence1981Co. v. Decker, 98 F. 381, 382 ).” (Matter of Riverdale Fabrics Corp. [Tillinghast-Stiles Co.], 306 NY 288, 289 .) This “rule” is applicable in the situation presented at bar (see Aloi v Board of Educ., supra). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Western Assur. Co. of Toronto v. Decker
neutral
1 sentence1981Co. v. Decker, 98 F. 381, 382 ).” (Matter of Riverdale Fabrics Corp. [Tillinghast-Stiles Co.], 306 NY 288, 289 .) This “rule” is applicable in the situation presented at bar (see Aloi v Board of Educ., supra). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
In re the Arbitration between Riverdale Fabrics Corp. & Tillinghast-Stiles Co.
green
1 sentence1981Co. v. Decker, 98 F. 381, 382 ).” (Matter of Riverdale Fabrics Corp. [Tillinghast-Stiles Co.], 306 NY 288, 289 .) This “rule” is applicable in the situation presented at bar (see Aloi v Board of Educ., supra). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Wnek Vending & Amusements, Inc. v. City of Buffalo
neutral
1 sentence1980Respondents rely on Wnek Vending & Amusements v City of Buffalo ( 96 Misc 2d 983, 991 ) for the proposition that the “right-privilege” doctrine remains valid in the situation presented at bar. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Guadagno v. Diamond Tours & Travel, Inc.
green
1 sentence1978Guadagno v Diamond Tours & Travel ( 89 Misc 2d 697 ) was brought on behalf of some 400 persons who participated in three separate charter tours to a Jamaican resort over a three-week period in December, 1975 to January, 1976. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Miller
green
1 sentence1967We also believe that the situation presented in this claim fits, to some extent, within the doctrine set forth in Andrews v. State of New York ( 19 Misc 2d 217 , affd. 11 A D 2d 599, affd. 9 N Y 2d 606, 608): “The valuation of the property for that purpose included an element of value enhanced by the existence of the original project, but under the ruling1 in United States v. Miller ( 317 U. S. 369 ) this is to be compensated where, as here, the project is subsequently enlarged by the-construction of transmission lines, in which event the Miller case requires payment of the market price as enh | 1 | 1967–1967 |
D. W. Winkelman Co. v. State
green
1 sentence1967(See Winkelman Co. v. State of New York, 17 Misc 2d 418, 423 , supra.) Obviously, such timing would have indicated to prospective buyers, well before January, 1955, that this property was going to be in a strategic location relative to Interchange 39 of the Thruway. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Andrews v. State of New York
neutral
1 sentence1967We also believe that the situation presented in this claim fits, to some extent, within the doctrine set forth in Andrews v. State of New York ( 19 Misc 2d 217 , affd. 11 A D 2d 599, affd. 9 N Y 2d 606, 608): “The valuation of the property for that purpose included an element of value enhanced by the existence of the original project, but under the ruling1 in United States v. Miller ( 317 U. S. 369 ) this is to be compensated where, as here, the project is subsequently enlarged by the-construction of transmission lines, in which event the Miller case requires payment of the market price as enh | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Schultheis v. Wohlleb
neutral
1 sentence1938The situation presented at bar is much stronger than that which was involved in Schultheis v. Wohlleb ( 231 App. Div. 851 ) and in Carney v. Richell Realty Corp. (Id. 845; affd., 256 N. Y. 667 ). | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Samuel v. Bastress
neutral
1 sentence1938The situation presented at bar is much stronger than that which was involved in Schultheis v. Wohlleb ( 231 App. Div. 851 ) and in Carney v. Richell Realty Corp. (Id. 845; affd., 256 N. Y. 667 ). | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Dunham v. . Griswold
green
2 sentences1894This rule defendants contend is not applicable, because plaintiff was not making a claim against them about the merits of which they must be presumed to have had knowledge, but, rather, it was a claim against corporations, of which the defendant Curiel was not an officer, and as to the merits of which he had no knowledge whatever; so that there was absent one of the elements which may usually be found in cases of which Dunham v. Griswold, 100 N. Y. 224 , 3 N. E. 76 , affords an illustration, to wit, such knowledge of the circumstances lying at the foundation of the claim made as enables the al 1894This rule defendants contend is not applicable, because plaintiff was not making a claim against them about the merits of which they must be presumed to have had knowledge, but, rather, it was a claim against corporations, of which the defendant Curiel was not an officer, and as to the merits of which he had no knowledge whatever; so that there was absent one of the elements which may usually be found in cases of which Dunham v. Griswold, 100 N. Y. 224 , 3 N. E. 76 , affords an illustration, to wit, such knowledge of the circumstances lying at the foundation of the claim made as enables the al | 1 | 1894–1894 |