constant pressure presumption in Oklahoma

1935To ‘the contrary, a presumption is created that the former spouse had secured a divorce, which warrants this court in the ease at bar to recognize the legitimacy of the issue of the respective marriages. ‘•When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout and in every particular plainly to make the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption, tha't it is illegal and void Nixon et a

1935To ‘the contrary, a presumption is created that the former spouse had secured a divorce, which warrants this court in the ease at bar to recognize the legitimacy of the issue of the respective marriages. ‘•When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout and in every particular plainly to make the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption, tha't it is illegal and void Nixon et a

1916The party attacking such second marriage has the burden of proof to show that neither party to the first marriage had obtained a divorce. * * * ■ ■ “The law is so positive in requiring a party who asserts the illegality of a marriage, to take the burden of proving it that such requirement is enforced, even though it involve the proving a negative. • When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout a

1916The party attacking such second marriage has the burden of proof to show that neither party to the first marriage had obtained a divorce. * * * ■ ■ “The law is so positive in requiring a party who asserts the illegality of a marriage, to take the burden of proving it that such requirement is enforced, even though it involve the proving a negative. • When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout a

1987KAUGER, Justice, with whom DOOLIN, Chief Justice joins, dissenting by reason of stare decisis: Because the majority opinion fails to overrule or distinguish the controlling Oklahoma cases: Cox v. Cox, 95 Okl. 14 , 217 P. 493 , 34 A.L.R. 432 (1923); Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okl. 249 , 204 P. 284 , 34 A.L.R. 441 (1921); and Copeland v. Copeland, 73 Okla. 252 , 175 P. 764 (1918), 1 I must dissent.

1987KAUGER, Justice, with whom DOOLIN, Chief Justice joins, dissenting by reason of stare decisis: Because the majority opinion fails to overrule or distinguish the controlling Oklahoma cases: Cox v. Cox, 95 Okl. 14 , 217 P. 493 , 34 A.L.R. 432 (1923); Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okl. 249 , 204 P. 284 , 34 A.L.R. 441 (1921); and Copeland v. Copeland, 73 Okla. 252 , 175 P. 764 (1918), 1 I must dissent.

1987KAUGER, Justice, with whom DOOLIN, Chief Justice joins, dissenting by reason of stare decisis: Because the majority opinion fails to overrule or distinguish the controlling Oklahoma cases: Cox v. Cox, 95 Okl. 14 , 217 P. 493 , 34 A.L.R. 432 (1923); Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okl. 249 , 204 P. 284 , 34 A.L.R. 441 (1921); and Copeland v. Copeland, 73 Okla. 252 , 175 P. 764 (1918), 1 I must dissent.

1987KAUGER, Justice, with whom DOOLIN, Chief Justice joins, dissenting by reason of stare decisis: Because the majority opinion fails to overrule or distinguish the controlling Oklahoma cases: Cox v. Cox, 95 Okl. 14 , 217 P. 493 , 34 A.L.R. 432 (1923); Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okl. 249 , 204 P. 284 , 34 A.L.R. 441 (1921); and Copeland v. Copeland, 73 Okla. 252 , 175 P. 764 (1918), 1 I must dissent.

1987KAUGER, Justice, with whom DOOLIN, Chief Justice joins, dissenting by reason of stare decisis: Because the majority opinion fails to overrule or distinguish the controlling Oklahoma cases: Cox v. Cox, 95 Okl. 14 , 217 P. 493 , 34 A.L.R. 432 (1923); Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okl. 249 , 204 P. 284 , 34 A.L.R. 441 (1921); and Copeland v. Copeland, 73 Okla. 252 , 175 P. 764 (1918), 1 I must dissent.

1987KAUGER, Justice, with whom DOOLIN, Chief Justice joins, dissenting by reason of stare decisis: Because the majority opinion fails to overrule or distinguish the controlling Oklahoma cases: Cox v. Cox, 95 Okl. 14 , 217 P. 493 , 34 A.L.R. 432 (1923); Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okl. 249 , 204 P. 284 , 34 A.L.R. 441 (1921); and Copeland v. Copeland, 73 Okla. 252 , 175 P. 764 (1918), 1 I must dissent.

