Campbell test in Oregon

8 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Birchfieldgreen or · 2007 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011See State v. Birchfield, 342 Or. 624, 629-31 , 157 P.3d 216 (2007) (applying the two-part Campbell test). [7] We note further that nothing in the briefs submitted in Conway or William asserted that the admissibility of the Intoxilyzer certifications depended on such a "collateral" versus a "noncollateral" distinction. 2011See State v. Birchfield, 342 Or. 624, 629-31 , 157 P.3d 216 (2007) (applying the two-part Campbell test). [7] We note further that nothing in the briefs submitted in Conway or William asserted that the admissibility of the Intoxilyzer certifications depended on such a "collateral" versus a "noncollateral" distinction.	1	1
State v. Mooregreen or · 2002 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003The court stated that, in later decisions, it had proceeded to the second prong of the Campbell test “to consider the reliability of proffered hearsay only when confrontation, in the classic sense, was impossible.” Moore, 334 Or at 339 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 2003The court stated that, in later decisions, it had proceeded to the second prong of the Campbell test “to consider the reliability of proffered hearsay only when confrontation, in the classic sense, was impossible.” Moore, 334 Or at 339 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).	1	1
California v. Greenred scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 2 sentences 1993See California v. Green, 399 US 149, 158 , 90 S Ct 1930 , 26 L Ed 2d 489 (1970) (a defendant’s right to confront accuser under the Sixth Amendment “is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination”). 9 With respect to the “reliability” prong of the Campbell test, State v. Moen, supra, held: “The hearsay exception 431 expressed in OEC 803(4) is ‘firmly rooted.’ ” 309 Or at 63 . 1993See California v. Green, 399 US 149, 158 , 90 S Ct 1930 , 26 L Ed 2d 489 (1970) (a defendant’s right to confront accuser under the Sixth Amendment “is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination”). 9 With respect to the “reliability” prong of the Campbell test, State v. Moen, supra, held: “The hearsay exception 431 expressed in OEC 803(4) is ‘firmly rooted.’ ” 309 Or at 63 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Kennedy green or · 1983 2 sentences 2009We point this out “so that our decision is not misunderstood to foreclose any potential issue of state law for the future.” Kennedy, 295 Or at 268 . 2009We point this out "so that our decision is not misunderstood to foreclose any potential issue of state law for the future." Kennedy, 295 Or. at 268 , 666 P.2d 1316 . [9] That is not to say that the questions asked, or the subjective intentions of the questioners, are not relevant to this inquiry.	2	2009–2009
State v. William green orctapp · 2005 2 sentences 2011Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. Conway, 70 Or.App. 721 , 690 P.2d 1128 (1984), rev. den., 298 Or. 704 , 695 P.2d 1371 (1985); Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. William, 199 Or.App. 191 , 110 P.3d 1114 , rev. den., 339 Or. 406 , 122 P.3d 64 (2005). [8] See, e.g., Aguilar v. Washington County, 201 Or.App. 640, 648 , 120 P.3d 514 (2005) (stating that we will not overrule our own statutory interpretations "unless they are plainly wrong"). 2011Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. Conway, 70 Or.App. 721 , 690 P.2d 1128 (1984), rev. den., 298 Or. 704 , 695 P.2d 1371 (1985); Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. William, 199 Or.App. 191 , 110 P.3d 1114 , rev. den., 339 Or. 406 , 122 P.3d 64 (2005). [8] See, e.g., Aguilar v. Washington County, 201 Or.App. 640, 648 , 120 P.3d 514 (2005) (stating that we will not overrule our own statutory interpretations "unless they are plainly wrong").	1	2011–2011
State v. Conway green orctapp · 1984 2 sentences 2011Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. Conway, 70 Or.App. 721 , 690 P.2d 1128 (1984), rev. den., 298 Or. 704 , 695 P.2d 1371 (1985); Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. William, 199 Or.App. 191 , 110 P.3d 1114 , rev. den., 339 Or. 406 , 122 P.3d 64 (2005). [8] See, e.g., Aguilar v. Washington County, 201 Or.App. 640, 648 , 120 P.3d 514 (2005) (stating that we will not overrule our own statutory interpretations "unless they are plainly wrong"). 2011Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. Conway, 70 Or.App. 721 , 690 P.2d 1128 (1984), rev. den., 298 Or. 704 , 695 P.2d 1371 (1985); Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. William, 199 Or.App. 191 , 110 P.3d 1114 , rev. den., 339 Or. 406 , 122 P.3d 64 (2005). [8] See, e.g., Aguilar v. Washington County, 201 Or.App. 640, 648 , 120 P.3d 514 (2005) (stating that we will not overrule our own statutory interpretations "unless they are plainly wrong").	1	2011–2011
