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9 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kinkead v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See Kinkead v. State, 791 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that plea agreement term that the parties would argue restitution at sentencing was not an agreement by defendant to pay restitution amount greater than that resulting from his crime), trans. denied. [11] Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Campbell to pay $2,700 based on cleanup costs which were not associated with the exploitation charge to which Campbell pleaded guilty. | 1 | 1 |
Webb v. Jarvisgreen2 sentences2000I acknowledge that the court must typically balance the three factors enunciated in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.1991), which include the relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of harm to the injured person and public policy concerns, to determine whether a duty exists. 2000I acknowledge that the court must typically balance the three factors enunciated in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.1991), which include the relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of harm to the injured person and public policy concerns, to determine whether a duty exists. | 1 | 1 |
Board of Com'rs of Delaware County v. Briggsgreen2 sentences1999Briggs, 167 Ind.App. 96, 108 , 337 N.E.2d 852, 861 (1975) (citing Foust, supra). 1999Briggs, 167 Ind.App. 96, 108 , 337 N.E.2d 852, 861 (1975) (citing Foust, supra). | 1 | 1 |
Malachowski v. Bank One, Indianapolis, N.A.green1 sentence1998Malachowski v. Bank One, 682 N.E.2d 530, 532 (Ind.1997), reh’g denied. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bleeke v. Lemmon
green
1 sentence2015Bleeke, 6 N.E.3d at 934 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Catt v. Board of Com'rs of Knox County
green
2 sentences2010"In Indiana, it is well settled that a governmental entity has a common law duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel." Catt, 779 N.E.2d at 3 . 2010"In Indiana, it is well settled that a governmental entity has a common law duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel." Catt, 779 N.E.2d at 3 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2009In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when, based on a totality of the cireumstances, the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 2009In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when, based on a totality of the cireumstances, the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Kindred v. State
green
2 sentences2003Kindred v. State, 771 N.E.2d 760 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) held that it was outside the statutory jurisdiction of the sentencing court to enter an order granting Class I credit time classification to the defendant, "effectively granting him one day of credit time for each day of incarceration ... regardless of any disciplinary actions." Id. at 764 . 2003Kindred v. State, 771 N.E.2d 760 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) held that it was outside the statutory jurisdiction of the sentencing court to enter an order granting Class I credit time classification to the defendant, "effectively granting him one day of credit time for each day of incarceration ... regardless of any disciplinary actions." Id. at 764 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Benton v. City of Oakland City
green
2 sentences2000Id. 2000Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Griffin v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1992Although Criterion did not dispute Campbell's status as indigent, the trial court denied Campbell's motion to proceed in for-ma pauperis. 2 From this denial, Campbell appeals. 3 DISCUSSION '"[There] can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." So wrote Justice Black in the seminal case of Griffin v. Illinois (1956), 851 U.S. 12 , 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591 , 100 L.Ed. 891 , which held that a state must provide trial transcripts prepared at public expense to its indigent criminal appellants when the state provided for an appeal as of right and re | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.