G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1998 ·
…a charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.
✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2008–2024 · 2 courts ·
…a defendant may be indicted for the commission of a substantive crime as a principal offender and convicted of aiding and abetting its commission although not named in the indictment as an aider and abettor without violating federal due process.
at p. 407
✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2001 ·
…under ohio law, the state may charge and try an aider and abettor as a principal, and if the evidence at trial reasonably indicates that the defendant was an aider and abettor rather than a principal offender, a jury instruction regarding complicity may be given.
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Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Williams v. Bunting
under ohio law, the state may charge and try an aider and abettor as a principal, and even if the evidence at trial reasonably indicates that the defendant was an aider and abettor rather than a principal offender, a jury instruction regarding complicity may be given
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. McGee
a defendant may be indicted for the commission of a substantive crime as a principal offender and convicted of aiding and abetting its commission although not named in the indictment as an aider and abettor without violating federal due process.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jordan Christopher Danski v. Gary Miniard
See, e.g., Berry v. Capello, 576 F. -6- No. 25-1287, Danski v. Miniard App’x 579, 589-90 (6th Cir. 2014) (concluding “the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to sustain [the defendant’s] convictions” under the aiding-and-abetting instruction); Bennett v. Rewerts, No. 18-1730, 2018 WL 8732861 , at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2018) (same); Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 408 (6th Cir. 1986) (construing Ohio law to allow “a jury instruction regarding complicity” when defendant had “legal notice of the possibility”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Portis
The court further held that R.C. 2923.03(F) “adequately notifies defendants that the jury may be instructed on complicity, even when the charge is drawn in terms of the principal offense.” Id. at ¶ 178-184, citing State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998), citing Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 (6th Cir.1986).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. A.W.M.
In this respect, " 'participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed.' " Id. at 245 , quoting State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34 (4th Dist.1971). {¶ 48} Pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(F), "[a] charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense." Accordingly, "a defendant charged with an offense may be convicted of that offense upon proof that he was complicit in its commission, even though the indictment is 'stated * * * in terms of the principal offense' and does no…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Young
The court further held that R.C. 2923.03(F) “adequately notifies defendants that the jury may be instructed on complicity, even when the charge is drawn in terms of the principal offense.” Id. at ¶ 178-184, citing State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998), citing Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 (6th Cir.1986).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. David Sosa-Baladron
We have held, however, that a defendant “may be indicted for the commission of a substantive crime as a principal offender and convicted of aiding and abetting its commission . . . without violating federal due process.” United States v. VanderZwaag, 467 F. App’x 402, 407 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407 (6th Cir. 1986)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Smith
R.C. 2923.03(F) states, “[a] charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.” (Emphasis added.) “This provision places defendants on notice that the jury may be given a complicity instruction even though the defendant has been charged as a principal offender.” State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 (1998), citing Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 (6th Cir.1986).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Reid v. Warden, Correctional Reception Center
(2×)
Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407 (6th Cir.1986).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Daniel Vanderzwaag
This court has held that a single defendant “may be indicted for the commission of a substantive crime as a principal offender and convicted of aiding and abetting its commission although not named in the indictment as an aider and abettor without violating federal due process.” Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407 (6th Cir.1986).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Osborne
All indictments must be read in effect, then, as if the alternatives provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2 were embodied in each count thereof.”); Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d, 406, 407 (6th Cir.1986) ([T]his Court has expressly acknowledged that a defendant may be indicted for the commission of a substantive crime as a principal offender and convicted of aiding and abetting its commission although not named in the indictment as a aider or abettor without violating federal due process.” citing Stone v. Wingo, 416 F.2d 857 (6th Cir.1969) (The defendants were not charged as aiders and abettors but the Sixt…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robert O'Neal v. Terry L. Morris
See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2923.03(A), (F) (Anderson 1993); Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407-08 (6th Cir.) (discussing the practice and holding that it does not violate a defendant’s right to notice of the charges against him or her), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 934 , 107 S.Ct. 409 , 93 L.Ed.2d 361 (1986).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Coleman
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929, 946 , citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 .
cited
Cited "see"
State v. McKnelly
See State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133 , 151 (1998), citing Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 (6th Cir. 1986).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Polite
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929, 946 , citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 .
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Harris
See State v. Keenan , 81 Ohio St.3d 133 , 151, 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998), citing Hill v. Perini , 788 F.2d 406 , 407-408 (6th Cir.1986). {¶ 59} An accomplice to the commission of a criminal offense is subject to the same prosecution and punishment as the principal offender, and may be charged in the language of the principal offense.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. McKelton (Slip Opinion)
(2×)
See Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 (6th Cir.1986).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Reed
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929, 946 , citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 . {¶37} Moreover, Crim.R. 33(E)(2) provides that a variance between the allegations and the evidence at trial is not reversible error unless the defense is prejudiced or misled thereby.
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Griffin
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929, 946 , citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406 , 407–408.
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Hudson, 2007-Ca-00176 (2-2-2009)
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133 , 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929 , 946 , *Page 14 citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406 , 407-408 ." Thus, as noted by appellee, a complicity charge need not appear in the indictment containing the principal offense. {¶ 71} Moreover, as noted by the court in State v. Phillips (Oct. 12, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No 77082, 2000 WL 1513704 , "[w]hether a defendant is tried for the crime as a principal or as an accomplice does not alter the name or identity of the crimes charged." Id. at 2. {¶ 72} Moreover, we note that the trial court, upon granting th…
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Templeton, Unpublished Decision (3-14-2007)
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133 , 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929 , 946 , citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406 , 407-408 .
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Hand
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133 , 151, 689 N.E.2d 929 , citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 . {¶ 182} Additionally, for the amendment to constitute reversible error, Hand must demonstrate that the amendment hampered his defense or prejudiced him.
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Hickman, Unpublished Decision (12-13-2004)
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133 , 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929 , 946 , citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406 , 407-408 .
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Wilder, Unpublished Decision (3-7-2003)
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133 , 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929 , 946 , citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406 , 407-408." {¶ 27} The above quote correctly sets forth the law in Ohio.
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Herring
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929, 946 , citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 .
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Herring
See State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 151 , 689 N.E.2d 929, 946 , citing Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406, 407-408 .
cited
Cited "see"
Leslie A. Reece v. Anthony Brigano
See Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 934 (1986). 9 Accordingly, the district court's order is affirmed.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. McGee
While all indictments must inform the defendant of the crime with which he or she is charged, Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 , 82 S.Ct. 1038 , 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962), we have long held that “[i]n keeping with the provisions of § 2 ... an indictment need not specifically charge ‘aiding and abetting’ or ‘causing’ the commission of an offense against the United States, in order to support a jury verdict based upon a finding of either.” United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 72 (6th Cir.1966); see also Hill v. Perini, 788 F.2d 406, 407 (6th Cir.1986) (“[A] defendant may be indi…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Penn, Unpublished Decision (12-14-2000)
Id. ; see, also, Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406 , 408 , certiorari denied (1986), 479 U.S. 934 (recognizing that a defendant has notice that the jury may be given a complicity instruction even though the defendant was charged as a principal offender when the evidence at trial indicates that the defendant committed the offense under a complicity theory).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Luff
“When the evidence adduced at trial could reasonably be found to have proven the defendant guilty as an aider and abettor, a jury instruction by the trial court on that subject is proper.” State v. Perryman (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 14 , 3 O.O.3d 8 , 358 N.E.2d 1040 , paragraph five of the syllabus; see, also, Hill v. Perini (C.A.6, 1986), 788 F.2d 406 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John Boston HILL, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
E.P. PERINI, Respondent-Appellee
v.
E.P. PERINI, Respondent-Appellee
84-3595.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Apr 21, 1986.
John Boston Hill, Marion, Ohio, Miriam Hirsch Sheline argued, Cincinanti, Ohio, for petitioner-appellant., Christine Manuelian argued, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, for respondent-ap-pellee.
Jones, Nelson, Edwards.
Cited by 48 opinions | Published
GEORGE CLIFTON EDWARDS, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge.
This habeas corpus appeal from the Northern District of Ohio involves one significant legal question. Appellant Hill was indicted by a Hancock County Grand Jury on one count of aggravated robbery in violation of O.R.C. § 2911.01. The trial jury as allowed by the judge’s charge found him not guilty as a principal offender but convicted him of complicity in committing the offense of aggravated robbery. See O.R.C. § 2923.03(A)(2) and (F). Appellant exhausted his remedies in the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court. Before this court, appellant claims that he was deprived of adequate notice of the charge he was convicted on and thus deprived a fair trial.
In addition, appellant claims his conviction is in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment — a claim which we reject finding not even arguable merit under the record in this case.
