Doe defendant in California

2026(See generally Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176 [“the new defendant in an amended complaint [must] be substituted for an existing fictious Doe defendant”].) Regardless, we assume that was plaintiffs’ intent.

2026(See generally Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176 [“the new defendant in an amended complaint [must] be substituted for an existing fictious Doe defendant”].) Regardless, we assume that was plaintiffs’ intent.

2016(Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 599 ["Where a complaint sets forth, or attempts to set forth, a cause of action against a defendant designated by fictitious name and his true name is thereafter discovered and substituted by amendment, he is considered a party to the action from its commencement so that the statute of limitations stops running as of the date of the earlier pleading."].) As an aside, review of the attorney's certificate of merit filed by Rubenstein suggests she knows the identity of at least one other Doe defendant because the certificate n

1999(Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 599 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 364 P.2d 681 ].) Among the requirements for application of the section 474 relation-back doctrine is that the new defendant in an amended complaint be substituted for an existing fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint.

2017However, Cabandong's explanation is irrelevant, since for purposes of computing the three years in which the plaintiff must serve the defendant, "[f]ailure to discover relevant facts or evidence is not a cause beyond the plaintiff's control ..." (§ 583.240, subd. (d)). ( Republic Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1253 , 1256, 207 Cal.Rptr. 241 [under predecessor to § 583.240, subd. (d), plaintiff's failure to discover the true identity or facts showing the liability of an unserved Doe defendant insufficient excuse for delay in service of summons on real defendant].) In a related ar

2017However, Cabandong's explanation is irrelevant, since for purposes of computing the three years in which the plaintiff must serve the defendant, "[f]ailure to discover relevant facts or evidence is not a cause beyond the plaintiff's control ..." (§ 583.240, subd. (d)). ( Republic Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1253 , 1256, 207 Cal.Rptr. 241 [under predecessor to § 583.240, subd. (d), plaintiff's failure to discover the true identity or facts showing the liability of an unserved Doe defendant insufficient excuse for delay in service of summons on real defendant].) In a related ar

2025(McOwen, at p. 947; General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580 , 597–598 & fn. 16.) For example, in McOwen, the plaintiff substituted a doctor for a Doe defendant after learning from an expert that the doctor’s failure to order an angiogram fell below the standard of care.

2022(See McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 942-945 ; General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 593-596 .) They also contend the court abused its 1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified. 2 discretion by failing to amend the case management conference order dismissing the Doe defendants so that it could substitute in Boles for a Doe defendant.

2026(McClatchy, at p. 371; Hahn, at pp. 897–898.) Section 474 applies only when the plaintiff “is actually ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant. [Citations.] ‘The question is whether [the plaintiff] knew or reasonably should have known that he had a cause of action against [the defendant].’ ” ( McClatchy, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 371– 372; see also McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 [“If the identity of the Doe defendant is known but, at the time of the filing of the complaint the plaintiff did not know fa

2022(See McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 942-945 ; General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 593-596 .) They also contend the court abused its 1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified. 2 discretion by failing to amend the case management conference order dismissing the Doe defendants so that it could substitute in Boles for a Doe defendant.

2018(Sobeck, at pp. 869–870; accord, Winding Creek v. McGlashan (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 933 , 940–942 [third amended complaint against attorneys related back to filing of original complaint, thus defeating the statute of limitations, despite plaintiffs’ two-year delay between learning of the attorney defendants’ alleged involvement and naming them as defendants]; Munoz v. Purdy (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 942 , 945–48; see also Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 6:80.1 [“Because plaintiffs have up to 3 years in which to serve summons [citations], namin

2018(Sobeck, at pp. 869–870; accord, Winding Creek v. McGlashan (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 933 , 940–942 [third amended complaint against attorneys related back to filing of original complaint, thus defeating the statute of limitations, despite plaintiffs’ two-year delay between learning of the attorney defendants’ alleged involvement and naming them as defendants]; Munoz v. Purdy (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 942 , 945–48; see also Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 6:80.1 [“Because plaintiffs have up to 3 years in which to serve summons [citations], namin

