administrator claim in Texas

1931And in the case of Moore v. Hardison, 10 Tex. 467 , it was held that the allowance by an administrator of a claim barred by the statute of limitations will not bind the estate.

1916It has been the law of this state since 10 Tex. 467 (Moore v. Hardison), that an approval by an administrator of a claim barred by the statute of limitation does not bind the estate, but, once approved by the county court, "the quasi judgment so created can be treated as a nullity." Howard v. Johnson, 69 Tex. 657 , 7 S.W. 523 .

1973Small v. Small, 434 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1968, writ ref. n. r. e.).

1973Co. v. Jackman, 77 Tex. 622 , 14 S.W. 305 (Tex.1890), stated: “Without an allowance by the administrator of a claim, or its establishment by a court of competent jurisdiction after its rejection, the county court has no power to approve it or to order its payment.” Since the Probate Code only gives the probate court the right to hear approved claims, order of a probate court rejecting a claim, which has not been approved by the administrator and which thus stood rejected 30 days later as a matter of law, was a nullity.

1973Co. v. Jackman, 77 Tex. 622 , 14 S.W. 305 (Tex.1890), stated: “Without an allowance by the administrator of a claim, or its establishment by a court of competent jurisdiction after its rejection, the county court has no power to approve it or to order its payment.” Since the Probate Code only gives the probate court the right to hear approved claims, order of a probate court rejecting a claim, which has not been approved by the administrator and which thus stood rejected 30 days later as a matter of law, was a nullity.

1947“It is one of the regulations of our probate system, which imposes the loss of the claim, if the party neglects to bring his suit within the time required to facilitate the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.” This case is cited and followed in Jaye v. Wheat, supra. The opinion in Thacker v. Sams, Tex.Civ App., 44 S.W.2d 391, 392 , cites with approval the following quotation from 14 Texas Jurisprudence, p.'148: “Because of the mandatory and prohibitory character of the statute above noticed, a failure to institute the suit within the prescribed period bars the claim absolutely, agai

1947And if not statutes of limitation, then they are not affected by the provisions of Article 24, Paschal's Digest." The holding in Cotton v. Jones is cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Lanius, 82 Tex. 677 , 18 S.W. 201 , where it is again said that the suit on the rejected claim is in the nature of an appeal from the action of the administrator on the claim.

1947And if not statutes of limitation, then they are not affected by the provisions of Article 24, Paschal's Digest." The holding in Cotton v. Jones is cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Lanius, 82 Tex. 677 , 18 S.W. 201 , where it is again said that the suit on the rejected claim is in the nature of an appeal from the action of the administrator on the claim.

1947And if not statutes of limitation, then they are not affected by the provisions of Article 24, Paschal’s Digest.” The holding in Cotton v. Jones is cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Lanius, 82 Tex. 677 , 18 S.W. 201 , where it is again said that the suit on the rejected claim is in the nature of an appeal from the action of the administrator on the claim. .The ninety day statute is thus described in Stanfield v. Neill, 36 Tex. 688 : “We have not hitherto, nor do we now recognize the law limiting the time, after presentation and rejection, to. the commencement of suits again

1947The ninety day statute is thus described in Stanfield v. Neill, 36 Tex. 688 : *Page 669 "We have not hitherto, nor do we now recognize the law limiting the time, after presentation and rejection, to the commencement of suits against executors and administrators, as properly a statute of limitations, suspended by the present Constitution.

1947“It is one of the regulations of our probate system, which imposes the loss of the claim, if the party neglects to bring his suit within the time required to facilitate the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.” This case is cited and followed in Jaye v. Wheat, supra. The opinion in Thacker v. Sams, Tex.Civ App., 44 S.W.2d 391, 392 , cites with approval the following quotation from 14 Texas Jurisprudence, p.'148: “Because of the mandatory and prohibitory character of the statute above noticed, a failure to institute the suit within the prescribed period bars the claim absolutely, agai

1927Claim shall not be paid, unless, etc. — No claim for money, or any part thereof, shall be paid until it has been *391 approved by the County Judge or established by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.” The Court of Civil Appeals admits that the precise question now before us is one of first impression unless it be settled adversely to the administrator’s contention in the case of Converse & Co. v. Sorley, 39 Texas, 515 , where it was held that the payment by an administrator of a claim without authentication was void.

1918Cases, 534; Williams v. Scott, Law Reports Appealed Cases (1900) 499; Voltz v. Voltz, 75 Ala. 555 ; James v. James, 55 Ala. 525 ; Trust Co. v. Menage, 73 Minn. 441 , 76 N. W. 195 . [2] The Code of Louisiana expressly provides that an administrator who is a mortgagee of property of the estate may purchase such property at his own sale; but this statutory provision, the manifest purposes of ■which is to protect an administrator from 'the sacrifice of property of the estate upon which he holds a mortgage and the resulting depreciation of the value of his claim against the estate, only relieves th

1918Cases, 534; Williams v. Scott, Law Reports Appealed Cases (1900) 499; Voltz v. Voltz, 75 Ala. 555 ; James v. James, 55 Ala. 525 ; Trust Co. v. Menage, 73 Minn. 441 , 76 N. W. 195 . [2] The Code of Louisiana expressly provides that an administrator who is a mortgagee of property of the estate may purchase such property at his own sale; but this statutory provision, the manifest purposes of ■which is to protect an administrator from 'the sacrifice of property of the estate upon which he holds a mortgage and the resulting depreciation of the value of his claim against the estate, only relieves th

1918Cases, 534; Williams v. Scott, Law Reports Appealed Cases (1900) 499; Voltz v. Voltz, 75 Ala. 555 ; James v. James, 55 Ala. 525 ; Trust Co. v. Menage, 73 Minn. 441 , 76 N. W. 195 . [2] The Code of Louisiana expressly provides that an administrator who is a mortgagee of property of the estate may purchase such property at his own sale; but this statutory provision, the manifest purposes of ■which is to protect an administrator from 'the sacrifice of property of the estate upon which he holds a mortgage and the resulting depreciation of the value of his claim against the estate, only relieves th

1918Cases, 534; Williams v. Scott, Law Reports Appealed Cases (1900) 499; Voltz v. Voltz, 75 Ala. 555 ; James v. James, 55 Ala. 525 ; Trust Co. v. Menage, 73 Minn. 441 , 76 N. W. 195 . [2] The Code of Louisiana expressly provides that an administrator who is a mortgagee of property of the estate may purchase such property at his own sale; but this statutory provision, the manifest purposes of ■which is to protect an administrator from 'the sacrifice of property of the estate upon which he holds a mortgage and the resulting depreciation of the value of his claim against the estate, only relieves th

1900Fo reference was made to the case of Jenkins v. Cain, supra. In this decision the court seems to have given a controlling effect to the language of the statute authorizing suits against an administrator only when a claim for money against an estate has been rejected.