8 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Spence Ex Rel. Estate of Spence v. Wingategreen2 sentences2021See Spence v. Wingate, 381 S.C. 487, 489 , 674 S.E.2d 169, 170 (2009) (per curiam) (finding while the circuit court did not explicitly reiterate the argument raised by the losing party at summary judgment in its order, the issue was nevertheless ruled upon by a general ruling as to the issue and adoption of the precise argument of the winning party). 2021See Spence v. Wingate, 381 S.C. 487, 489 , 674 S.E.2d 169, 170 (2009) (per curiam) (finding while the circuit court did not explicitly reiterate the argument raised by the losing party at summary judgment in its order, the issue was nevertheless ruled upon by a general ruling as to the issue and adoption of the precise argument of the winning party). | 1 | 1 |
Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbiagreen2 sentences2021STANDARD OF REVIEW "On review from a grant of summary judgment, [this c]ourt applies the same standard applied by the circuit court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP." Stevens & Wilkinson of S.C., Inc. v. City of Columbia, 409 S.C. 568, 576 , 762 S.E.2d 696, 700 (2014). 2021STANDARD OF REVIEW "On review from a grant of summary judgment, [this c]ourt applies the same standard applied by the circuit court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP." Stevens & Wilkinson of S.C., Inc. v. City of Columbia, 409 S.C. 568, 576 , 762 S.E.2d 696, 700 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Doegreen2 sentences2016Code Ann. § 15-3-535 (2005) (stating personal injury actions must be commenced within three years "after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action"); Jackson v. Doe, 342 S.C. 552, 558 , 537 S.E.2d 567, 570 (Ct. App. 2000) ("The language of Rule 15(c) clearly speaks to a change in party, not the addition of a defendant to an already existing defendant. 2016Code Ann. § 15-3-535 (2005) (stating personal injury actions must be commenced within three years "after the person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action"); Jackson v. Doe, 342 S.C. 552, 558 , 537 S.E.2d 567, 570 (Ct. App. 2000) ("The language of Rule 15(c) clearly speaks to a change in party, not the addition of a defendant to an already existing defendant. | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Howegreen2 sentences2014Client's expert, Dr. Gregory B. 3 See also Doe, 367 S.C. at 443 , 626 S.E.2d at 30 ("Because nothing in the record suggests that a dispute exists regarding any of the factual issues regarding the applicability of the statute of limitations in the underlying case, such as estoppel or some discrepancy as to the operative dates, we hold Doe's claim against Porter- Gaud as a matter of law, had lapsed long before [defendant] undertook to represent him."). 2014Client's expert, Dr. Gregory B. 3 See also Doe, 367 S.C. at 443 , 626 S.E.2d at 30 ("Because nothing in the record suggests that a dispute exists regarding any of the factual issues regarding the applicability of the statute of limitations in the underlying case, such as estoppel or some discrepancy as to the operative dates, we hold Doe's claim against Porter- Gaud as a matter of law, had lapsed long before [defendant] undertook to represent him."). | 1 | 1 |
Suppressed v. Suppressedgreen2 sentences2005Litigation inherently causes a client to suffer emotional distress, and to allow damages for such distress would escalate the cost of practicing law.”); Suppressed v. Suppressed, 206 Ill.App.3d 918 , 151 111.Dec. 830, 565 N.E.2d 101, 106 (1990) (stating that to allow an action for breach of fiduciary duty based on emotional harm alone "would be opening the door to any number of malpractice actions brought by clients who may have been less than satisfied with their legal representation but can point to no specific harm other than their own emotional distress”); (2) Doe’s claim for breach of fid 2005Litigation inherently causes a client to suffer emotional distress, and to allow damages for such distress would escalate the cost of practicing law.”); Suppressed v. Suppressed, 206 Ill.App.3d 918 , 151 111.Dec. 830, 565 N.E.2d 101, 106 (1990) (stating that to allow an action for breach of fiduciary duty based on emotional harm alone "would be opening the door to any number of malpractice actions brought by clients who may have been less than satisfied with their legal representation but can point to no specific harm other than their own emotional distress”); (2) Doe’s claim for breach of fid | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Kidd
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 358-60 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Bowen v. Lee Process Systems Co.
green
2 sentences2005Bowen, 342 S.C. at 241 , 536 S.E.2d at 91 . 2005Bowen, 342 S.C. at 241 , 536 S.E.2d at 91 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Doe v. Stegall
green
1 sentence2005Id., 653 F.2d at 236 . *217 We are persuaded that the denial of Doe’s motion to proceed anonymously meets the criteria for appellate review. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
cluster 366577
green
1 sentence2005Id., 653 F.2d at 236 . *217 We are persuaded that the denial of Doe’s motion to proceed anonymously meets the criteria for appellate review. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
LK v. Reed
green
1 sentence1999See Parsons v. Parker, supra; LK v. Reed, supra. In holding otherwise, the Court of Appeals essentially held consent could be a complete defense to Doe’s claim of negligent supervision. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.