2023The trial court denied the motion as procedurally defective, untimely, and not based on new facts or law. 5 Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1061 [“a plaintiff has three years from the date of filing the complaint to identify and serve a Doe defendant”]; Higgins v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 973, 982 [“even where the filing of an amended complaint on a Doe defendant relates back to the filing of an original complaint, the plaintiff must nonetheless identify and serve a Doe defendant with a summons and complaint within three years of the commencement of the action”]; Lopa v. Superior

2017Thus, even where the filing of an amended complaint on a Doe defendant relates back to the filing of an original complaint, the plaintiff must nonetheless identify and serve a Doe defendant with a summons and complaint within three years of the commencement of the action. ( Lopa v. Superior Court (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 382 , 387-390, 120 Cal.Rptr. 445 [under predecessor to § 583.210, subd. (a) ]; see § 583.250, subd. (d) [requirements of § 583.210 et seq."are mandatory and are not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute"].) The remainder of Cabandong's

2024Rather, the complaint must allege that they were responsible in some way for the acts complained of.’” (Ibid.) “If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed.” (Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176 (Woo).) “‘There is a strong policy in favor of litigating cases on their merits, and the California courts have been very liberal in permitting the amendment of pleadings to bring in a

2023(See Streicher v. Tommy’s Electric Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 876, 885 [trial court abused its discretion by not allowing plaintiff leave to cure defects in manner in which Doe defendants were identified in amended complaint].) Further, to the extent McKiernan and Torcal contend the claims do not relate back because the City failed to exercise sufficient diligence to discover their role in the alleged scheme by the time the original pleadings were filed, the argument fails.

2020Relying on Smeltzley v. Nicholson Manufacturing Co. (1977) 18 Cal.3d 932, 934 , he suggests, but does not argue in any depth, that despite the passage of time, he can avoid the bar of the statute of limitations and amend his complaint to add a cause of action for slander against a new defendant under the relation-back doctrine, because he named Doe defendants as well as State Farm, and because the claim arises from the same general set of facts alleged in the original complaint.

2014Co. (1977) 18 Cal.3d 932, 934 [“same general set of facts” requirement met where “amended complaint seeks recovery for same accident and injuries as the original complaint”].) In addition, trial courts have the discretion to deny a motion for leave to substitute a named person for a Doe defendant where (1) the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed seeking leave to amend after learning of the defendant’s identity and culpability and (2) the delay resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant.

2009“Second, although plaintiffs contend that their subsequently acquired knowledge is irrelevant so long as plaintiffs were unaware of the identity of Doe defendants at the time of filing the original complaint, substantial authority supports respondents’ argument that unreasonable delay in filing an amendment after actually acquiring such knowledge can bar a plaintiff’s resort to the fictitious name procedure. . . . [(See Barnes v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 199, 206 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 839 ]; Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg.

2009“Second, although plaintiffs contend that their subsequently acquired knowledge is irrelevant so long as plaintiffs were unaware of the identity of Doe defendants at the time of filing the original complaint, substantial authority supports respondents’ argument that unreasonable delay in filing an amendment after actually acquiring such knowledge can bar a plaintiff’s resort to the fictitious name procedure. . . . [(See Barnes v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 199, 206 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 839 ]; Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg.

2018Further, a party’s denial of liability does not relieve a plaintiff of the obligation timely to 13 Accord, Stephens v. Berry (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 474, 477 [Complaint naming driver as Doe defendant was time-barred where the evidence made it “perfectly plain that, almost from the very moment of the accident, appellants were aware of the identity of Berry and of the fact that he was the driver of the Ford Falcon that had struck their station wagon from behind.

