Chase motion in Texas

2015Importantly, as the Mayfield Court explained, “fleeing slowly is still fleeing.” Mayfield v. State, 219 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.).

2010As this Court has noted, “under the law, fleeing slowly is still fleeing.” Mayfield v. State, 219 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.).

2025In considering whether a defendant has an intent to evade arrest, “[t]he length and speed of the chase are factors . . . but are not determinative by themselves.” Baines v. State, 418 S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d) (holding low-speed chase around single city block provided sufficient evidence to support defendant intended to flee).

2015The length and speed of the chase are factors in considering whether there was an attempt to escape, but are not determinative by themselves.” Baines, 418 S.W.3d at 670 .

2025For the “fleeing” portion of the elements, “[t]he gravamen of the offense is the evasion of an arrest, not the evasion of a police officer.” Jackson v. State, 690 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), aff’d, 718 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Crim.

2024Stegall v. Oadra, 868 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tex. 1993) (“The Texas Probate Code was patterned after the Uniform Probate Code.”).

2018Credit Union v. Martin, 29 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Tex. 2000). 1 The judgment also granted Chase’s motion to nonsuit its counterclaim against Hames and its third-party claims against Stovall.

2013See Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984).

2011See Taub v. Houston Pipeline Co. , 75 S.W.3d 606, 618 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (although trespass plaintiff may claim nominal damages, failure to raise nominal damages in response to summary judgment not basis for reversal of summary judgment); see also Tex. R.

2011Konrath’s affidavit is evidence of liability Appellant argues that Konrath’s affidavit cannot support a liability finding because — although it was attached as summary judgment evidence — the “only explicit reference to this affidavit in the motion for summary judgment is language citing to the affidavit as evidence of Chase’s damages.” Chase’s motion for summary judgment states that the “pleading, affidavits and exhibits filed herein show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact between the parties, and accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant as a matter

2011Konrath’s affidavit is evidence of liability Appellant argues that Konrath’s affidavit cannot support a liability finding because — although it was attached as summary judgment evidence — the “only explicit reference to this affidavit in the motion for summary judgment is language citing to the affidavit as evidence of Chase’s damages.” Chase’s motion for summary judgment states that the “pleading, affidavits and exhibits filed herein show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact between the parties, and accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant as a matter

2010See Lehmann , 39 S.W.3d at 206 .

2001The first order “granted” the Motion to Enforce Rule 11 Agreement without any specificity, and ordered Bank One to “pay to the receiver the sum of $7,575.42 in attorney’s fees and expenses occasioned by the breach of the Rule 11 Agreement for which let execution issue.” The second order denied the banks’ motions to terminate the injunction, denied Chase’s motion to release property, and ordered that the banks jointly and severally “pay to the Receiver the sum of $29,026.50 as reasonable and necessary interim Receivership fees and expenses incurred in the maintenance and preservation of the est