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8 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver.green2 sentences2026We have since emphasized that “[t]he fact that a client appears to have consented does not mitigate the attorney’s misconduct or provide a defense against a violation.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 2018-Ohio-4717, ¶ 16 ; see also id., quoting Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), Comment 17 (explaining that “‘[Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j)] prohibits the lawyer from engaging in sexual activity with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client, unless the sexual relationship predates the client-lawyer relationship’” [emphasis added in Sarver]). 2026We have since emphasized that “[t]he fact that a client appears to have consented does not mitigate the attorney’s misconduct or provide a defense against a violation.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 2018-Ohio-4717, ¶ 16 ; see also id., quoting Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), Comment 17 (explaining that “‘[Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j)] prohibits the lawyer from engaging in sexual activity with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client, unless the sexual relationship predates the client-lawyer relationship’” [emphasis added in Sarver]). | 1 | 2 |
Torrance v. Romgreen2 sentences2024Co., S.D.Ohio No. 2:20-cv-5344, 2021 WL 38273 , *4; Torrance v. Rom, 2020-Ohio-3971 , 157 N.E.3d 172, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.) (“[t]he doctrine is a shield, not a sword”). 8 {¶15} With the foregoing in mind, the Litsingers’ promissory estoppel claim fails as a matter of law. 2024Co., S.D.Ohio No. 2:20-cv-5344, 2021 WL 38273 , *4; Torrance v. Rom, 2020-Ohio-3971 , 157 N.E.3d 172, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.) (“[t]he doctrine is a shield, not a sword”). 8 {¶15} With the foregoing in mind, the Litsingers’ promissory estoppel claim fails as a matter of law. | 1 | 1 |
Sanderson v. Ohio Edison Co.green1 sentence2000See Sanderson v. Ohio Edison Co. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 582 , paragraph one of the syllabus. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Patrick v. Painesville Commercial Properties, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008It does not furnish a basis for damages claims, but a defense against the claim of the stopped party"). {¶ 32} Because promissory estoppel, not equitable estoppel, properly is used to create a cause of action, we find appellees were indeed entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the equitable estoppel claims. {¶ 33} Regarding promissory estoppel, "[a] claim of promissory estoppel involves four elements: (1) a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise was made, (3) the reliance is reasonable and foreseeable, and (4) the party *Page 14 relying on the promise 2007It does not furnish a basis for damages claims, but a defense against the claim of the stopped party"). *Page 12 {¶ 29} Because promissory estoppel, not equitable estoppel, properly is used to create a cause of action, we construe Holt's "estoppel" claim in its first amended complaint as a claim of promissory estoppel. {¶ 30} "A claim of promissory estoppel involves four elements: (1) there must be a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) the party to whom the promise was made must rely on it, (3) the reliance is reasonable and foreseeable, and (4) the party relying on the promise must have been i | 2 | 2007–2008 |
Doe v. Adkins
green
2 sentences2008It does not furnish a basis for damages claims, but a defense against the claim of the stopped party"). {¶ 32} Because promissory estoppel, not equitable estoppel, properly is used to create a cause of action, we find appellees were indeed entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the equitable estoppel claims. {¶ 33} Regarding promissory estoppel, "[a] claim of promissory estoppel involves four elements: (1) a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise was made, (3) the reliance is reasonable and foreseeable, and (4) the party *Page 14 relying on the promise 2007It does not furnish a basis for damages claims, but a defense against the claim of the stopped party"). *Page 12 {¶ 29} Because promissory estoppel, not equitable estoppel, properly is used to create a cause of action, we construe Holt's "estoppel" claim in its first amended complaint as a claim of promissory estoppel. {¶ 30} "A claim of promissory estoppel involves four elements: (1) there must be a clear and unambiguous promise, (2) the party to whom the promise was made must rely on it, (3) the reliance is reasonable and foreseeable, and (4) the party relying on the promise must have been i | 2 | 2007–2008 |
State v. Bradley
green
2 sentences2014Wynn contends that a continuance would have allowed counsel to better prepare a defense against the claim that Wynn was the author of the letter. {¶ 88} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under the two-prong analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). 2014Wynn contends that a continuance would have allowed counsel to better prepare a defense against the claim that Wynn was the author of the letter. {¶ 88} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under the two-prong analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2014Wynn contends that a continuance would have allowed counsel to better prepare a defense against the claim that Wynn was the author of the letter. {¶ 88} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under the two-prong analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). 2014Wynn contends that a continuance would have allowed counsel to better prepare a defense against the claim that Wynn was the author of the letter. {¶ 88} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under the two-prong analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Weldon Tool Co. v. Kelley
green
1 sentence1959Lehman v. Haynam, supra; Weldon Tool Co. v. Kelley, 81 Ohio App., 427 , 76 N. E. (2d), 629; 28 A. L. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.