2018Further, a party’s denial of liability does not relieve a plaintiff of the obligation timely to 13 Accord, Stephens v. Berry (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 474, 477 [Complaint naming driver as Doe defendant was time-barred where the evidence made it “perfectly plain that, almost from the very moment of the accident, appellants were aware of the identity of Berry and of the fact that he was the driver of the Ford Falcon that had struck their station wagon from behind.

1996(Marasco v. Wadsworth (1978) 21 Cal.3d 82, 87 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 843 , 578 P.2d 90 ]; Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 599; Breceda v. Gamsby (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 167, 173 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 832 ]; Williams v. Goodman (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 856, 861 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 877 ].) “It is not enough, of course, simply to name ‘Doe’ defendants.

1996(Marasco v. Wadsworth (1978) 21 Cal.3d 82, 87 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 843 , 578 P.2d 90 ]; Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 599; Breceda v. Gamsby (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 167, 173 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 832 ]; Williams v. Goodman (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 856, 861 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 877 ].) “It is not enough, of course, simply to name ‘Doe’ defendants.

2018Although Estill argues she did not discover the true nature of her claims until she learned the identities of the alleged wrongdoers on September 9, 2011, ignorance of the identity of a defendant does not delay accrual of a cause of action because the defendant's identity is not an element of a cause of action. ( Fox, supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 807 , 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d 914 ; Norgart, supra , 21 Cal.4th at pp. 398-399, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 , 981 P.2d 79 [the plaintiff may allege she is ignorant of the name of a defendant, designate the defendant as a Doe defendant, use the machinery of d

2018Although Estill argues she did not discover the true nature of her claims until she learned the identities of the alleged wrongdoers on September 9, 2011, ignorance of the identity of a defendant does not delay accrual of a cause of action because the defendant's identity is not an element of a cause of action. ( Fox, supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 807 , 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d 914 ; Norgart, supra , 21 Cal.4th at pp. 398-399, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 , 981 P.2d 79 [the plaintiff may allege she is ignorant of the name of a defendant, designate the defendant as a Doe defendant, use the machinery of d

2023(See ibid. [“the plaintiff does not relinquish her rights under section 474 simply because she has a suspicion of wrongdoing arising from one or more facts she does know”].) Hahn observed, “If a reasonable diligence standard governed section 474, plaintiffs would be incentivized to routinely name any and all persons who might conceivably have some connection with the suit at the outset.” (Hahn, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 900.) A rule requiring a plaintiff to substitute a named defendant for a Doe defendant upon learning of the possibility of liability would create a similar problematic incent

2016(Marasco v. Wadsworth (1978) 21 Cal.3d 82, 85 ; McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 (McOwen) [with a timely complaint, the issue becomes relation back]; Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163 , 1169–1170 (Fuller); Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176 (Woo) [“If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed.”].) Thus, section 474 can be characterized as an exceptio

2020(Marasco v. Wadsworth (1978) 21 Cal.3d 82, 85 ; McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937 , 942–943 (McOwen); Woo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 176 [“If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed.”].) 12 Thus, section 474 can be characterized as an exception to a statute of limitations defense.

2016(Marasco v. Wadsworth (1978) 21 Cal.3d 82, 85 ; McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 (McOwen) [with a timely complaint, the issue becomes relation back]; Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163 , 1169–1170 (Fuller); Woo v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176 (Woo) [“If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has expired is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed.”].) Thus, section 474 can be characterized as an exceptio

2016In support of his claim, appellant cites language in McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 ] (McOwen), which in turn cited Dieckmann v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 345, 363 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 602 ] (Dieckmann): “If the identity of the Doe defendant is known but, at the time of the filing of the complaint the plaintiff did not know facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that liability is probable, the requirements of section 474 are met. ‘Section 474 allows a plaintiff in good faith to delay suing particular persons as named defendants unti

