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8 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Aguilargreen1 sentence2018Wayne No. 15AP0018, 2015-Ohio-5174, ¶ 11 (“even if the original sentencing 4 entry did not comply with Rule 32(C), it would not mean that Mr. Aguilar’s motion to withdraw plea was a pre-sentence motion”). {¶17} Furthermore, the underlying sentencing entries did comply with Criminal Rule 32(C). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gillgreen2 sentences1980Cf. State v. Gill (1977), 49 Ohio St. 2d 177, 180-183 (Locher, J., dissenting). *147 However, the affidavit is silent as to when the informant visited appellant’s residence, and when the contraband was viewed by the informant. 1980Cf. State v. Gill (1977), 49 Ohio St. 2d 177, 180-183 (Locher, J., dissenting). *147 However, the affidavit is silent as to when the informant visited appellant’s residence, and when the contraband was viewed by the informant. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Chaim Kahan, Solomon Wercberger and Mor Wercbergergreen2 sentences1980See, e.g., United States v. Kahan (C.A. 2, 1978), 572 F. 2d 923, 929 , certiorari denied (1978), 439 U.S. 833 ; United States v. Fleming (C.A. 8, 1977), 566 F. 2d 623, 625 ; United States v. Gonzalez (C.A. 2, 1977), 555 F. 2d 308, 312 ; United States v. Dudek, supra, at page 1293. 1980See, e.g., United States v. Kahan (C.A. 2, 1978), 572 F. 2d 923, 929 , certiorari denied (1978), 439 U.S. 833 ; United States v. Fleming (C.A. 8, 1977), 566 F. 2d 623, 625 ; United States v. Gonzalez (C.A. 2, 1977), 555 F. 2d 308, 312 ; United States v. Dudek, supra, at page 1293. | 1 | 1 |
McLaughlin v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1980See, e.g., United States v. Kahan (C.A. 2, 1978), 572 F. 2d 923, 929 , certiorari denied (1978), 439 U.S. 833 ; United States v. Fleming (C.A. 8, 1977), 566 F. 2d 623, 625 ; United States v. Gonzalez (C.A. 2, 1977), 555 F. 2d 308, 312 ; United States v. Dudek, supra, at page 1293. 1980See, e.g., United States v. Kahan (C.A. 2, 1978), 572 F. 2d 923, 929 , certiorari denied (1978), 439 U.S. 833 ; United States v. Fleming (C.A. 8, 1977), 566 F. 2d 623, 625 ; United States v. Gonzalez (C.A. 2, 1977), 555 F. 2d 308, 312 ; United States v. Dudek, supra, at page 1293. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McCray v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1988The Aguilar test has been applied by the court to determine whether the police had probable cause to search without a warrant in McCray v. Illinois (1967), 386 U.S. 300 . 1988The Aguilar test has been applied by the court to determine whether the police had probable cause to search without a warrant in McCray v. Illinois (1967), 386 U.S. 300 . | 2 | 1974–1988 |
State v. Karr
green
2 sentences1977Under Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U. S. 108, 114 , that “substantial basis” must include (1) information about the facts upon which the informant based his allegations of criminal activity, and (2) “some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” 2 Appellant urges, however, that under United States v. Harris, supra, the informant’s personal observations of criminal activity, which have usually satisfied the first part of the Aguilar test (State v. Karr, supra, at page 165), should also suffice to sa 1977Under Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U. S. 108, 114 , that “substantial basis” must include (1) information about the facts upon which the informant based his allegations of criminal activity, and (2) “some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” 2 Appellant urges, however, that under United States v. Harris, supra, the informant’s personal observations of criminal activity, which have usually satisfied the first part of the Aguilar test (State v. Karr, supra, at page 165), should also suffice to sa | 2 | 1977–1978 |
Aguilar v. Texas
red
2 sentences1977Under Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U. S. 108, 114 , that “substantial basis” must include (1) information about the facts upon which the informant based his allegations of criminal activity, and (2) “some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” 2 Appellant urges, however, that under United States v. Harris, supra, the informant’s personal observations of criminal activity, which have usually satisfied the first part of the Aguilar test (State v. Karr, supra, at page 165), should also suffice to sa 1977Under Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U. S. 108, 114 , that “substantial basis” must include (1) information about the facts upon which the informant based his allegations of criminal activity, and (2) “some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” 2 Appellant urges, however, that under United States v. Harris, supra, the informant’s personal observations of criminal activity, which have usually satisfied the first part of the Aguilar test (State v. Karr, supra, at page 165), should also suffice to sa | 2 | 1975–1977 |
State v. Ketterer
green
