complicity instruction in Ohio

2016That’s the State’s theory.” Accordingly, Mr. Prince was on notice at least one and a half months before his December 15, 2014 trial date that the State intended to argue complicity. {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “R.C. 2923.03(F) adequately notifies defendants that the jury may be instructed on complicity, even when the charge is drawn in terms of the principal offense.” State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 251 (2002). 6 Accordingly, while his indictment charged him strictly as a principal offender, Mr. Prince had constructive notice that the State could seek a complicity ins

2013State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 251 (2002), and State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 (1998). {¶51} Here, the State moved to include the complicity instruction prior to trial.

2018R.C. 2923.03(F) provides that “A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.” “This provision places defendants on notice that the jury may be given a complicity instruction even though the defendant has been charged as a principal offender.” State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998).

2018R.C. 2923.03(F) provides that “A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.” “This provision places defendants on notice that the jury may be given a complicity instruction even though the defendant has been charged as a principal offender.” State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998).

2014R.C. 2923.03(F) states, “[a] charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.” (Emphasis added.) “This provision places defendants on notice that the jury may be given a complicity instruction even though the defendant has been charged as a principal offender.” State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 (1998), citing Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 (6th Cir.1986).

2000Id. ; see, also, Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406 , 408 , certiorari denied (1986), 479 U.S. 934 (recognizing that a defendant has notice that the jury may be given a complicity instruction even though the defendant was charged as a principal offender when the evidence at trial indicates that the defendant committed the offense under a complicity theory).

2025With respect to the issue raised by Clark, we have previously held that “a defendant is not prejudiced when a complicity instruction does not refer specifically to the culpable mental state if the instructions for the underlying offenses include the requisite mental state.” State v. Gibbs, 2006-Ohio-175, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Head, 2005-Ohio-3407, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.) (holding that “a trial court’s complicity jury instruction properly stated the law where the court separately instructed the jury as to the culpable mental states of the underlying crimes”).

2016This court has addressed a similar issue in Head, supra. {¶105} In Head, this court determined that a trial court’s complicity instruction was proper even though it did not individually specify the mens rea for the crimes of which the defendant was convicted.

2025With respect to the issue raised by Clark, we have previously held that “a defendant is not prejudiced when a complicity instruction does not refer specifically to the culpable mental state if the instructions for the underlying offenses include the requisite mental state.” State v. Gibbs, 2006-Ohio-175, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Head, 2005-Ohio-3407, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.) (holding that “a trial court’s complicity jury instruction properly stated the law where the court separately instructed the jury as to the culpable mental states of the underlying crimes”).

2021No. 86126, 2006-Ohio-175, ¶ 24 (where the trial court instructed the jury on the culpable mental states necessary to convict the defendant of the principal offenses, "a defendant is not prejudiced when a complicity instruction does not refer specifically to the culpable mental state if the instructions for the underlying offenses include the requisite mental state"). {¶ 35} There was ample evidence at trial that Webster had the requisite criminal intent for the charged offenses.

2025“The fact that the testimony of a co-defendant constituted the primary evidence against appellant does not, standing alone, render appellant's convictions against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-2058, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.).

2025“The fact that the testimony of a co-defendant constituted the primary evidence against appellant Scioto App. No. 23CA4048 22 does not, standing alone, render appellant's convictions against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-2058, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.).

2023R.C. 2903.02(A) provides: “No person shall purposely cause the death of another[.]” And R.C. 2923.02(A) provides: “No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.” {¶49} The jury also found Appellant guilty of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), which provides: “No person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another's unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordna

2023R.C. 2903.02(A) provides: “No person shall purposely cause the death of another[.]” And R.C. 2923.02(A) provides: “No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.” {¶49} The jury also found Appellant guilty of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), which provides: “No person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another's unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordna

2025The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave a standard complicity instruction at trial. {¶ 120} Boyd argues in his fourth and final assignment of error that the trial court erred in giving a complicity instruction, first because there was “not any evidence 39. presented by the state that either the front seat passenger or the driver were involved in the criminal acts.” He then argues, seemingly paradoxically, that the complicity instruction unfairly and prejudicially undermined his defense that he was an innocent passenger, who was merely present and not culpable. {¶ 121} “‘The c

1999Regardless of whether a complicity instruction was requested, a trial court “must give all instructions that are relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the factfinder.” State v. Joy (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 178, 181 , 657 N.E.2d 503 , 505, citing State v. Comen (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 206 , 553 N.E.2d 640 , paragraph two of the syllabus.

2025Similarly, in State v. Mincey, 2018-Ohio-662 (1st Dist.), the court held that the trial court followed the language of the statute in instructing the jury and that since the culpable mental state (knowingly) with the accompanying charge was given by the court immediately following the complicity instruction, “[t]he jurors would have understood that they should apply ‘knowingly’ to the complicity charge.” Id. at ¶ 31 - 32.