2016In support of his claim, appellant cites language in McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 ] (McOwen), which in turn cited Dieckmann v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 345, 363 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 602 ] (Dieckmann): “If the identity of the Doe defendant is known but, at the time of the filing of the complaint the plaintiff did not know facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that liability is probable, the requirements of section 474 are met. ‘Section 474 allows a plaintiff in good faith to delay suing particular persons as named defendants unti

2014Products, Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1503 .) Section 474 "permits a plaintiff to amend complaints by adding parties as Doe defendants '[w]hen the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant' at the time the complaint is filed. 'The purpose of section 474 is to enable a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations when he [or she] is ignorant of the identity of the defendant.' [Citation.] . . . 'If the requirements of section 474 are satisfied, the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant filed after the statute of limitations has exp

2013Section 474 provides, in relevant part: ―When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint . . . and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.‖ ―‗The purpose of section 474 is to enable a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations when he [or she] is ignorant of the identity of the defendant‘ [Citation.] The cases discussing section 474 deal with whether the plaintiff was truly ignorant of the identity of

2021Proc., § 583.210, subd. (a); Jolly[,] supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1118 .) Where the identity of at least one defendant is known, for example, the plaintiff must avail himself of the opportunity to file a timely complaint naming Doe defendants and take discovery.

2014From the time such a complaint is filed, the plaintiff has three years to identify and serve the defendant.” (Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1118 .) Thus, “[i]f plaintiffs do not have a sufficient basis to allege that a particular internalized injury-causing toxin was manufactured or supplied by a specific person or entity, their complaints must name Doe defendants [citation], availing them of [section 474]’s protection against the statute of limitations [citation] until they can identify the defendants and name them by their true names.” (Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71,

2026(McClatchy, at p. 371; Hahn, at pp. 897–898.) Section 474 applies only when the plaintiff “is actually ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant. [Citations.] ‘The question is whether [the plaintiff] knew or reasonably should have known that he had a cause of action against [the defendant].’ ” ( McClatchy, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 371– 372; see also McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 [“If the identity of the Doe defendant is known but, at the time of the filing of the complaint the plaintiff did not know fa

2020Legal Principles “The general rule is that an amended complaint that adds a new defendant does not relate back to the date of filing of the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed. [Citations.] A recognized exception to the general rule is the substitution under section 474 of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint as to 7 whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint.” (Woo, supra,75 Cal.App.4th at p.176.)5 “Section 474 allows a

2025The complaint further alleges that the defendants, including the Doe defendants, failed to refer the case to a proper specialist to evaluate the decedent’s complications, that they negligently failed to adequately supervise the patient’s care, and that, as a result of all of this negligence and wrongful conduct and these omissions in the diagnosis, care, and treatment of the decedent by the defendants, the decedent died.” (Id. at p. 117.) Finally, the plaintiff’s counsel admitted during argument on the motion for summary judgment that he knew at the time of filing of the defendant doctor’s inv

2016(See, e.g., McClatchy, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 374 [Doe amendment may not be “based on a later-drawn legal conclusion arising from the discovery of an additional fact when that fact does not add anything to the theory of liability apparent at the time of the original pleading”]; Dover v. Sadowinski (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 113, 117-118 [amendment improper where plaintiff’s counsel admitted knowing defendant was involved but claimed they had “no idea . . . how deeply . . . he was involved”].) Notably, the Albillos continued to assert their interpretation of the sublease as excluding the sidew

2022(See Bernson, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 937 [“the plaintiff must avail himself of the opportunity to file a timely complaint naming Doe defendants and take discovery”]; Vaca, supra, at p. 746, fn. 6 .) His failure to do so was not induced by any actions attributable to C.H.L./American Ambulance.

