Aguilar test in California

1976He urges that statements attributed to Attebury in which he purported to repeat conversations wherein defendant had asserted his skills with and inclinations to use explosives for criminal purposes, do not satisfy the requirements of the “first prong” of Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 ], (See Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. 410, 412-413 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 637,641-642 , 89 S.Ct. 584 ].) We have held that the first prong of the Aguilar test requires that “the affidavit [for issuance of a search warrant] must allege the informant’s statement in language

1976He urges that statements attributed to Attebury in which he purported to repeat conversations wherein defendant had asserted his skills with and inclinations to use explosives for criminal purposes, do not satisfy the requirements of the “first prong” of Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 ], (See Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. 410, 412-413 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 637,641-642 , 89 S.Ct. 584 ].) We have held that the first prong of the Aguilar test requires that “the affidavit [for issuance of a search warrant] must allege the informant’s statement in language

1985The Aguilar test of the sufficiency of hearsay in an affidavit was frequently stated as follows: “(1) the affidavit must allege the informant’s statement in language that is factual rather than conclusionary and must establish that the informant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained in such statement; and (2) the affidavit must contain some underlying factual information from which the magistrate issuing the warrant can reasonably conclude that the informant was credible or his information reliable.” (People v. Hamilton (1969) 71 Cal.2d 176, 179-180 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 785 , 454 P.2d

1985The Aguilar test of the sufficiency of hearsay in an affidavit was frequently stated as follows: “(1) the affidavit must allege the informant’s statement in language that is factual rather than conclusionary and must establish that the informant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained in such statement; and (2) the affidavit must contain some underlying factual information from which the magistrate issuing the warrant can reasonably conclude that the informant was credible or his information reliable.” (People v. Hamilton (1969) 71 Cal.2d 176, 179-180 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 785 , 454 P.2d

1980Real parties argue that the facts thus furnished are conclusionary and fail to meet the first prong of the Aguilar test which requires that the magistrate be informed of some of the underlying factual circumstances on which the affiant's conclusions are based. ( Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. 108, 114 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 728-729 ].) It is true that in the affidavit Dunlap did not say how he knew the items belonged to other semiconductor companies, or why he believed them to be stolen.

1980Real parties argue that the facts thus furnished are conclusionary and fail to meet the first prong of the Aguilar test which requires that the magistrate be informed of some of the underlying factual circumstances on which the affiant's conclusions are based. ( Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. 108, 114 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 728-729 ].) It is true that in the affidavit Dunlap did not say how he knew the items belonged to other semiconductor companies, or why he believed them to be stolen.

1979(See Price v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d 836, 841 ; People v. Senkir (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 411, 419 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 138 ].) The last cited case however, concluded (p. 4.19), “ ‘assuming that a search warrant could properly be issued on the basis of such double hearsay, both “prongs” of the Aguilar test would have to be met both as to the informant’s statement and as to the statement of the declarant reported by the informant.’ ” Other such authority has held that hearsay on hearsay was not to be disregarded, but instead should be considered as part of the total factual situation offered to

1979(See Price v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d 836, 841 ; People v. Senkir (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 411, 419 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 138 ].) The last cited case however, concluded (p. 4.19), “ ‘assuming that a search warrant could properly be issued on the basis of such double hearsay, both “prongs” of the Aguilar test would have to be met both as to the informant’s statement and as to the statement of the declarant reported by the informant.’ ” Other such authority has held that hearsay on hearsay was not to be disregarded, but instead should be considered as part of the total factual situation offered to

2019It therefore meets the Aguilar standard for likelihood." ( D.T. , at pp. 700-701, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 , first italics added, second italics in original.) As in Page and D.T. , we continue to find Simons persuasive.

2019It therefore meets the Aguilar standard for likelihood." ( D.T. , at pp. 700-701, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 , first italics added, second italics in original.) As in Page and D.T. , we continue to find Simons persuasive.

2026(In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 533 (B.M.).) In B.M., our Supreme Court gave further guidance on the Aguilar standard: “Likely” means “more than a mere possibility”—the probability of serious injury must be great when we are looking at the circumstances.

2026(In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 533 (B.M.).) In B.M., our Supreme Court gave further guidance on the Aguilar standard: “Likely” means “more than a mere possibility”—the probability of serious injury must be great when we are looking at the circumstances.

2018In *342 that case, a different panel of our court concluded the defendant committed as-used aggravated assault when she held the sharpened tip of a pencil to the victim's neck during a robbery and told him not to involve the police because she "knew where he lived." ( Id. at p. 1469, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 857 .) Like the majority does here, the Page court cites the two-part Aguilar test, but then applies the Simons test.

2018In *342 that case, a different panel of our court concluded the defendant committed as-used aggravated assault when she held the sharpened tip of a pencil to the victim's neck during a robbery and told him not to involve the police because she "knew where he lived." ( Id. at p. 1469, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 857 .) Like the majority does here, the Page court cites the two-part Aguilar test, but then applies the Simons test.

1981The two requirements of Aguilar are: “(1) the affidavit must allege the informant’s statement in language that is factual rather than conclusionary and must establish that the informant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained in such statement; and (2) the affidavit must contain some underlying factual information from which the magistrate issuing the warrant can reasonably conclude that the informant was credible or his information reliable.” (People v. Smith (1976) 17 Cal.3d 845, 850 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 397 , 553 P.2d 557 ].) The first prong of the Aguilar test obviously is satisf

1981The two requirements of Aguilar are: “(1) the affidavit must allege the informant’s statement in language that is factual rather than conclusionary and must establish that the informant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained in such statement; and (2) the affidavit must contain some underlying factual information from which the magistrate issuing the warrant can reasonably conclude that the informant was credible or his information reliable.” (People v. Smith (1976) 17 Cal.3d 845, 850 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 397 , 553 P.2d 557 ].) The first prong of the Aguilar test obviously is satisf

1970(People v. Tillman (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 134, 138 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. West (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 801, 804-805 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 341 ]; see People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502, 509-511 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ].)” In holding that the affidavit was insufficient in Hamilton under the first “prong” of the Aguilar test because it failed to set forth any of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, we quoted from Spinelli: “ ‘In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered,

1970(People v. Tillman (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 134, 138 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. West (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 801, 804-805 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 341 ]; see People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502, 509-511 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ].)” In holding that the affidavit was insufficient in Hamilton under the first “prong” of the Aguilar test because it failed to set forth any of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, we quoted from Spinelli: “ ‘In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered,

2019The Court then issued a decision in B.M. , in which it held *868 that "speculation without record support as to how the object could have been used or what injury might have been inflicted if the object had been used differently is not appropriate." ( B.M. , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 530 , 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 .) The Court clarified, "the Aguilar standard does not permit conjecture as to how the object could have been used," rather "the inquiry focuses on 'the force actually used. ' " ( Id. at p. 534, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 .) The Court cited People v. Beasley (2003)

2019The Court then issued a decision in B.M. , in which it held *868 that "speculation without record support as to how the object could have been used or what injury might have been inflicted if the object had been used differently is not appropriate." ( B.M. , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 530 , 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 .) The Court clarified, "the Aguilar standard does not permit conjecture as to how the object could have been used," rather "the inquiry focuses on 'the force actually used. ' " ( Id. at p. 534, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 .) The Court cited People v. Beasley (2003)

2021(See B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 533 ; People v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 188 .) Thus, the jury in this case was required to determine whether, under the Aguilar standard, Thompson used a knife “in a manner not only capable of producing but also likely to produce death or great bodily injury.” ( B.M., supra, at p. 530 , italics in original; see Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1036 .) At issue in B.M., was a section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) finding on a record where the appellant, a juvenile, repeatedly jabbed a six-inch long butter knife with serrated blade and a rounded tip into her sis

2021(See B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 533 ; People v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 188 .) Thus, the jury in this case was required to determine whether, under the Aguilar standard, Thompson used a knife “in a manner not only capable of producing but also likely to produce death or great bodily injury.” ( B.M., supra, at p. 530 , italics in original; see Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1036 .) At issue in B.M., was a section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) finding on a record where the appellant, a juvenile, repeatedly jabbed a six-inch long butter knife with serrated blade and a rounded tip into her sis