1987KAUGER, Justice, with whom DOOLIN, Chief Justice joins, dissenting by reason of stare decisis: Because the majority opinion fails to overrule or distinguish the controlling Oklahoma cases: Cox v. Cox, 95 Okl. 14 , 217 P. 493 , 34 A.L.R. 432 (1923); Brokeshoulder v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okl. 249 , 204 P. 284 , 34 A.L.R. 441 (1921); and Copeland v. Copeland, 73 Okla. 252 , 175 P. 764 (1918), 1 I must dissent.

1954In the case of Hill v. Jones, 180 Okl. 330 , 69 P.2d 324, 326 , it was stated as follows: “ * * * When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout and in every particular plainly to make the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption, that it is illegal and void. * * * ” Looking now to the evidence herein, in the light of the above rule, only one fact stands out as pointing to a

1954In the case of Hill v. Jones, 180 Okl. 330 , 69 P.2d 324, 326 , it was stated as follows: “ * * * When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout and in every particular plainly to make the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption, that it is illegal and void. * * * ” Looking now to the evidence herein, in the light of the above rule, only one fact stands out as pointing to a

1935The salutary rule so widely recognized and enforced should a fortiori find lodgment in the courts of this state, where the parties to the marriage relations are all full-blood Indians, unused and unaccustomed to the laws of the whites, and to whom written laws governing their domestic relations were innovations at the time.” Chancey v. Whinnery, 47 Okla. 272 , 147 P. 1036 -38; Lewis v. Lewis, 60 Okla. 60 , 158 P. 368 ; Bishop on Marriage, Divorce & Separation (1st Ed.) vol. 1, sec. 1145; Boulden v. McIntire (Ind.) 21 N. E. 445 ; Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones (Ill.) 8 N. E. 865 ; Nixon v. Wichita

1935The salutary rule so widely recognized and enforced should a fortiori find lodgment in the courts of this state, where the parties to the marriage relations are all full-blood Indians, unused and unaccustomed to the laws of the whites, and to whom written laws governing their domestic relations were innovations at the time.” Chancey v. Whinnery, 47 Okla. 272 , 147 P. 1036 -38; Lewis v. Lewis, 60 Okla. 60 , 158 P. 368 ; Bishop on Marriage, Divorce & Separation (1st Ed.) vol. 1, sec. 1145; Boulden v. McIntire (Ind.) 21 N. E. 445 ; Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones (Ill.) 8 N. E. 865 ; Nixon v. Wichita

1935The salutary rule so widely recognized and enforced should a fortiori find lodgment in the courts of this state, where the parties to the marriage relations are all full-blood Indians, unused and unaccustomed to the laws of the whites, and to whom written laws governing their domestic relations were innovations at the time.” Chancey v. Whinnery, 47 Okla. 272 , 147 P. 1036 -38; Lewis v. Lewis, 60 Okla. 60 , 158 P. 368 ; Bishop on Marriage, Divorce & Separation (1st Ed.) vol. 1, sec. 1145; Boulden v. McIntire (Ind.) 21 N. E. 445 ; Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones (Ill.) 8 N. E. 865 ; Nixon v. Wichita

1916The party attacking such second marriage has the burden of proof to show that neither party to the first marriage had obtained a divorce. * * * ■ ■ “The law is so positive in requiring a party who asserts the illegality of a marriage, to take the burden of proving it that such requirement is enforced, even though it involve the proving a negative. • When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout a

1916The party attacking such second marriage has the burden of proof to show that neither party to the first marriage had obtained a divorce. * * * ■ ■ “The law is so positive in requiring a party who asserts the illegality of a marriage, to take the burden of proving it that such requirement is enforced, even though it involve the proving a negative. • When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a presumption of its legality, not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout a