Aguilar test in Texas

2007However, if based upon hearsay, the issuing magistrate must (1) be informed of the underlying circumstances from which it can be determined that the affiant received his information in a "reliable" way, and the magistrate must also (2) be informed of specific factual allegations from which the affiant concluded the source was "credible" or his information "reliable." The above two requirements are commonly known as the "two-pronged test" of Aguilar . (1) The United States Supreme Court has subsequently relaxed the rigid standards in the Aguilar analysis to allow consideration of the "totality

2007However, if based upon hearsay, the issuing magistrate must (1) be informed of the underlying circumstances from which it can be determined that the affiant received his information in a "reliable" way, and the magistrate must also (2) be informed of specific factual allegations from which the affiant concluded the source was "credible" or his information "reliable." The above two requirements are commonly known as the "two-pronged test" of Aguilar . (1) The United States Supreme Court has subsequently relaxed the rigid standards in the Aguilar analysis to allow consideration of the "totality

1988Alfred Walker, First Assistant State’s Attorney, in the petition for discretionary review that he has filed in this cause on behalf of the State, has succinctly, and perhaps correctly, formulated the issue that is before this Court for resolution when he states: “The basic question in this case is whether [, given what the Legislature of Texas enacted after the Supreme Court of the United States decided Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), which, for Federal Fourth Amendment Constitutional purposes, adopted a two prong test in making the determination whether

1988Alfred Walker, First Assistant State’s Attorney, in the petition for discretionary review that he has filed in this cause on behalf of the State, has succinctly, and perhaps correctly, formulated the issue that is before this Court for resolution when he states: “The basic question in this case is whether [, given what the Legislature of Texas enacted after the Supreme Court of the United States decided Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), which, for Federal Fourth Amendment Constitutional purposes, adopted a two prong test in making the determination whether

1970In Aguilar, the Supreme Court wrote: “Although an affidavit may he based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed. [2d] 697, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 , 84 S.Ct. 825 , was ‘cred

1970In Aguilar, the Supreme Court wrote: “Although an affidavit may he based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed. [2d] 697, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 , 84 S.Ct. 825 , was ‘cred

1987In Eisenhauer v. State, 684 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. granted) (Eisenhauer II) the First Court of Appeals elected to follow the Judge Teague dissent in Eisenhauer v. State, 678 S.W.2d 947 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (Eisenhauer I) and held that Texas law requires both prongs of the Aguilar test to be satisfied. 1 Under this view the legislature and the Texas courts have adopted a more stringent rule than the federal courts.

1987In Eisenhauer v. State, 684 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, pet. granted) (Eisenhauer II) the First Court of Appeals elected to follow the Judge Teague dissent in Eisenhauer v. State, 678 S.W.2d 947 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (Eisenhauer I) and held that Texas law requires both prongs of the Aguilar test to be satisfied. 1 Under this view the legislature and the Texas courts have adopted a more stringent rule than the federal courts.

1985Where the reliability of the informer is shown and the description is detailed and accurate, probable cause is established under Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Pearson v. State, 657 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Lucky v. State, 471 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Crim.App.1971); Almendarez v. State, 460 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Crim.App.1970); Rangel v. State, 444 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1969).

1985Where the reliability of the informer is shown and the description is detailed and accurate, probable cause is established under Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Pearson v. State, 657 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Lucky v. State, 471 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Crim.App.1971); Almendarez v. State, 460 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Crim.App.1970); Rangel v. State, 444 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1969).

1985Where the reliability of the informer is shown and the description is detailed and accurate, probable cause is established under Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Pearson v. State, 657 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Lucky v. State, 471 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Crim.App.1971); Almendarez v. State, 460 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Crim.App.1970); Rangel v. State, 444 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1969).

1985Where the reliability of the informer is shown and the description is detailed and accurate, probable cause is established under Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Pearson v. State, 657 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Lucky v. State, 471 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Crim.App.1971); Almendarez v. State, 460 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Crim.App.1970); Rangel v. State, 444 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1969).

1975We conclude that when the affidavit is considered as a whole in the common sense and realistic way recommended in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), the second prong of the Aguilar test was met.

1975We conclude that when the affidavit is considered as a whole in the common sense and realistic way recommended in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), the second prong of the Aguilar test was met.

1973“Though the informant has not given information in the past, the credibility and reliability has been established by his excellent reputation in the neighborhood in which he resides, the lack of a criminal record and bis continuous gainful employment.” ’ 476 S.W.2d at 27 .” For the reasons discussed in Wetherby, Adair, and Yantis, supra, we hold that the underlying circumstances showing credibility of the informer and the reliability of his information are sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the Aguilar test.

1973“Though the informant has not given information in the past, the credibility and reliability has been established by his excellent reputation in the neighborhood in which he resides, the lack of a criminal record and bis continuous gainful employment.” ’ 476 S.W.2d at 27 .” For the reasons discussed in Wetherby, Adair, and Yantis, supra, we hold that the underlying circumstances showing credibility of the informer and the reliability of his information are sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the Aguilar test.

1970In Aguilar, the Supreme Court wrote: “Although an affidavit may he based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed. [2d] 697, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 , 84 S.Ct. 825 , was ‘cred

1970In Aguilar, the Supreme Court wrote: “Although an affidavit may he based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed. [2d] 697, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 , 84 S.Ct. 825 , was ‘cred

2021Id. at 129 ; see also Ex parte Trejo, 602 S.W.3d 918 , 918-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (granting application for postconviction writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his counsel did not properly inform him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea).

2021Id. at 128 .

2019Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d at 536 .

2016Because we already addressed this issue in one of Aguilar’s previous appeals, In re Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-13-00038-CV, 2014 WL 667516 , at *7 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2014, pet. denied) (mem.op.), the law of the case doctrine applies, Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d at 685 , and we overrule Aguilar’s issue asserting the Bexar County Probate Court’s sanctions order was an erroneous imposi-, tion of death penalty sanctions. 2.