2018As I read the majority opinion, we reach no conclusion about the meaning of the word "likely" in the Aguilar standard, other than to say that it means something "more than a mere possibility." (Maj. opn., ante , 241 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 548, 431 P.3d at p. 1185; see id . at pp. 548-549, 431 P.3d at p. 1185.) The majority opinion cites several definitions of the word "likely" according to which the word means " 'having a high probability,' " " 'very probable,' " or a " 'probability [that is] great.' " (Maj. opn., ante , 241 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 547-548, 431 P.3d at pp. 1184.) The opinion cites those

2018As I read the majority opinion, we reach no conclusion about the meaning of the word "likely" in the Aguilar standard, other than to say that it means something "more than a mere possibility." (Maj. opn., ante , 241 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 548, 431 P.3d at p. 1185; see id . at pp. 548-549, 431 P.3d at p. 1185.) The majority opinion cites several definitions of the word "likely" according to which the word means " 'having a high probability,' " " 'very probable,' " or a " 'probability [that is] great.' " (Maj. opn., ante , 241 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 547-548, 431 P.3d at pp. 1184.) The opinion cites those

1988However, we deemed the Aguilar test “a convenient shorthand articulation of previously established principles of California law in the area of hearsay affidavits.” (Campa, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 880.) In Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 527 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ], the Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli “two-pronged test” and substituted a “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis.

1988However, we deemed the Aguilar test “a convenient shorthand articulation of previously established principles of California law in the area of hearsay affidavits.” (Campa, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 880.) In Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 527 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ], the Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli “two-pronged test” and substituted a “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis.

1979(People v. Nadell (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 746, 753 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 444 ]; People v. Scott (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 268, 278-279 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 257 ].) An earlier (pre-Aguilar-Spinelli) case concluded that the hearsay information of a primary unidentified police informer should have been under oath.

1979(People v. Nadell (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 746, 753 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 444 ]; People v. Scott (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 268, 278-279 [ 66 Cal.Rptr. 257 ].) An earlier (pre-Aguilar-Spinelli) case concluded that the hearsay information of a primary unidentified police informer should have been under oath.

1979In the case of In re Jean M. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 96, 103-104 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 679 ], the court stated: “[W]e believe that the so called ‘two-prong’ Aguilar test, if satisfied as to the primary confidential informant, need not be projected to a declarant whose statements are recounted by the confidential informant if that declarant is a suspect and the focus of the investigation.

1979In the case of In re Jean M. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 96, 103-104 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 679 ], the court stated: “[W]e believe that the so called ‘two-prong’ Aguilar test, if satisfied as to the primary confidential informant, need not be projected to a declarant whose statements are recounted by the confidential informant if that declarant is a suspect and the focus of the investigation.

1979(Ming v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.App.3d 206, 214-215 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 477 ].) Moreover, “where the declarant is or may be the subject of police inquiry and makes a statement potentially adverse to his interests, that statement, when reported by a reliable informant, satisfies both prongs [one of which is personal knowledge] of the Aguilar test.” (People v. Mardian, Al Cal.App.3d 16, 31 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 269 ].) The information conveyed to Deputy Carpenter by Wynn, and Wynn’s own conduct and statements in the negotiations, arrangements for and participation in the PCP transaction, established that H

1979(Ming v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.App.3d 206, 214-215 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 477 ].) Moreover, “where the declarant is or may be the subject of police inquiry and makes a statement potentially adverse to his interests, that statement, when reported by a reliable informant, satisfies both prongs [one of which is personal knowledge] of the Aguilar test.” (People v. Mardian, Al Cal.App.3d 16, 31 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 269 ].) The information conveyed to Deputy Carpenter by Wynn, and Wynn’s own conduct and statements in the negotiations, arrangements for and participation in the PCP transaction, established that H

