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8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 1 courts 1965–1968 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Padgettgreen2 sentences1968See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 , 86 S. Ct. 1761 (1966); cf. Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 238 , 237 A. 2d 209, 214 (1968). 1968See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 , 86 S. Ct. 1761 (1966); cf. Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 238 , 237 A. 2d 209, 214 (1968). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Negrigreen2 sentences1966While it is true that Escobedo was decided on June 22, 1964, almost three years after appellant's trial, appellant's conviction was not then "final" as we defined that word in Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 128-29 , 213 A. 2d 670, 675-76 (1965), and thus under Negri appellant would have been entitled to raise an Escobedo claim. 1966While it is true that Escobedo was decided on June 22, 1964, almost three years after appellant's trial, appellant's conviction was not then "final" as we defined that word in Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 128-29 , 213 A. 2d 670, 675-76 (1965), and thus under Negri appellant would have been entitled to raise an Escobedo claim. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Bayergreen2 sentences1968Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the Supreme Court in United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 , 67 S. Ct. 1394, 1398 (1947), aptly centers upon the position of the accused in such circumstances: “[Ajfter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. 1968Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the Supreme Court in United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 , 67 S. Ct. 1394, 1398 (1947), aptly centers upon the position of the accused in such circumstances: “[Ajfter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences1968See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 , 86 S. Ct. 1761 (1966); cf. Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 238 , 237 A. 2d 209, 214 (1968). 1968See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 , 86 S. Ct. 1761 (1966); cf. Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 238 , 237 A. 2d 209, 214 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences1968See People v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 96 , 429 P. 2d 600 , 60 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1967) (Escobedo claim) ; People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9 , 429 P. 2d 177 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) (Miranda claim) ; People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 82 , 429 P. 2d 137 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (Escobedo claim). 10 United States v. Wade, supra at 227, 87 S. Ct. at 1932: “The presence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial itself, operates to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.” Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, supra at 492, 1968See People v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 96 , 429 P. 2d 600 , 60 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1967) (Escobedo claim) ; People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9 , 429 P. 2d 177 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) (Miranda claim) ; People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 82 , 429 P. 2d 137 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (Escobedo claim). 10 United States v. Wade, supra at 227, 87 S. Ct. at 1932: “The presence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial itself, operates to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.” Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, supra at 492, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Cheeks
green
2 sentences1966Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 423 Pa. 67 , 223 A. 2d 291 (1966). 1966Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 423 Pa. 67 , 223 A. 2d 291 (1966). | 2 | 1966–1966 |
People v. Doherty
green
2 sentences1968See People v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 96 , 429 P. 2d 600 , 60 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1967) (Escobedo claim) ; People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9 , 429 P. 2d 177 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) (Miranda claim) ; People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 82 , 429 P. 2d 137 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (Escobedo claim). 10 United States v. Wade, supra at 227, 87 S. Ct. at 1932: “The presence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial itself, operates to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.” Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, supra at 492, 1968See People v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 96 , 429 P. 2d 600 , 60 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1967) (Escobedo claim) ; People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9 , 429 P. 2d 177 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) (Miranda claim) ; People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 82 , 429 P. 2d 137 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (Escobedo claim). 10 United States v. Wade, supra at 227, 87 S. Ct. at 1932: “The presence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial itself, operates to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.” Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, supra at 492, | 1 | 1968–1968 |
People v. Powell
green
2 sentences1968See People v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 96 , 429 P. 2d 600 , 60 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1967) (Escobedo claim) ; People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9 , 429 P. 2d 177 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) (Miranda claim) ; People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 82 , 429 P. 2d 137 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (Escobedo claim). 10 United States v. Wade, supra at 227, 87 S. Ct. at 1932: “The presence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial itself, operates to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.” Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, supra at 492, 1968See People v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 96 , 429 P. 2d 600 , 60 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1967) (Escobedo claim) ; People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9 , 429 P. 2d 177 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) (Miranda claim) ; People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 82 , 429 P. 2d 137 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (Escobedo claim). 10 United States v. Wade, supra at 227, 87 S. Ct. at 1932: “The presence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial itself, operates to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.” Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, supra at 492, | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Johnson v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1968Except for the absence of Miranda and Escobedo warnings, an infirmity which, by itself, could not support an involuntariness claim, see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966), the only other possible irregularity present in Baity’s interrogation was the so-called “trick.” The Supreme Court of the United States has spoken infrequently in the area of trick confessions, but those few cases which do appear indicate that the law in this area does not conflict with our own Pennsylvania decisions. 1968Except for the absence of Miranda and Escobedo warnings, an infirmity which, by itself, could not support an involuntariness claim, see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 , 86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966), the only other possible irregularity present in Baity’s interrogation was the so-called “trick.” The Supreme Court of the United States has spoken infrequently in the area of trick confessions, but those few cases which do appear indicate that the law in this area does not conflict with our own Pennsylvania decisions. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Escobedo v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1968See People v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 96 , 429 P. 2d 600 , 60 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1967) (Escobedo claim) ; People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9 , 429 P. 2d 177 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967) (Miranda claim) ; People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 82 , 429 P. 2d 137 , 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967) (Escobedo claim). 10 United States v. Wade, supra at 227, 87 S. Ct. at 1932: “The presence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial itself, operates to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.” Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, supra at 492, | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Commonwealth v. Schmidt
green
2 sentences1968In Johnson v. New Jersey, the Court said (pages 733-734) : “Apart from its broad implications, the precise holding of Escobedo was that statements elicited by the police during an interrogation may not be used against the accused at a criminal trial, ‘[where] the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consul 1968In Johnson v. New Jersey, the Court said (pages 733-734) : “Apart from its broad implications, the precise holding of Escobedo was that statements elicited by the police during an interrogation may not be used against the accused at a criminal trial, ‘[where] the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consul | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Chester Nelson v. People of the State of California, Robert A. Heinze, Warden
green
1 sentence1965With the holding of Mendes , compare the holding-in Nelson v. California, 346 F. 2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965) (counsel’s failure to object to introduction of confession waives Escobedo claim even though accused disagreed at trial with strategy of counsel). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
United States of America Ex Rel. Oscar Walden, Jr. v. Frank J. Pate, Warden, Illinois State Penitentiary, Joliet Branch
green
2 sentences1965Walden v. Pate, 350 F. 2d 240 (1965), is concededly explicit in holding that the Escobedo rule is not to be applied retrospectively. 1965Walden v. Pate, 350 F. 2d 240 (1965), is concededly explicit in holding that the Escobedo rule is not to be applied retrospectively. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences1965Believing that the basic function of the ruling in Escobedo is “to provide adequate assurance of police adherence to the constitutional principles inherent in due process,” 3 and analogizing this ease to Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965), a majority of this Court concludes that no useful purpose would be served by applying the Escobedo principle to cases other than non-final judgments. 4 The Escobedo principle may indeed act as a protecting deterrent against excesses in interrogations. 1965Believing that the basic function of the ruling in Escobedo is “to provide adequate assurance of police adherence to the constitutional principles inherent in due process,” 3 and analogizing this ease to Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965), a majority of this Court concludes that no useful purpose would be served by applying the Escobedo principle to cases other than non-final judgments. 4 The Escobedo principle may indeed act as a protecting deterrent against excesses in interrogations. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.