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8 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nueces County v. Fergusongreen2 sentences2010Nueces County v. Ferguson, 97 S.W.3d 205, 213 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (citing Tex. 1 No evidence was produced by Cortez at either of the two hearings held by the trial court on Cortez's plea to the jurisdiction and m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. 3 Natural Res. 2010Because Cortez is protected by governmental immunity and is therefore shielded from liability for intentional torts, see Ferguson, 97 S.W.3d at 214 (providing that a government employee sued in his official capacity is entitled to the same immunity as the governmental entity he represents), we conclude that Zellers's pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, and the trial court therefore did not err in granting Cortez's plea to the jurisdiction on that basis. | 2 | 2 |
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Joachimgreen1 sentence2025As stated above, a “collateral attack is accomplished through initiating a new case under a different cause number that challenges the effect of the original judgment.” Thompson, 569 S.W.3d at 172, 175 (“[B]ecause Landry’s motion to vacate the default judgment was filed in the same lawsuit in which the judgment was signed, the motion was a direct attack, not a collateral attack on the judgment.”); see Travelers, 315 S.W.3d at 863 (“A void order is subject to collateral attack in a new lawsuit . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
In re Thompsongreen2 sentences2025First, she waited 13 years to file her motion; her filing was long after the deadline to be timely.8 See Valdez, 465 S.W.3d at 221 ; PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 275 ; Thompson, 569 S.W.3d at 175 . 2025As stated above, a “collateral attack is accomplished through initiating a new case under a different cause number that challenges the effect of the original judgment.” Thompson, 569 S.W.3d at 172, 175 (“[B]ecause Landry’s motion to vacate the default judgment was filed in the same lawsuit in which the judgment was signed, the motion was a direct attack, not a collateral attack on the judgment.”); see Travelers, 315 S.W.3d at 863 (“A void order is subject to collateral attack in a new lawsuit . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
Compton v. Henriegreen2 sentences2016In concluding that the challenge for cause was appropriately denied, the high court recognized that “bias, in its usual meaning, is an inclination toward one side of an issue . . . but to disqualify, it must appear that the state of mind of the juror leads to the natural inference that he will not or did not act with impartiality.” Id. at 94 (quoting Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. 1963)). 2016In concluding that the challenge for cause was appropriately denied, the high court recognized that “bias, in its usual meaning, is an inclination toward one side of an issue . . . but to disqualify, it must appear that the state of mind of the juror leads to the natural inference that he will not or did not act with impartiality.” Id. at 94 (quoting Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. 1963)). | 1 | 1 |
TX. Nat. Res. Con. Com'n v. Whitegreen1 sentence2010Conservation Comm'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. 2001); Bland Indep. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pns Stores, Inc., D/B/A MacFrugal's Bargain Closeouts D/B/A MacFrugals, Inc. v. Anna E. Rivera as Next Friend for Rachel Rivera
green
1 sentence2025First, she waited 13 years to file her motion; her filing was long after the deadline to be timely.8 See Valdez, 465 S.W.3d at 221 ; PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 275 ; Thompson, 569 S.W.3d at 175 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Valdez v. Hollenbeck
green
1 sentence2025First, she waited 13 years to file her motion; her filing was long after the deadline to be timely.8 See Valdez, 465 S.W.3d at 221 ; PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 275 ; Thompson, 569 S.W.3d at 175 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Cortez
green
1 sentence2018State v. Cortez , 482 S.W.3d 176 , 182-83 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2015), vacated and remanded , 501 S.W.3d 606 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Jose Luis Cortez
green
1 sentence2018State v. Cortez , 482 S.W.3d 176 , 182-83 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2015), vacated and remanded , 501 S.W.3d 606 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Heien v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2018The first time that the State petitioned this Court to review the Seventh Court of Appeals's unanimous decision affirming the trial court's order granting Cortez's motion to suppress, this Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for reconsideration under Heien v. North Carolina , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 530 , 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (holding that an officer's mistake of law was reasonable if the statute contained at least some ambiguity and the issue has not been resolved by a State's appellate court). 2018The first time that the State petitioned this Court to review the Seventh Court of Appeals's unanimous decision affirming the trial court's order granting Cortez's motion to suppress, this Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for reconsideration under Heien v. North Carolina , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 530 , 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (holding that an officer's mistake of law was reasonable if the statute contained at least some ambiguity and the issue has not been resolved by a State's appellate court). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cortez Ex Rel. Estate of Puentes v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016In concluding that the challenge for cause was appropriately denied, the high court recognized that “bias, in its usual meaning, is an inclination toward one side of an issue . . . but to disqualify, it must appear that the state of mind of the juror leads to the natural inference that he will not or did not act with impartiality.” Id. at 94 (quoting Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. 1963)). 2016In concluding that the challenge for cause was appropriately denied, the high court recognized that “bias, in its usual meaning, is an inclination toward one side of an issue . . . but to disqualify, it must appear that the state of mind of the juror leads to the natural inference that he will not or did not act with impartiality.” Id. at 94 (quoting Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. 1963)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
McKithan v. State
green
1 sentence2015Accordingly, Cortez’s motion for new trial did not warrant setting aside the judgment or require a holding to make such determination, the trial court did not err in refusing to set a hearing on Cortez’s motion, see McKithan, 324 S.W.3d at 594 , and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Chambers v. Maroney
green
2 sentences1988Rather than "factual and practical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men [act]," the Cortez analysis focuses on "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id., at 449 U.S., at 417-418, 101 S.Ct., at 695. 1988Rather than "factual and practical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men [act]," the Cortez analysis focuses on "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id., at 449 U.S., at 417-418, 101 S.Ct., at 695. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Cortez
green
2 sentences1988Rather than “factual and practical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men [act],” the Cortez analysis focuses on “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Id., at 449 U.S., at 417-418 , 101 S.Ct., at 695 . 1988Rather than “factual and practical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men [act],” the Cortez analysis focuses on “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Id., at 449 U.S., at 417-418 , 101 S.Ct., at 695 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Roy Jones Lumber Co. v. Murphy
green
2 sentences1977The Texas Supreme Court in Roy Jones Lumber Co. v. Murphy, 139 Tex. 478 , 163 S.W.2d 644 (1942), established rules to determine when a trial court must hear testimony of jurors during a hearing on a motion for new trial predicated on jury misconduct. 1977The Texas Supreme Court in Roy Jones Lumber Co. v. Murphy, 139 Tex. 478 , 163 S.W.2d 644 (1942), established rules to determine when a trial court must hear testimony of jurors during a hearing on a motion for new trial predicated on jury misconduct. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.