1976He urges that statements attributed to Attebury in which he purported to repeat conversations wherein defendant had asserted his skills with and inclinations to use explosives for criminal purposes, do not satisfy the requirements of the “first prong” of Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 ], (See Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. 410, 412-413 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 637,641-642 , 89 S.Ct. 584 ].) We have held that the first prong of the Aguilar test requires that “the affidavit [for issuance of a search warrant] must allege the informant’s statement in language

1976He urges that statements attributed to Attebury in which he purported to repeat conversations wherein defendant had asserted his skills with and inclinations to use explosives for criminal purposes, do not satisfy the requirements of the “first prong” of Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 ], (See Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. 410, 412-413 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 637,641-642 , 89 S.Ct. 584 ].) We have held that the first prong of the Aguilar test requires that “the affidavit [for issuance of a search warrant] must allege the informant’s statement in language

1970(People v. Tillman (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 134, 138 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. West (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 801, 804-805 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 341 ]; see People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502, 509-511 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ].)” In holding that the affidavit was insufficient in Hamilton under the first “prong” of the Aguilar test because it failed to set forth any of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, we quoted from Spinelli: “ ‘In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered,

1970(People v. Tillman (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 134, 138 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. West (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 801, 804-805 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 341 ]; see People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502, 509-511 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ].)” In holding that the affidavit was insufficient in Hamilton under the first “prong” of the Aguilar test because it failed to set forth any of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, we quoted from Spinelli: “ ‘In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered,

1970(People v. Tillman (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 134, 138 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. West (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 801, 804-805 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 341 ]; see People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502, 509-511 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ].)” In holding that the affidavit was insufficient in Hamilton under the first “prong” of the Aguilar test because it failed to set forth any of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, we quoted from Spinelli: “ ‘In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered,

1970(People v. Tillman (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 134, 138 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 614 ]; People v. West (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 801, 804-805 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 341 ]; see People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502, 509-511 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ].)” In holding that the affidavit was insufficient in Hamilton under the first “prong” of the Aguilar test because it failed to set forth any of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, we quoted from Spinelli: “ ‘In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered,

2019The Court then issued a decision in B.M. , in which it held *868 that "speculation without record support as to how the object could have been used or what injury might have been inflicted if the object had been used differently is not appropriate." ( B.M. , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 530 , 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 .) The Court clarified, "the Aguilar standard does not permit conjecture as to how the object could have been used," rather "the inquiry focuses on 'the force actually used. ' " ( Id. at p. 534, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 .) The Court cited People v. Beasley (2003)

2019The Court then issued a decision in B.M. , in which it held *868 that "speculation without record support as to how the object could have been used or what injury might have been inflicted if the object had been used differently is not appropriate." ( B.M. , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 530 , 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 .) The Court clarified, "the Aguilar standard does not permit conjecture as to how the object could have been used," rather "the inquiry focuses on 'the force actually used. ' " ( Id. at p. 534, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 431 P.3d 1180 .) The Court cited People v. Beasley (2003)

1976(See People v. Hogan (1969) 71 Cal.2d 888, 890-891 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 28 , 457 P.2d 868 ]; People v. Zimnicki (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 577, 582 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 614 ].) 9 The affidavit recites as follows-: “While in the emergency room at Rogue Valley Hospital Dale Attebury stated to the Siskiyou County Sheriff’s Deputy Paul White that he believes the bombing was done by a person known to him as ‘John.’ Attebury’s reason for this belief is statements made by ‘John’ that he, ‘John,’ had explosives and torches for the purpose of burglarizing a business in Happy Camp. ‘John’ further spoke of having burglar

1976(See People v. Hogan (1969) 71 Cal.2d 888, 890-891 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 28 , 457 P.2d 868 ]; People v. Zimnicki (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 577, 582 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 614 ].) 9 The affidavit recites as follows-: “While in the emergency room at Rogue Valley Hospital Dale Attebury stated to the Siskiyou County Sheriff’s Deputy Paul White that he believes the bombing was done by a person known to him as ‘John.’ Attebury’s reason for this belief is statements made by ‘John’ that he, ‘John,’ had explosives and torches for the purpose of burglarizing a business in Happy Camp. ‘John’ further spoke of having burglar

1972(Cf. People v. Escollias, 264 Cal.App.2d 16 , 18-19 . . .; People v. Pease, 242 Cal.App.2d 442 , 446-447 . . .; People v. Stewart, 241 Cal.App.2d 509 , 514-515 . . . .)” We have no reason to think the court in Price intended to question the reasonableness of reliance by a law enforcement officer upon information supplied by another officer identified by name, organization and duty station, which the latter has obtained from an informant whose reliability is vouched for by the second officer for sufficient reasons he sets forth.

