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8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 2016–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Com. v. Min, J.green1 sentence2026See Pa.R.A.P. 513. 12 The PCRA court did not order Brooks to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. - 11 - J-S22029-25 error.” Commonwealth v. Min, 320 A.3d 727, 730 (Pa. Super. 2024). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fearsgreen1 sentence2026When reviewing a claim of ineffective counsel, “[c]ounsel is presumed effective, and [the PCRA petitioner] bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Strasburg Scooters, LLC v. Strasburg Rail Rd., Inc.green1 sentence2025See Strasburg Scooters, LLC, 210 A.3d at 1067 (declaring that a judgment or decree rendered by a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction is null and void).9 Accordingly, we affirm the June 6, 2024 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County to the extent that it denied Brooks’ motion to file a late appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Dixgreen1 sentence2023See Dix, 207 A.3d at 390 . - 16 - J-S33043-22 Brooks’s third issue challenges the discretionary aspects of the trial court’s sentence. | 1 | 1 |
Shearer, D., Aplts. v. Hafer, S.green1 sentence2020Regarding the first requirement of separability, the Family Court contends that the question of whether it qualifies as a “Commonwealth party” within the meaning of the Sovereign Immunity Act and, therefore, retains sovereign immunity from Brooks’ claim “is clearly both conceptually and factually distinct from the merits of [the] underlying negligence cause of action.” Family Court’s Brief at 18; see also id. at 16 (citing Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433 ), id. at 26-27 (citing Yorty v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 79 A.3d 655 (Pa. Super. 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
Township of Worcester v. Office of Open Recordsgreen1 sentence2020“In determining whether an order is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action, we must first decide whether review of the order implicates the merits of the main cause of action.” Twp. of Worcester v. Office of Open Records, 129 A.3d 44, 55 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 78 A.3d 1070 (Pa. 2013)). “[I]f the resolution of an issue concerning a challenged trial court order can be achieved independent from an analysis of the merits of the underlying dispute, then the order is separable for purposes of determining whether the order is a collateral order pursuant | 1 | 1 |
Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp.green2 sentences2020Regarding the first requirement of separability, the Family Court contends that the question of whether it qualifies as a “Commonwealth party” within the meaning of the Sovereign Immunity Act and, therefore, retains sovereign immunity from Brooks’ claim “is clearly both conceptually and factually distinct from the merits of [the] underlying negligence cause of action.” Family Court’s Brief at 18; see also id. at 16 (citing Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433 ), id. at 26-27 (citing Yorty v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 79 A.3d 655 (Pa. Super. 2013)). 2020Regarding the first requirement of separability, the Family Court contends that the question of whether it qualifies as a “Commonwealth party” within the meaning of the Sovereign Immunity Act and, therefore, retains sovereign immunity from Brooks’ claim “is clearly both conceptually and factually distinct from the merits of [the] underlying negligence cause of action.” Family Court’s Brief at 18; see also id. at 16 (citing Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433 ), id. at 26-27 (citing Yorty v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 79 A.3d 655 (Pa. Super. 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
Yorty v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.green1 sentence2020Regarding the first requirement of separability, the Family Court contends that the question of whether it qualifies as a “Commonwealth party” within the meaning of the Sovereign Immunity Act and, therefore, retains sovereign immunity from Brooks’ claim “is clearly both conceptually and factually distinct from the merits of [the] underlying negligence cause of action.” Family Court’s Brief at 18; see also id. at 16 (citing Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433 ), id. at 26-27 (citing Yorty v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 79 A.3d 655 (Pa. Super. 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Brooksgreen1 sentence2016See Brooks, 875 A.2d at 1147-48 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Kennedy
green
1 sentence2020“In determining whether an order is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action, we must first decide whether review of the order implicates the merits of the main cause of action.” Twp. of Worcester v. Office of Open Records, 129 A.3d 44, 55 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 78 A.3d 1070 (Pa. 2013)). “[I]f the resolution of an issue concerning a challenged trial court order can be achieved independent from an analysis of the merits of the underlying dispute, then the order is separable for purposes of determining whether the order is a collateral order pursuant | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Leak v. Defino-Nastasi
green
1 sentence2020“In determining whether an order is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action, we must first decide whether review of the order implicates the merits of the main cause of action.” Twp. of Worcester v. Office of Open Records, 129 A.3d 44, 55 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 78 A.3d 1070 (Pa. 2013)). “[I]f the resolution of an issue concerning a challenged trial court order can be achieved independent from an analysis of the merits of the underlying dispute, then the order is separable for purposes of determining whether the order is a collateral order pursuant | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Hopkins, K.
green
1 sentence2018In his penultimate claim, Brooks argues that the trial court erred by imposing a mandatory minimum sentence that is unconstitutional under Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Elliott
green
2 sentences2016Subsequently, our Supreme Court revisited the Brooks issue in Commonwealth v. Elliott, 622 Pa. 236 , 80 A.3d 415 (2013). 2016Subsequently, our Supreme Court revisited the Brooks issue in Commonwealth v. Elliott, 622 Pa. 236 , 80 A.3d 415 (2013). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.