Doe defendant in Arizona

2025Timeliness of Doe’s claim ¶30 The superior court found that Doe’s claims were untimely under A.R.S. § 12-821, which requires “all actions” against public entities or employees to be filed “within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” Determining when a cause of action accrues is usually a factual question for the jury, Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 316, ¶ 23 (2002), but “it may be decided as a matter of law if the record shows when the plaintiff unquestionably [was] aware of the necessary facts underlying [his or her] cause of action,” Cruz v. City of Tucson, 243 Ariz.

2025Timeliness of Doe’s claim ¶30 The superior court found that Doe’s claims were untimely under A.R.S. § 12-821, which requires “all actions” against public entities or employees to be filed “within one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” Determining when a cause of action accrues is usually a factual question for the jury, Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 316, ¶ 23 (2002), but “it may be decided as a matter of law if the record shows when the plaintiff unquestionably [was] aware of the necessary facts underlying [his or her] cause of action,” Cruz v. City of Tucson, 243 Ariz.

2024Camarillo v. Vaage, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 26, 38 (Cal. App. 2003) (“The policy of section 474 seeks to protect those plaintiffs who are truly ignorant of the identity of a person brought into the case as a Doe defendant.

2023See Budreau v. Budreau, 134 Ariz. 539, 541 (App. 1982) (while appeal pending, trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider Rule 60 motion unless litigant applies to this court for revestment of jurisdiction for that specific purpose); Hobbs v. Condry (In re Estate of Condry), 117 Ariz. 566, 568 (App. 1977) (appellate court may exercise discretion to revest jurisdiction in trial court for limited period and specific purpose of determining matters specified in appellate order).

2023See Budreau v. Budreau, 134 Ariz. 539, 541 (App. 1982) (while appeal pending, trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider Rule 60 motion unless litigant applies to this court for revestment of jurisdiction for that specific purpose); Hobbs v. Condry (In re Estate of Condry), 117 Ariz. 566, 568 (App. 1977) (appellate court may exercise discretion to revest jurisdiction in trial court for limited period and specific purpose of determining matters specified in appellate order).

2023Therefore, I respectfully dissent.10 ¶37 Federal Bankruptcy law clearly provides—even after the (fairly) recent comprehensive amendments to the code—that a Chapter 7 debtor’s claims arising before filing of a bankruptcy petition belong to the bankruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1) (bankruptcy estate consists of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property” at commencement of the case); Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2001); Desert Palm 9The Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Phoenix and St.

2022See Greismer v. Griesmer, 116 Ariz. 512, 512-13 (App. 1977) (holding that where alleged tort giving rise to husband’s action against former wife occurred while the parties were married, cause of action did not accrue until the dissolution of marriage, since before the dissolution, husband was precluded from bringing an action by the doctrine of interspousal immunity).

2007It held that disclosure of the Doe defendants' identities was warranted after considering the following five factors: (1) plaintiff's ability to establish a prima facie claim, (2) the specificity of plaintiff's discovery request, (3) the availability of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed information, (4) the central need for discovery to advance plaintiff's claim, and (5) defendants' expectation of privacy. 326 F.Supp.2d at 564-67 . ¶ 14 In Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D.Cal. 1999), the Northern District of California also expressed concerns about the

2007Id. at 578-80 . ¶ 15 Relying on Seescandy.com , a superior court in New Jersey denied plaintiff's request to compel an internet service provider ("ISP") to reveal the identity of the Doe defendants, who allegedly posted defamatory information about plaintiff on the ISP's bulletin board.

2007Id. at 760-61. ¶ 16 Declining to follow Seescandy.com and Dendrite, the superior court in this case adopted Cahill , which was the only guidance from a state supreme court available at that time. [5] As in Dendrite, plaintiffs in Cahill sought to compel an ISP to disclose the identity of the Doe defendant who allegedly posted defamatory information about plaintiffs on an internet blog site. [6] Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454-55 .

2007Id. at 760-61. ¶ 16 Declining to follow Seescandy.com and Dendrite, the superior court in this case adopted Cahill , which was the only guidance from a state supreme court available at that time. 5 As in Dendrite, plaintiffs in Cahill sought to compel an ISP to disclose the identity of the Doe defendant who allegedly posted defamatory information about plaintiffs on an internet blog site. 6 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454-55 .