Chase motion in Ohio

2015Id. {¶33} The record discloses no abuse of discretion by the trial court in granting Chase’s motion for default without an oral hearing.

2014R. 56 if there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be litigated, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.” (Citation omitted.) Smith v. Five Rivers MetroParks, 134 Ohio App.3d 754, 760 , 732 N.E.2d 422 (2d Dist.1999).

2014R. 56 if there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be litigated, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.” (Citation omitted.) Smith v. Five Rivers MetroParks, 134 Ohio App.3d 754, 760 , 732 N.E.2d 422 (2d Dist.1999).

2013(Citations omitted.) {¶ 17} “When an order of a trial court is interlocutory, the order remains subject to revision or modification by the trial court until and unless the order is certified as suitable for appeal, or the action is finally terminated as to all claims and all parties.” Lingo at ¶ 17, citing Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 90 , 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989). {¶ 18} When the trial court denied Chase’s motion for summary judgment in the prior action, its order was interlocutory only.

2013(Citations omitted.) {¶ 17} “When an order of a trial court is interlocutory, the order remains subject to revision or modification by the trial court until and unless the order is certified as suitable for appeal, or the action is finally terminated as to all claims and all parties.” Lingo at ¶ 17, citing Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 90 , 541 N.E.2d 64 (1989). {¶ 18} When the trial court denied Chase’s motion for summary judgment in the prior action, its order was interlocutory only.

2013Kreps v. Christiansen, 88 Ohio St.3d 313, 316 , 725 N.E.2d 663 (2000). {¶24} As indicated, appellants here were given both notice and the opportunity to respond to appellee Chase’s motion to dismiss and did, in fact, file a response to that motion.

2013Kreps v. Christiansen, 88 Ohio St.3d 313, 316 , 725 N.E.2d 663 (2000). {¶24} As indicated, appellants here were given both notice and the opportunity to respond to appellee Chase’s motion to dismiss and did, in fact, file a response to that motion.

2013The assignment of error is overruled. 2 In State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985 , the Ohio Supreme Court clarified that “[a] trunk and a passenger compartment of an automobile are subject to different standards of probable cause to conduct searches” under the automobile exception.

2013The assignment of error is overruled. 2 In State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985 , the Ohio Supreme Court clarified that “[a] trunk and a passenger compartment of an automobile are subject to different standards of probable cause to conduct searches” under the automobile exception.

2008Griffey v. Rajan (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 79 , 514 N.E.2d 1122 .

2008Homyak v. Brooks (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 105, 106 , 16 OBR 111, 474 N.E.2d 676 , citing Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 , 5 OBR 120, 448 N.E.2d 1365 ; Antonopoulos v. Eisner (1972), 30 Ohio App.2d 187, 193 , 59 O.O.2d 309 , 284 N.E.2d 194 . {¶ 24} We note that Chase’s motion for relief from judgment was filed on February 13, 2008, approximately one year and nine months after the trial court’s May 25, 2006 judgment entry.

2008Homyak v. Brooks (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 105, 106 , 16 OBR 111, 474 N.E.2d 676 , citing Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 , 5 OBR 120, 448 N.E.2d 1365 ; Antonopoulos v. Eisner (1972), 30 Ohio App.2d 187, 193 , 59 O.O.2d 309 , 284 N.E.2d 194 . {¶ 24} We note that Chase’s motion for relief from judgment was filed on February 13, 2008, approximately one year and nine months after the trial court’s May 25, 2006 judgment entry.

2008Griffey v. Rajan (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 79 , 514 N.E.2d 1122 .

2008Adomeit v. Baltimore (1974), 39 Ohio App.2d 97, 105 , 68 O.O.2d 251 , 316 N.E.2d 469 .

2008Adomeit v. Baltimore (1974), 39 Ohio App.2d 97, 105 , 68 O.O.2d 251 , 316 N.E.2d 469 .

2008Group, Inc. (2005), 159 Ohio App.3d at 556 , 824 N.E.2d 600 . {¶ 27} Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Chase met its burden as to timeliness when filing its motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) and therefore erred in granting Chase’s motion for relief from judgment.

