plaintiff argues claim in Connecticut

2024In support of her argument, the plaintiff highlights the final sentence in the following quotation from the decision of the hearing officer, which was made in the context of distinguishing Bassford v. Bassford, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-15- 6012903-S (March 24, 2016) (reprinted at 180 Conn. App. 335 , 183 A.3d 686 (2018)), aff’d, 180 Conn. App. 331 , 183 A.3d 680 (2018): ‘‘In Bassford, the decedent had been involuntarily conserved.

2024In support of her argument, the plaintiff highlights the final sentence in the following quotation from the decision of the hearing officer, which was made in the context of distinguishing Bassford v. Bassford, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-15- 6012903-S (March 24, 2016) (reprinted at 180 Conn. App. 335 , 183 A.3d 686 (2018)), aff’d, 180 Conn. App. 331 , 183 A.3d 680 (2018): ‘‘In Bassford, the decedent had been involuntarily conserved.

2022We are not persuaded by that argument. 10 The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he emotional abuse was actually being caused by the [children’s mother] falsely accusing and coercing the children, shaming the [plaintiff] to the children, brainwashing the children and used sheer manipulation tactics.’’ In support of this argument, the plaintiff devotes a significant portion of his brief to discussing ‘‘malicious parent syndrome.’’ Neither the hearing officer nor the court made any findings as to ‘‘malicious parent syndrome,’’ and it is ‘‘axiomatic that this appellate body does not engage in fact-findin

2022We are not persuaded by that argument. 10 The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he emotional abuse was actually being caused by the [children’s mother] falsely accusing and coercing the children, shaming the [plaintiff] to the children, brainwashing the children and used sheer manipulation tactics.’’ In support of this argument, the plaintiff devotes a significant portion of his brief to discussing ‘‘malicious parent syndrome.’’ Neither the hearing officer nor the court made any findings as to ‘‘malicious parent syndrome,’’ and it is ‘‘axiomatic that this appellate body does not engage in fact-findin

2020Statutory con- struction, in turn, presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Rosato v. Rosato, 77 Conn. App. 9, 18 , 822 A.2d 974 (2003).

2020Statutory con- struction, in turn, presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Rosato v. Rosato, 77 Conn. App. 9, 18 , 822 A.2d 974 (2003).

2018The plaintiff argues that the warning gives rise to an inference of discrimination against the plaintiff on the basis of his religion. "[R]emarks made by someone other than the person who made the decision adversely affecting the plaintiff may have little tendency to show that the decision-maker was motivated by the discriminatory sentiment expressed in the remark." Tomassi v. Insignia Financial Group, Inc. , 478 F.3d 111 , 115 (2d Cir. 2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. , 557 U.S. 167 , 177-78, 129 S.Ct. 2343 , 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009).

2018The plaintiff argues that the warning gives rise to an inference of discrimination against the plaintiff on the basis of his religion. "[R]emarks made by someone other than the person who made the decision adversely affecting the plaintiff may have little tendency to show that the decision-maker was motivated by the discriminatory sentiment expressed in the remark." Tomassi v. Insignia Financial Group, Inc. , 478 F.3d 111 , 115 (2d Cir. 2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. , 557 U.S. 167 , 177-78, 129 S.Ct. 2343 , 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009).

2018We note that the only explicit mention of race is contained in paragraph one of the initial complaint, where it is alleged that the plaintiff is "a white, sixty-two (62) year old female ...." 5 In her brief, the plaintiff argues that her claim is indeed one of discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the act: "The issue, then, regarding the first count concerns the adequacy of the allegation ... to state a claim under [§§] 46a-101 (e) and 46-100." We note also that the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that count one of the amended substitute complaint alleged race discrim

2018We note that the only explicit mention of race is contained in paragraph one of the initial complaint, where it is alleged that the plaintiff is "a white, sixty-two (62) year old female ...." 5 In her brief, the plaintiff argues that her claim is indeed one of discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the act: "The issue, then, regarding the first count concerns the adequacy of the allegation ... to state a claim under [§§] 46a-101 (e) and 46-100." We note also that the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that count one of the amended substitute complaint alleged race discrim

2018The plaintiff argues that the warning gives rise to an inference of discrimination against the plaintiff on the basis of his religion. "[R]emarks made by someone other than the person who made the decision adversely affecting the plaintiff may have little tendency to show that the decision-maker was motivated by the discriminatory sentiment expressed in the remark." Tomassi v. Insignia Financial Group, Inc. , 478 F.3d 111 , 115 (2d Cir. 2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. , 557 U.S. 167 , 177-78, 129 S.Ct. 2343 , 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009).

