Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2018Johnston, 336 S.W.3d at 658 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 ).3 Appellant does not argue that the test chosen in his case was unreasonable or that the test was performed in an unreasonable manner.4 Rather, appellant argues that in every case, a subsequent search would be “per se unreasonable” where no facts show that “the first blood draw was inadequate or ineffective.” In support of his argument, appellant relies on the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 2018Johnston, 336 S.W.3d at 658 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 ).3 Appellant does not argue that the test chosen in his case was unreasonable or that the test was performed in an unreasonable manner.4 Rather, appellant argues that in every case, a subsequent search would be “per se unreasonable” where no facts show that “the first blood draw was inadequate or ineffective.” In support of his argument, appellant relies on the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. | 3 | 6 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2014See State v. Davis, 41 Kan.App.2d 1034 , 207 P.3d 281, 285 (2009). 2014See State v. Davis, 41 Kan.App.2d 1034 , 207 P.3d 281, 285 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Swain v. Spinneygreen2 sentences2003See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832 , 839 n. 13 (8th Cir.1986) (stating that "a body cavity search must be conducted consistently with the Schmerber factors”); Giles v. Acker-man, 746 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.1984) (stating that Schmerber "implies that intrusions into the arrestee’s body, including body cavity searches ... are not authorized by arrest alone”); see also Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that “Robinson did not hold that all possible searches of an arres-tee’s body are automatically permissible as a search incident to arrest”); Fuller v. M.G. 2003See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832 , 839 n. 13 (8th Cir.1986) (stating that "a body cavity search must be conducted consistently with the Schmerber factors”); Giles v. Acker-man, 746 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.1984) (stating that Schmerber "implies that intrusions into the arrestee’s body, including body cavity searches ... are not authorized by arrest alone”); see also Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that “Robinson did not hold that all possible searches of an arres-tee’s body are automatically permissible as a search incident to arrest”); Fuller v. M.G. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 429227green2 sentences2003Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that “Robinson simply did not authorize” arresting officers to conduct a strip and visual body cavity search); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir.1983) (stating that "the Robinson court simply did not contemplate the significantly greater intrusions that occur[]” in a visual search of an arrestee’s anal and vaginal cavities). 2003Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that “Robinson simply did not authorize” arresting officers to conduct a strip and visual body cavity search); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir.1983) (stating that "the Robinson court simply did not contemplate the significantly greater intrusions that occur[]” in a visual search of an arrestee’s anal and vaginal cavities). | 1 | 1 |
Julie Ann Giles v. Richard (Dick) J. Ackerman, Sheriff of Bonneville Countygreen2 sentences2003See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832 , 839 n. 13 (8th Cir.1986) (stating that "a body cavity search must be conducted consistently with the Schmerber factors”); Giles v. Acker-man, 746 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.1984) (stating that Schmerber "implies that intrusions into the arrestee’s body, including body cavity searches ... are not authorized by arrest alone”); see also Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that “Robinson did not hold that all possible searches of an arres-tee’s body are automatically permissible as a search incident to arrest”); Fuller v. M.G. 2003See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832 , 839 n. 13 (8th Cir.1986) (stating that "a body cavity search must be conducted consistently with the Schmerber factors”); Giles v. Acker-man, 746 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.1984) (stating that Schmerber "implies that intrusions into the arrestee’s body, including body cavity searches ... are not authorized by arrest alone”); see also Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that “Robinson did not hold that all possible searches of an arres-tee’s body are automatically permissible as a search incident to arrest”); Fuller v. M.G. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Toyin Oyekan and Eniten Keleni, A/K/A Eniten Kelanigreen2 sentences2003See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832 , 839 n. 13 (8th Cir.1986) (stating that "a body cavity search must be conducted consistently with the Schmerber factors”); Giles v. Acker-man, 746 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.1984) (stating that Schmerber "implies that intrusions into the arrestee’s body, including body cavity searches ... are not authorized by arrest alone”); see also Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that “Robinson did not hold that all possible searches of an arres-tee’s body are automatically permissible as a search incident to arrest”); Fuller v. M.G. 2003See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832 , 839 n. 13 (8th Cir.1986) (stating that "a body cavity search must be conducted consistently with the Schmerber factors”); Giles v. Acker-man, 746 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.1984) (stating that Schmerber "implies that intrusions into the arrestee’s body, including body cavity searches ... are not authorized by arrest alone”); see also Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that “Robinson did not hold that all possible searches of an arres-tee’s body are automatically permissible as a search incident to arrest”); Fuller v. M.G. | 1 | 1 |
Fuller v. Jewelrygreen2 sentences2003Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that “Robinson simply did not authorize” arresting officers to conduct a strip and visual body cavity search); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir.1983) (stating that "the Robinson court simply did not contemplate the significantly greater intrusions that occur[]” in a visual search of an arrestee’s anal and vaginal cavities). 2003Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that “Robinson simply did not authorize” arresting officers to conduct a strip and visual body cavity search); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir.1983) (stating that "the Robinson court simply did not contemplate the significantly greater intrusions that occur[]” in a visual search of an arrestee’s anal and vaginal cavities). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnston
green
2 sentences2018Johnston, 336 S.W.3d at 658 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 ).3 Appellant does not argue that the test chosen in his case was unreasonable or that the test was performed in an unreasonable manner.4 Rather, appellant argues that in every case, a subsequent search would be “per se unreasonable” where no facts show that “the first blood draw was inadequate or ineffective.” In support of his argument, appellant relies on the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 2018Johnston, 336 S.W.3d at 658 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 ).3 Appellant does not argue that the test chosen in his case was unreasonable or that the test was performed in an unreasonable manner.4 Rather, appellant argues that in every case, a subsequent search would be “per se unreasonable” where no facts show that “the first blood draw was inadequate or ineffective.” In support of his argument, appellant relies on the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.