third proposition error in Oklahoma

2000Pennington v. State, 1995 OK CR 79, ¶ 63 , 913 P.2d 1356, 1370-71, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 841 , 117 S.Ct. 121 , 136 L.Ed.2d 72 (1996). 4.

2000Pennington v. State, 1995 OK CR 79, ¶ 63 , 913 P.2d 1356, 1370-71, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 841 , 117 S.Ct. 121 , 136 L.Ed.2d 72 (1996). 4.

1996This, Appellant argues, goes against the principle of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987).

1996This, Appellant argues, goes against the principle of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987).

1996This, Appellant argues, goes against the principle of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987).

1996This, Appellant argues, goes against the principle of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987).

1995This Court decided in Cooper v. State, 889 P.2d 293 (Okl.Cr.1995) the provisions of 22 O.S.1991 §§ 1175.1 through 1175.8 are constitutional and the allocation of a clear and convincing burden of proof to a criminal defendant “is not subject to proscription under the Due Process clause, because it does not ‘offend[ ] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ Medina [v. California ], 505 U.S. [-] at -, 112 S.Ct. [2572] at 2577, 120 L.Ed.2d [353] at 363 [ (1992) ] (quoting Patterson [v. New York], 432 U.S. [197] at 202, [ 9

1995This Court decided in Cooper v. State, 889 P.2d 293 (Okl.Cr.1995) the provisions of 22 O.S.1991 §§ 1175.1 through 1175.8 are constitutional and the allocation of a clear and convincing burden of proof to a criminal defendant “is not subject to proscription under the Due Process clause, because it does not ‘offend[ ] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ Medina [v. California ], 505 U.S. [-] at -, 112 S.Ct. [2572] at 2577, 120 L.Ed.2d [353] at 363 [ (1992) ] (quoting Patterson [v. New York], 432 U.S. [197] at 202, [ 9

1995This Court decided in Cooper v. State, 889 P.2d 293 (Okl.Cr.1995) the provisions of 22 O.S.1991 §§ 1175.1 through 1175.8 are constitutional and the allocation of a clear and convincing burden of proof to a criminal defendant “is not subject to proscription under the Due Process clause, because it does not ‘offend[ ] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ Medina [v. California ], 505 U.S. [-] at -, 112 S.Ct. [2572] at 2577, 120 L.Ed.2d [353] at 363 [ (1992) ] (quoting Patterson [v. New York], 432 U.S. [197] at 202, [ 9

1988Counsel on appeal suggests that this requires that appellant’s conviction be reversed, and cites McQueen v. State, 421 P.2d 284 (Okl.Cr.1966).

1987Paris Bank of Texas v. Custer, 681 P.2d 71 (Okl.1984).

1982As was said in United States v. D’Amico, supra, “the clipping by the officer of the few strands of hair from appellant’s head was so minor an imposition that the appellant suffered no true humiliation or affront to his dignity.” In the third proposition of error, appellants assert that the trial court committed error by failing to suppress evidence gained from a search of the apartment.

1973The defendant cites the case of Hooper v. State, 7 Okl.Cr. 43 , 121 P. 1087 (1912), which held that the fact that the defendant has been in prison for an offense cannot be shown unless it is in some manner connected with the offense for which he is on trial, but the court continued and also stated: “ * * * But, while it is true that this evidence was improperly admitted, it does not necessarily follow that this case should be reversed on this account.” The defendant further cites Welch v. United States, 10 Cir, 371 F.2d 287 (1966), as holding that evidence of unlawful conduct is inadmissible w

1973The defendant cites the case of Hooper v. State, 7 Okl.Cr. 43 , 121 P. 1087 (1912), which held that the fact that the defendant has been in prison for an offense cannot be shown unless it is in some manner connected with the offense for which he is on trial, but the court continued and also stated: “ * * * But, while it is true that this evidence was improperly admitted, it does not necessarily follow that this case should be reversed on this account.” The defendant further cites Welch v. United States, 10 Cir, 371 F.2d 287 (1966), as holding that evidence of unlawful conduct is inadmissible w

1973The defendant cites the case of Hooper v. State, 7 Okl.Cr. 43 , 121 P. 1087 (1912), which held that the fact that the defendant has been in prison for an offense cannot be shown unless it is in some manner connected with the offense for which he is on trial, but the court continued and also stated: “ * * * But, while it is true that this evidence was improperly admitted, it does not necessarily follow that this case should be reversed on this account.” The defendant further cites Welch v. United States, 10 Cir, 371 F.2d 287 (1966), as holding that evidence of unlawful conduct is inadmissible w

1973The case of Klaassen v. State, 38 Okl.Cr. 402 , 266 P. 495 (1928), which is cited by defendants in their briefs on appeal is distinguishable from the present action.