2018We note that the only explicit mention of race is contained in paragraph one of the initial complaint, where it is alleged that the plaintiff is "a white, sixty-two (62) year old female ...." 5 In her brief, the plaintiff argues that her claim is indeed one of discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the act: "The issue, then, regarding the first count concerns the adequacy of the allegation ... to state a claim under [§§] 46a-101 (e) and 46-100." We note also that the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that count one of the amended substitute complaint alleged race discrim

2018We note that the only explicit mention of race is contained in paragraph one of the initial complaint, where it is alleged that the plaintiff is "a white, sixty-two (62) year old female ...." 5 In her brief, the plaintiff argues that her claim is indeed one of discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the act: "The issue, then, regarding the first count concerns the adequacy of the allegation ... to state a claim under [§§] 46a-101 (e) and 46-100." We note also that the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that count one of the amended substitute complaint alleged race discrim

2017Although the plaintiff argues that the standard of review for this issue is plenary, this court has held that "the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under the act is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review." Ayantola v. Board of Trustees of Technical Colleges , 116 Conn.App. 531 , 538, 976 A.2d 784 (2009).

2017Although the plaintiff argues that the standard of review for this issue is plenary, this court has held that "the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under the act is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review." Ayantola v. Board of Trustees of Technical Colleges , 116 Conn.App. 531 , 538, 976 A.2d 784 (2009).

2014He was sentenced to five years imprisonment, execution suspended, followed by twenty years probation, and is listed on Connecticut’s sex offender registry. 2 To the extent that the plaintiff argues that his claim should be analyzed under the framework that this court applied in Edwards v. Tardif, supra, 240 Conn. 610 , we disagree.

2012We therefore refer to Kamm and New Milford Medical Group, LLC, collectively as the defendants. 3 Relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in Wexler v. DeMaio, 280 Conn. 168, 181 , 906 A.2d 1196 (2006), the plaintiff argues that the standard of review in the present case is plenary.

2012We therefore refer to Kamm and New Milford Medical Group, LLC, collectively as the defendants. 3 Relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in Wexler v. DeMaio, 280 Conn. 168, 181 , 906 A.2d 1196 (2006), the plaintiff argues that the standard of review in the present case is plenary.

2007These boldface catchlines should not be read or considered as statements of legislative intent since their sole purpose is to provide users with a brief description of the contents of the sections.'" Id., at 389 n. 14, quoting General Statutes, preface, p. vii. [6] The plaintiff argues that the analysis of Toll Gate Farms, Inc. v. Milk Regulation Board, supra, 148 Conn. at 346-47 , 170 A.2d 883 , is inapposite because the present case is analogous to attempting to sell regular milk as skim milk; put differently, in the plaintiff's view, a fee that is unreasonable simply is not a "`conveyance f

2007These boldface catchlines should not be read or considered as statements of legislative intent since their sole purpose is to provide users with a brief description of the contents of the sections.'" Id., at 389 n. 14, quoting General Statutes, preface, p. vii. [6] The plaintiff argues that the analysis of Toll Gate Farms, Inc. v. Milk Regulation Board, supra, 148 Conn. at 346-47 , 170 A.2d 883 , is inapposite because the present case is analogous to attempting to sell regular milk as skim milk; put differently, in the plaintiff's view, a fee that is unreasonable simply is not a "`conveyance f

2006In the present case, the plaintiff argues that the doctrine of superseding cause has been abolished in all civil cases as a consequence of Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424 , 820 A.2d 258 (2003), and that, therefore, the jury instruction was improper.

2006In the present case, the plaintiff argues that the doctrine of superseding cause has been abolished in all civil cases as a consequence of Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424 , 820 A.2d 258 (2003), and that, therefore, the jury instruction was improper.

2002The federal constitution does not apply. however, because no state action is involved in this case. "[S]tate action. . . [is] an essential requirement for invocation of the due process clauses of both our federal and state constitutions. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Savage v. Aronson , 214 Conn. 256 , 284 . 571 A.2d 696 (1990).