2 sentences2015Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that Mr. Aguilar’s motion to withdraw was a post-sentence motion. {¶6} The doctrine of res judicata “bars the assertion of claims against a valid, final judgment of conviction that have been raised or could have been raised on appeal.” State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 59 . 2015Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that Mr. Aguilar’s motion to withdraw was a post-sentence motion. {¶6} The doctrine of res judicata “bars the assertion of claims against a valid, final judgment of conviction that have been raised or could have been raised on appeal.” State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 59 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. McCallister
green
1 sentence2015McCallister, 2013-Ohio-5559 at ¶ 7 . {¶10} Mr. Aguilar also argues that the post-release control defect made his entire sentence void. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences1988In Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , the United States Supreme Court redefined the test for determining the existence of probable cause based on an informant’s tip. 1988In Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , the United States Supreme Court redefined the test for determining the existence of probable cause based on an informant’s tip. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Jose Gonzalez and Jose Vicente Costano
green
2 sentences1980See, e.g., United States v. Kahan (C.A. 2, 1978), 572 F. 2d 923, 929 , certiorari denied (1978), 439 U.S. 833 ; United States v. Fleming (C.A. 8, 1977), 566 F. 2d 623, 625 ; United States v. Gonzalez (C.A. 2, 1977), 555 F. 2d 308, 312 ; United States v. Dudek, supra, at page 1293. 1980See, e.g., United States v. Kahan (C.A. 2, 1978), 572 F. 2d 923, 929 , certiorari denied (1978), 439 U.S. 833 ; United States v. Fleming (C.A. 8, 1977), 566 F. 2d 623, 625 ; United States v. Gonzalez (C.A. 2, 1977), 555 F. 2d 308, 312 ; United States v. Dudek, supra, at page 1293. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
United States v. Billy G. Fleming
green
2 sentences1980See, e.g., United States v. Kahan (C.A. 2, 1978), 572 F. 2d 923, 929 , certiorari denied (1978), 439 U.S. 833 ; United States v. Fleming (C.A. 8, 1977), 566 F. 2d 623, 625 ; United States v. Gonzalez (C.A. 2, 1977), 555 F. 2d 308, 312 ; United States v. Dudek, supra, at page 1293. 1980See, e.g., United States v. Kahan (C.A. 2, 1978), 572 F. 2d 923, 929 , certiorari denied (1978), 439 U.S. 833 ; United States v. Fleming (C.A. 8, 1977), 566 F. 2d 623, 625 ; United States v. Gonzalez (C.A. 2, 1977), 555 F. 2d 308, 312 ; United States v. Dudek, supra, at page 1293. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Lechner
green
2 sentences1978When, as here, that bare minimum is not met, we agree with the pertinent observation of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in State v. Lechner (Ark. 1977), 557 S. W. 2d 195, 198 , that “Catch phrases alone such as ‘reliable confidential informant, who has proven very reliable in the past,’ carry no weight.” This, together with a lack of recitation of facts about the informant that would indicate the reliability of his information, requires a conclusion that the affidavit is insufficient to meet the second prong of the Aguilar test. 1978When, as here, that bare minimum is not met, we agree with the pertinent observation of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in State v. Lechner (Ark. 1977), 557 S. W. 2d 195, 198 , that “Catch phrases alone such as ‘reliable confidential informant, who has proven very reliable in the past,’ carry no weight.” This, together with a lack of recitation of facts about the informant that would indicate the reliability of his information, requires a conclusion that the affidavit is insufficient to meet the second prong of the Aguilar test. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Harris
green
2 sentences1977Under Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U. S. 108, 114 , that “substantial basis” must include (1) information about the facts upon which the informant based his allegations of criminal activity, and (2) “some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” 2 Appellant urges, however, that under United States v. Harris, supra, the informant’s personal observations of criminal activity, which have usually satisfied the first part of the Aguilar test (State v. Karr, supra, at page 165), should also suffice to sa 1977Under Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U. S. 108, 114 , that “substantial basis” must include (1) information about the facts upon which the informant based his allegations of criminal activity, and (2) “some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” 2 Appellant urges, however, that under United States v. Harris, supra, the informant’s personal observations of criminal activity, which have usually satisfied the first part of the Aguilar test (State v. Karr, supra, at page 165), should also suffice to sa | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Spinelli v. United States
red
2 sentences1974We wish to note, however, that the United States Supreme Court in Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U. S. 410 , has set forth an alternative to the Aguilar test which could also be applied here. 1974We wish to note, however, that the United States Supreme Court in Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U. S. 410 , has set forth an alternative to the Aguilar test which could also be applied here. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.