plaintiff argues hearing in Rhode Island

2012The plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred in his “analysis and application of the principles enunciated by this Court in the seminal case of Dupre v. Dupre,” 857 A.2d 242 (R.I.2004).

2012The plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred in his "analysis and application of the principles enunciated by this Court in the seminal case of Dupre v. Dupre, " 857 A.2d 242 (R.I.2004).

2023Felkner v. Rhode Island College, 203 A.3d 433 , 440 n.2 (R.I. 2019) (Felkner I). -1- summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.

2011The plaintiff argues that our inquiry, under the Recreational Use Statute, as to the nature and scope of activity for which the premises are held open to the public, “could lead to absurd and unintended consequences”; plaintiff proposes that this Court should instead adopt an interpretation that contemplates the “specific plaintiffs purpose for being on the land.” The plaintiff relies on Iodence v. City of Alliance, 270 Neb. 59 , 700 N.W.2d 562 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320 , 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006), in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska declined to ad

2011The plaintiff argues that our inquiry, under the Recreational Use Statute, as to the nature and scope of activity for which the premises are held open to the public, “could lead to absurd and unintended consequences”; plaintiff proposes that this Court should instead adopt an interpretation that contemplates the “specific plaintiffs purpose for being on the land.” The plaintiff relies on Iodence v. City of Alliance, 270 Neb. 59 , 700 N.W.2d 562 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320 , 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006), in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska declined to ad

2011The plaintiff argues that our inquiry, under the Recreational Use Statute, as to the nature and scope of activity for which the premises are held open to the public, “could lead to absurd and unintended consequences”; plaintiff proposes that this Court should instead adopt an interpretation that contemplates the “specific plaintiffs purpose for being on the land.” The plaintiff relies on Iodence v. City of Alliance, 270 Neb. 59 , 700 N.W.2d 562 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320 , 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006), in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska declined to ad

2011The plaintiff argues that our inquiry, under the Recreational Use Statute, as to the nature and scope of activity for which the premises are held open to the public, “could lead to absurd and unintended consequences”; plaintiff proposes that this Court should instead adopt an interpretation that contemplates the “specific plaintiffs purpose for being on the land.” The plaintiff relies on Iodence v. City of Alliance, 270 Neb. 59 , 700 N.W.2d 562 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320 , 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006), in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska declined to ad

1990Although it is clear from the record that the hearing officer asked questions of the supervisor of Research and Highway Safety Promotion, we have indicated, “An administrative hearing officer is not required to assume a wholly passive role and may participate in the proceeding whenever necessary to the end that the hearing proceed in an orderly, expeditious fashion.” Davis, 427 A.2d at 337 .