2002The federal constitution does not apply. however, because no state action is involved in this case. "[S]tate action. . . [is] an essential requirement for invocation of the due process clauses of both our federal and state constitutions. . . ." (Citations omitted.) Savage v. Aronson , 214 Conn. 256 , 284 . 571 A.2d 696 (1990).

2002Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction because: (1) the defendant's demand that she dispose of her husband's stock usurps the authority of the probate court; 5 (2) the defendant does not have the authority to interpret or enforce the provisions of § 33-182g ; (3) the court is not required to defer to an administrative agency where a legal question (the determination of statutory language) is at issue; and (4) the relief available in an administrative action is an inadequate remedy because it has "a chilling effect on the Estate's ability to co

2002Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction because: (1) the defendant's demand that she dispose of her husband's stock usurps the authority of the probate court; 5 (2) the defendant does not have the authority to interpret or enforce the provisions of § 33-182g ; (3) the court is not required to defer to an administrative agency where a legal question (the determination of statutory language) is at issue; and (4) the relief available in an administrative action is an inadequate remedy because it has "a chilling effect on the Estate's ability to co

2002The plaintiff argues that her claim that expert testimony was not required to establish that the defendant had a duty to inform is controlled by our Supreme Court’s decision in Godwin v. Danbury Eye Physicians & Surgeons, P.C., supra, 254 Conn. 131 , which was decided subsequent to the plaintiffs trial and which involved the same trial judge, the same plaintiff’s counsel and the same defense counsel. 5 We agree.

2002The plaintiff argues that the rule established by the Supreme Court in Cannon has been overruled by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.

2002The plaintiff argues that the rule established by the Supreme Court in Cannon has been overruled by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.

2001"An action for abuse of process lies against any person using a legal process against another in an improper manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozzochi v. Beck , 204 Conn. 490 , 494 , 529 A.2d 171 (1987) see also Northwestern Mutual Life Ins.

2001"An action for abuse of process lies against any person using a legal process against another in an improper manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozzochi v. Beck , 204 Conn. 490 , 494 , 529 A.2d 171 (1987) see also Northwestern Mutual Life Ins.

2001Under Connecticut law, it is the "right of a tenant to enforce a covenant of quiet enjoyment." Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212 , 218 , 455 A.2d 857 (1983).

2001Under Connecticut law, it is the "right of a tenant to enforce a covenant of quiet enjoyment." Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212 , 218 , 455 A.2d 857 (1983).

2001We conclude that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff has not set forth facts that reveal the existence of a legally cognizable cause of action in that regard. 5 The plaintiff argues that her claim should survive the defendant’s motion for summary judgment under a partnership by estoppel, apparent agency or agency by estoppel theory. 6 The defendant, citing Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn. App. 759, 771 , 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), argues that “the doctrine of agency by estoppel, or apparent authority, has never been used to attach tort liability.” The doctrine o

2001We conclude that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff has not set forth facts that reveal the existence of a legally cognizable cause of action in that regard. 5 The plaintiff argues that her claim should survive the defendant’s motion for summary judgment under a partnership by estoppel, apparent agency or agency by estoppel theory. 6 The defendant, citing Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn. App. 759, 771 , 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), argues that “the doctrine of agency by estoppel, or apparent authority, has never been used to attach tort liability.” The doctrine o

2000"Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mayer v. Biafore, Florek O'Neill , 245 Conn. 88 , 91 , 713 A.2d 1267 (1998).

2000"Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mayer v. Biafore, Florek O'Neill , 245 Conn. 88 , 91 , 713 A.2d 1267 (1998).

2000For the proposition that the defense of good faith and fair dealing is not appropriate in a foreclosure action, the plaintiff refers to Southbridge Associates v. Garofalo , 53 Conn. App. 11 (1999).

1999One factor to be considered in determining whether an improper ruling on evidence is a harmless error is whether the testimony was cumulative . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 276 , 729 A.2d 245 , cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926 , 733 A.2d 850 (1999).

1999One factor to be considered in determining whether an improper ruling on evidence is a harmless error is whether the testimony was cumulative . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 276 , 729 A.2d 245 , cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926 , 733 A.2d 850 (1999).