Aguilar v. Washington County green orctapp · 2005 2 sentences 2011Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. Conway, 70 Or.App. 721 , 690 P.2d 1128 (1984), rev. den., 298 Or. 704 , 695 P.2d 1371 (1985); Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. William, 199 Or.App. 191 , 110 P.3d 1114 , rev. den., 339 Or. 406 , 122 P.3d 64 (2005). [8] See, e.g., Aguilar v. Washington County, 201 Or.App. 640, 648 , 120 P.3d 514 (2005) (stating that we will not overrule our own statutory interpretations "unless they are plainly wrong"). 2011Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. Conway, 70 Or.App. 721 , 690 P.2d 1128 (1984), rev. den., 298 Or. 704 , 695 P.2d 1371 (1985); Appellant's and Respondent's Briefs, State v. William, 199 Or.App. 191 , 110 P.3d 1114 , rev. den., 339 Or. 406 , 122 P.3d 64 (2005). [8] See, e.g., Aguilar v. Washington County, 201 Or.App. 640, 648 , 120 P.3d 514 (2005) (stating that we will not overrule our own statutory interpretations "unless they are plainly wrong").	1	2011–2011
State v. Nagel green or · 1994 2 sentences 2006However, the Supreme Court applied the rule in State v. Nagel, 320 Or. 24, 29 , 880 P.2d 451 (1994) (field sobriety test is search), which involved neither a trespass nor a technological enhancement. 2006However, the Supreme Court applied the rule in State v. Nagel, 320 Or. 24, 29 , 880 P.2d 451 (1994) (field sobriety test is search), which involved neither a trespass nor a technological enhancement.	1	2006–2006
State v. Rumary neutral orctapp · 2001 2 sentences 2003Rumary, 173 Or App at 224 . 2003Rumary, 173 Or App at 224 .	1	2003–2003
State v. Moen green or · 1990 2 sentences 1993See California v. Green, 399 US 149, 158 , 90 S Ct 1930 , 26 L Ed 2d 489 (1970) (a defendant’s right to confront accuser under the Sixth Amendment “is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination”). 9 With respect to the “reliability” prong of the Campbell test, State v. Moen, supra, held: “The hearsay exception 431 expressed in OEC 803(4) is ‘firmly rooted.’ ” 309 Or at 63 . 1993See California v. Green, 399 US 149, 158 , 90 S Ct 1930 , 26 L Ed 2d 489 (1970) (a defendant’s right to confront accuser under the Sixth Amendment “is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination”). 9 With respect to the “reliability” prong of the Campbell test, State v. Moen, supra, held: “The hearsay exception 431 expressed in OEC 803(4) is ‘firmly rooted.’ ” 309 Or at 63 .	1	1993–1993
State v. Casconi green orctapp · 1988 2 sentences 1989Thus, in State v. Louis, supra, police observation and photographic recording of the defendant’s public behavior was held not to constitute a search because the defendant’s privacy was not thereby invaded, while in State v. Casconi, 94 Or App 457 , 766 P2d 397 (1988), we suppressed similarly-obtained photographic evidence of similar conduct occurring in a public restroom stall, because the police surveillance “significantly impaired] freedom from scrutiny.” 94 Or App at 461 . 1989Thus, in State v. Louis, supra, police observation and photographic recording of the defendant’s public behavior was held not to constitute a search because the defendant’s privacy was not thereby invaded, while in State v. Casconi, 94 Or App 457 , 766 P2d 397 (1988), we suppressed similarly-obtained photographic evidence of similar conduct occurring in a public restroom stall, because the police surveillance “significantly impaired] freedom from scrutiny.” 94 Or App at 461 .	1	1989–1989
Allen v. Elwert green · 1896 2 sentences 1926S. Campbell claim: Rental horses — $35.00 per month per team ..........................216.77 In considering the mechanic’s lien law of this state, it was said in Allen v. Elwert, 29 Or. 428 ( 44 Pac. 824 ): “We do not think the claimants are entitled to a lien for the use of their tools or appliances # * for the reason that they are in no sense either materials furnished to be used in the construction, alteration, or repair of a building, ,or labor performed thereon, and are therefore not within either the letter or spirit of the statute.” In 18 R. 1926S. Campbell claim: Rental horses — $35.00 per month per team ..........................216.77 In considering the mechanic’s lien law of this state, it was said in Allen v. Elwert, 29 Or. 428 ( 44 Pac. 824 ): “We do not think the claimants are entitled to a lien for the use of their tools or appliances # * for the reason that they are in no sense either materials furnished to be used in the construction, alteration, or repair of a building, ,or labor performed thereon, and are therefore not within either the letter or spirit of the statute.” In 18 R.	1	1926–1926

Where else courts name it

TX 24 (1972–2026) OH 22 (1990–2026) FL 17 (1982–2025) CA 12 (1988–2026) GA 11 (1993–2025) IN 9 (1992–2018) KS 9 (2005–2026) OR 8 (1926–2011) WA 7 (1969–2018) PA 7 (1976–2023) IA 7 (2014–2020) AL 6 (1994–2017) AZ 5 (1987–2020) LA 5 (1983–2002) SC 5 (2004–2025) MD 4 (1978–2005) ID 4 (1976–2026) IL 4 (1989–2022) VA 3 (1993–2018) ME 3 (2001–2022) KY 2 (2018–2023) NE 2 (1995–2019) MS 2 (2012–2016) MN 2 (1990–2018) MA 2 (1977–2003) NM 2 (1983–2016) WI 2 (1977–2006) NY 2 (1996–2026) CO 2 (1978–2021) AR 2 (1910–2023) MO 2 (2011–2025) UT 2 (2001–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check