1972(Cf. People v. Escollias, 264 Cal.App.2d 16 , 18-19 . . .; People v. Pease, 242 Cal.App.2d 442 , 446-447 . . .; People v. Stewart, 241 Cal.App.2d 509 , 514-515 . . . .)” We have no reason to think the court in Price intended to question the reasonableness of reliance by a law enforcement officer upon information supplied by another officer identified by name, organization and duty station, which the latter has obtained from an informant whose reliability is vouched for by the second officer for sufficient reasons he sets forth.

1972(Cf. People v. Escollias, 264 Cal.App.2d 16 , 18-19 . . .; People v. Pease, 242 Cal.App.2d 442 , 446-447 . . .; People v. Stewart, 241 Cal.App.2d 509 , 514-515 . . . .)” We have no reason to think the court in Price intended to question the reasonableness of reliance by a law enforcement officer upon information supplied by another officer identified by name, organization and duty station, which the latter has obtained from an informant whose reliability is vouched for by the second officer for sufficient reasons he sets forth.

1972(Cf. People v. Escollias, 264 Cal.App.2d 16 , 18-19 . . .; People v. Pease, 242 Cal.App.2d 442 , 446-447 . . .; People v. Stewart, 241 Cal.App.2d 509 , 514-515 . . . .)” We have no reason to think the court in Price intended to question the reasonableness of reliance by a law enforcement officer upon information supplied by another officer identified by name, organization and duty station, which the latter has obtained from an informant whose reliability is vouched for by the second officer for sufficient reasons he sets forth.

1972(Cf. People v. Escollias, 264 Cal.App.2d 16 , 18-19 . . .; People v. Pease, 242 Cal.App.2d 442 , 446-447 . . .; People v. Stewart, 241 Cal.App.2d 509 , 514-515 . . . .)” We have no reason to think the court in Price intended to question the reasonableness of reliance by a law enforcement officer upon information supplied by another officer identified by name, organization and duty station, which the latter has obtained from an informant whose reliability is vouched for by the second officer for sufficient reasons he sets forth.

1972(Cf. People v. Escollias, 264 Cal.App.2d 16 , 18-19 . . .; People v. Pease, 242 Cal.App.2d 442 , 446-447 . . .; People v. Stewart, 241 Cal.App.2d 509 , 514-515 . . . .)” We have no reason to think the court in Price intended to question the reasonableness of reliance by a law enforcement officer upon information supplied by another officer identified by name, organization and duty station, which the latter has obtained from an informant whose reliability is vouched for by the second officer for sufficient reasons he sets forth.

1970(Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 641 , 89 S.Ct. 584 ]; Peopled v. Scoma, supra, 71 Cal.2d 332, 337 ; People v. Hamilton, 71 Cal.2d 176 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 454 P.2d 681 ].) In order to reconcile the second prong of the Aguilar test with respondent’s argument that the citizen-informer rule applies to search warrants, this court would have to accept a bare allegation of citizenship as a sufficient circumstance from which the magistrate could conclude that the informant was reliable.

1970(Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 641 , 89 S.Ct. 584 ]; Peopled v. Scoma, supra, 71 Cal.2d 332, 337 ; People v. Hamilton, 71 Cal.2d 176 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 454 P.2d 681 ].) In order to reconcile the second prong of the Aguilar test with respondent’s argument that the citizen-informer rule applies to search warrants, this court would have to accept a bare allegation of citizenship as a sufficient circumstance from which the magistrate could conclude that the informant was reliable.