2016First, we assume, without deciding, that the proper naming of Doe defendants under section 474 defeats not only the bar of a statute of limitations, but also a statute of repose such as the 10-year statute of repose set forth in section 337.15 at issue here.4 Second, we assume, without deciding, that the architects bore the initial burden of producing evidence showing plaintiffs were not “ignorant” of the architects’ potential liability, even though section 474 appears to be an exception to, and not an element of, defendant within three years of its filing. ( Bernson, supra, at p. 932 ; Norgar

2023The trial court denied the motion as procedurally defective, untimely, and not based on new facts or law. 5 Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1061 [“a plaintiff has three years from the date of filing the complaint to identify and serve a Doe defendant”]; Higgins v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 973, 982 [“even where the filing of an amended complaint on a Doe defendant relates back to the filing of an original complaint, the plaintiff must nonetheless identify and serve a Doe defendant with a summons and complaint within three years of the commencement of the action”]; Lopa v. Superior

2021(See Higgins v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 973, 982 ; Lesko v. Superior Court (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 476, 481-482 .) Thus, a plaintiff has three years from the date the complaint was filed to identify and serve a Doe defendant.

2018Although Estill argues she did not discover the true nature of her claims until she learned the identities of the alleged wrongdoers on September 9, 2011, ignorance of the identity of a defendant does not delay accrual of a cause of action because the defendant's identity is not an element of a cause of action. ( Fox, supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 807 , 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d 914 ; Norgart, supra , 21 Cal.4th at pp. 398-399, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 , 981 P.2d 79 [the plaintiff may allege she is ignorant of the name of a defendant, designate the defendant as a Doe defendant, use the machinery of d

2018Although Estill argues she did not discover the true nature of her claims until she learned the identities of the alleged wrongdoers on September 9, 2011, ignorance of the identity of a defendant does not delay accrual of a cause of action because the defendant's identity is not an element of a cause of action. ( Fox, supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 807 , 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661 , 110 P.3d 914 ; Norgart, supra , 21 Cal.4th at pp. 398-399, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 , 981 P.2d 79 [the plaintiff may allege she is ignorant of the name of a defendant, designate the defendant as a Doe defendant, use the machinery of d

2016(See also Woo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 177–178 [no genuine explanation for why plaintiff knew, forgot, and then remembered identity of Doe]; Dover v. Sadowinski (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 113 , 117–118 [plaintiff’s ignorance cannot be shown by asserting no knowledge of “ ‘how deeply as a negligent individual, [defendant] was involved’ ”].) This case is unlike Mishalow v. Horwald (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 517 (Mishalow), despite plaintiffs’ assertion it “involved circumstances almost identical to those here.” In Mishalow, the parents sued several doctors and Doe defendants for negligently treating

2016(See also Woo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 177–178 [no genuine explanation for why plaintiff knew, forgot, and then remembered identity of Doe]; Dover v. Sadowinski (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 113 , 117–118 [plaintiff’s ignorance cannot be shown by asserting no knowledge of “ ‘how deeply as a negligent individual, [defendant] was involved’ ”].) This case is unlike Mishalow v. Horwald (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 517 (Mishalow), despite plaintiffs’ assertion it “involved circumstances almost identical to those here.” In Mishalow, the parents sued several doctors and Doe defendants for negligently treating

2023In these circumstances, the rule is that “unreasonable delay in filing an amendment after actually acquiring” knowledge of the identity of a person against whom the plaintiff has a claim “can bar a plaintiff’s resort to the fictitious name procedure.” (Barrows v. American Motors Corp. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 (Barrows); accord A.N. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058 , 1065–1067 (A.N.).) In order to prevail on a claim of unreasonable delay, a defendant must show “specific prejudice . . . from the delay between the [time the evidence was developed] and the filing of the amend

2016(See, e.g., McClatchy, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 374 [Doe amendment may not be “based on a later-drawn legal conclusion arising from the discovery of an additional fact when that fact does not add anything to the theory of liability apparent at the time of the original pleading”]; Dover v. Sadowinski (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 113, 117-118 [amendment improper where plaintiff’s counsel admitted knowing defendant was involved but claimed they had “no idea . . . how deeply . . . he was involved”].) Notably, the Albillos continued to assert their interpretation of the sublease as excluding the sidew