2008Group, Inc. (2005), 159 Ohio App.3d at 556 , 824 N.E.2d 600 . {¶ 27} Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Chase met its burden as to timeliness when filing its motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) and therefore erred in granting Chase’s motion for relief from judgment.

2008“A Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment cannot be used as a substitute for a timely appeal or as a means to extend the time for perfecting an appeal from the original judgment.” Key v. Mitchell (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 89, 90-91 , 689 N.E.2d 548 .

2008“A Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment cannot be used as a substitute for a timely appeal or as a means to extend the time for perfecting an appeal from the original judgment.” Key v. Mitchell (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 89, 90-91 , 689 N.E.2d 548 .

2008Homyak v. Brooks (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 105, 106 , 16 OBR 111, 474 N.E.2d 676 , citing Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 , 5 OBR 120, 448 N.E.2d 1365 ; Antonopoulos v. Eisner (1972), 30 Ohio App.2d 187, 193 , 59 O.O.2d 309 , 284 N.E.2d 194 . {¶ 24} We note that Chase’s motion for relief from judgment was filed on February 13, 2008, approximately one year and nine months after the trial court’s May 25, 2006 judgment entry.

2008Homyak v. Brooks (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 105, 106 , 16 OBR 111, 474 N.E.2d 676 , citing Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 , 5 OBR 120, 448 N.E.2d 1365 ; Antonopoulos v. Eisner (1972), 30 Ohio App.2d 187, 193 , 59 O.O.2d 309 , 284 N.E.2d 194 . {¶ 24} We note that Chase’s motion for relief from judgment was filed on February 13, 2008, approximately one year and nine months after the trial court’s May 25, 2006 judgment entry.

2008Olive Baptist Church v. Pipkins Paints (1979), 64 Ohio App.2d 285, 289 , 18 O.O.3d 319 , 413 N.E.2d 850 (motion under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) filed seven months after notice of the action and four months after default entry is not filed “within a reasonable time”). {¶ 25} Our review of the record reveals that although Chase alleges that there were numerous bankruptcy filings by the Dewines, Chase never states why the bankruptcy filings (or subsequent stays issued by the trial court) caused any delay in the filing of Chase’s motion for relief from judgment.

2008Olive Baptist Church v. Pipkins Paints (1979), 64 Ohio App.2d 285, 289 , 18 O.O.3d 319 , 413 N.E.2d 850 (motion under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) filed seven months after notice of the action and four months after default entry is not filed “within a reasonable time”). {¶ 25} Our review of the record reveals that although Chase alleges that there were numerous bankruptcy filings by the Dewines, Chase never states why the bankruptcy filings (or subsequent stays issued by the trial court) caused any delay in the filing of Chase’s motion for relief from judgment.

2008Homyak v. Brooks (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 105, 106 , 16 OBR 111, 474 N.E.2d 676 , citing Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 , 5 OBR 120, 448 N.E.2d 1365 ; Antonopoulos v. Eisner (1972), 30 Ohio App.2d 187, 193 , 59 O.O.2d 309 , 284 N.E.2d 194 . {¶ 24} We note that Chase’s motion for relief from judgment was filed on February 13, 2008, approximately one year and nine months after the trial court’s May 25, 2006 judgment entry.

2008Homyak v. Brooks (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 105, 106 , 16 OBR 111, 474 N.E.2d 676 , citing Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 66 , 5 OBR 120, 448 N.E.2d 1365 ; Antonopoulos v. Eisner (1972), 30 Ohio App.2d 187, 193 , 59 O.O.2d 309 , 284 N.E.2d 194 . {¶ 24} We note that Chase’s motion for relief from judgment was filed on February 13, 2008, approximately one year and nine months after the trial court’s May 25, 2006 judgment entry.

1991In its ruling issued on October 31, 1990, the trial court denied Chase’s motion, *17 finding that the methods employed by Trooper Drake substantially complied with the requirements of the administrative code, based upon the holding in State v. Plummer (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 22 OBR 461, 490 N.E.2d 902 .

1991In its ruling issued on October 31, 1990, the trial court denied Chase’s motion, *17 finding that the methods employed by Trooper Drake substantially complied with the requirements of the administrative code, based upon the holding in State v. Plummer (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 22 OBR 461, 490 N.E.2d 902 .