For the reasons which follow, Hill’s claim must be dismissed. The indictment in this case charging appellant Hill with aggravated robbery was indeed somewhat laconic:
.The jurors of the grand jury of the State of Ohio, within and for the body of the County aforesaid, on their oaths, in the name and by the authority of the State of Ohio, do find and present that on or about the 12th day of March 1982, at Findlay, Hancock County, Ohio, John Boston Hill did in committing a theft offense as defined in Section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, have under his control a deadly weapon as defined in Section 2923.11 of the Revised Code, to wit: a shotgun.
While it is not customary for a person to be charged apparently as a principal of[*407] fender and subsequently to be found guilty as an accomplice to the alleged crime, we find no federal law or rule which prohibits this practice. In fact, this court has expressly acknowledged that a defendant may be indicted for the commission of a substantive crime as a principal offender and convicted of aiding and abetting its commission although not named in the indictment as an aider and abettor without violating federal due process. Stone v. Wingo, 416 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1969).
Indeed, the Ohio Revised Code squarely permits this practice. O.R.C. § 2923.03 provides:
§ 2923.03 Complicity.
(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense;
(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense;
(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code;
(4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense.
(B) It is no defense to a charge under this section that no person with whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted as a principal offender.
(C) No person shall be convicted of complicity under this section unless an offense is actually committed, but a person may be convicted of complicity in an attempt to commit an offense in violation of section 2923.02 of the Revised Code.
(D) No person shall be convicted of complicity under this section solely upon the testimony of an accomplice, unsupported by other evidence.
(E) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that, prior to the commission of or attempt to commit the offense, the actor terminated his complicity, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender. A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense. (Emphasis added).
This practice has apparently been established in Ohio for over 100 years. Hanoff v. The State of Ohio, 37 Ohio St. 178 (1881).
Additionally, we note that the indictment was followed by a much more explicit statement in the Bill of Particulars:
“That on or about the 12th day of March, 1982, between the hours of 2:30 A.M. and 3:00 A.M., this defendant entered the business premises known as ‘Yock’s’ and located at 431 East Main Cross St., Findlay, Hancock County, Ohio, in the presence of Keith Anthony Mira, and did obtain and exert control over a sum of money greater than Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00), by threat and at gunpoint, said money being the property of the patrons located then within Yock’s, those patrons being: Carl J. Peterman, Brad L. Fisher, Dave Woods, Deborah McCormick, William Porter, Gene Schey, Deborah Ernst, Mark Waltermire, Marion Norris, and Jeffrey James Koehler, and that the defendant and Keith Anthony Mira carried a shotgun or sawed-off shotgun and had the same under their control, said weapon being a deadly weapon as defined in O.R.C. § 2923.11, all of the aforesaid being in violation of Ohio Revised Code, § 2911.01, Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the first degree.”
The Ohio Supreme Court continues to approve of such a practice and the State Bar of Ohio should be on notice of the validity of the procedure which has been employed in this case. In State v. Perry-man, 49 Ohio St.2d 14, 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom., Perryman v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3136, 57 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1978), the Ohio Supreme Court explained:
[*408] During final arguments, the prosecutor suggested to the jury that the appellant could be held liable as an aider and abettor to the crime. Over appellant’s objection, the court charged on aiding and abetting.
Appellant argues such a charge was prejudicial to his rights. Early in the trial, appellant had filed a motion for a bill of particulars. In response, the state had said that the appellant did shoot and kill one Lawrence J. Busch while attempting to commit aggravated robbery. Appellant argues that once the state particularized that the appellant himself had shot and killed Busch, it could not shift its theory of criminal responsibility. In short, appellant concludes that he had a right to be tried, not as an accomplice to the Busch homicide, but as the principal in the first degree.
This assignment of error is without merit. Upon an examination of the record, it is evident that the state consistently argued that the appellant was the triggerman. It was only on direct examination of defense witnesses that any evidence of aiding and abetting came before the jury. Since appellant presented evidence from which reasonable men could find him guilty as an aider and abettor, the court’s instruction was, therefore, proper.
Perryman, 49 Ohio St.2d at 27-28, 358 N.E.2d 1040.
It thus appears that under Ohio law, the State may charge and try an aider and abettor as a principal, and if the evidence at trial reasonably indicates that the defendant was an aider and abettor rather than a principal offender, a jury instruction regarding complicity may be given. At the time of appellant Hill’s trial, this practice was settled law in Ohio. It thus appears that appellant, through his attorney, did have legal notice of the possibility that the jury might be given a complicity instruction.
Accordingly, for the above stated reasons, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.