2025Similarly, in State v. Mincey, 2018-Ohio-662 (1st Dist.), the court held that the trial court followed the language of the statute in instructing the jury and that since the culpable mental state (knowingly) with the accompanying charge was given by the court immediately following the complicity instruction, “[t]he jurors would have understood that they should apply ‘knowingly’ to the complicity charge.” Id. at ¶ 31 - 32.

2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2021Nonetheless, since the conviction is supported by the evidence with Williams acting as a principal, this issue is moot. {¶37} The third assignment of error is without merit. {¶38} In his fourth assignment of error, Williams argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a lesser included instruction for the Robbery offense given his foregoing argument that there was no testimony as to the specific nature of the threat of violence and the conduct would more properly fit the requirements for a third-degree felony. {¶39} To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defenda

2021Guy, 2018-Ohio-4836, at ¶ 43 , citing Horton, 2014-Ohio-2785, at ¶ 8 . {¶ 62} Finally, appellant argues that the evidence to support the complicity instruction was based on appellee's closing argument.

2019No. 17AP-322, 2018-Ohio-4836, ¶ 44 (citation omitted). {¶ 8} Daniels's second and third assignments of error contend that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶ 9} In reviewing whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict, "[t]he relevant inquiry for an appellate court is whether the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." McDonald-Glasco, 2018-Ohio-1918 at

2020No. 79607 (Feb. 7, 2002) ("In order to support a charge of complicity in jury instructions, there must be some evidence that the defendant solicited or procured another to commit the offense of those charges in the indictment, or aided or abetted another."); State v. Cornwell, 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 567 (1999) (although state's theory was that appellant was the sole gunman, trial court did not err in instructing on complicity No. 18AP-523 13 where some testimony by accomplices could be construed as conflicting and the complicity instruction "gave the jury the opportunity to convict [the defendant]

2005Bray would maintain, however, that the complicity instruction was still improper as the State proceeded with the sole theory that she was the shooter. {¶ 29} In State v. Cornwell 86 Ohio St.3d 560 , 1999-Ohio-125 , the defendant likewise asserted that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on complicity, since it was never pleaded or argued that he was anything but the shooter.

2016As such, we decline to discuss complicity as to Mr. Acevedo’s conviction for possession of heroin. 4 {¶10} “‘[S]ufficiency’ is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th Ed.1990).

2007Accordingly, the complicity instruction was proper. {¶ 55} The third assignment of error is without merit. {¶ 56} Kidd's fourth and fifth assignments of error challenge the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence respectively. {¶ 57} The Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a defendant may move the trial court for a judgment of acquittal "if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." Crim.R. 29(A). "`Sufficiency' is a term of art meaning that legal standard *Page 15 which is applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury," i.e. "whether the evidence is le

2025See also State v. Patterson, 2018-Ohio-3348, ¶ 39 (1st Dist.) (stating that “[b]ecause the trial court had already instructed the jury regarding felonious assault, including the mens rea, the trial court was not required to repeat its earlier instruction when instructing on complicity”).

2025(Additional citation omitted.) On the other hand, “‘It is well established that the trial court will not instruct the jury where there is no evidence to support an issue.’” State v. Mankin, 2020-Ohio-5317, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.), quoting Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg.

2025Jackson App. No. 24CA4 21 State v. Blanton, 2018-Ohio-1278, ¶ 84 (4th Dist.).

2025Law and Analysis The trial court did not err when it denied Boyd’s motion to suppress. {¶ 86} “‘Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.’” State v. Donaldson, 2019-Ohio-232, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372 , ¶ 8.

2025In State v. Word, 2019-Ohio-1733, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.), the court reviewed this specific jury instruction language in a complicity instruction and found that it was accurate: This court has recently considered and rejected this same argument.

2025The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave a standard complicity instruction at trial. {¶ 120} Boyd argues in his fourth and final assignment of error that the trial court erred in giving a complicity instruction, first because there was “not any evidence 39. presented by the state that either the front seat passenger or the driver were involved in the criminal acts.” He then argues, seemingly paradoxically, that the complicity instruction unfairly and prejudicially undermined his defense that he was an innocent passenger, who was merely present and not culpable. {¶ 121} “‘The c

2024“A complicity instruction is proper if ‘the evidence adduced at trial could reasonably be found to have proven the defendant guilty as an aider and abettor[.]’” State v. Simpson, 2013-Ohio-4276, ¶ 33 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d 14 (1976), paragraph five of the syllabus. {¶28} While Mr. Cruz argues had he known the State would seek a complicity instruction, his attorney would have cross-examined the various law enforcement officers and BCI forensic scientist differently, he has not explained what different questions his attorney would have asked.