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59 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1984–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Price, Eric Raygreen2 sentences2024App. 2013). 18 Whenever jury-charge error is asserted, “[o]ur first inquiry is whether the jury charge contained error.” Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. 2021“Our first inquiry 13 is whether the jury charge contained error.” Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. | 12 | 14 |
Ngo v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 744 . 2014Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Hutch v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Egregious harm is a demanding standard, “and such a determination must be done on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (citing Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. 2005See id. | 3 | 3 |
Oursbourn v. Stategreen2 sentences2015A. Applicable Law Appellant did not object to the jury charge, therefore, any potential error in the charge is reviewed only for “egregious harm.” Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. Crim. 2015A. Applicable Law Appellant did not object to the jury charge, therefore, any potential error in the charge is reviewed only for “egregious harm.” Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Igo v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Furthermore, the jury charge contained the standard curative language admonishing the jury not to consider the extent to which parole law might be applied to appellant, and there was no indication that the jury did not follow those instructions.2 See Igo v. State, 210 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex. Crim. 2011See Igo, 210 S.W.3d at 647 . | 3 | 3 |
Almanza v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Cody Watson v. The State of Texas Page 12 STANDARD OF REVIEW A claim of jury charge error is reviewed using the procedure set out in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. 2024App. 2015) (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ). | 2 | 3 |
Nava, Andres Maldonadogreen2 sentences2021Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. 2020Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Barrios v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. 2015See Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Murphy v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See id. § 20.01(b-1)(3) (listing “impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood” of victim as element of second-degree felony assault by strangulation); Murphy v. State, 44 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) (“The trial court is obligated to charge the jury on the law applicable to the case. 2015See id. § 20.01(b-1)(3) (listing “impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood” of victim as element of second-degree felony assault by strangulation); Murphy v. State, 44 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) (“The trial court is obligated to charge the jury on the law applicable to the case. | 2 | 2 |
Demps v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Demps , 278 S.W.3d at 68 . 2009See Demps, 278 S.W.3d at 68 . | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2025Ramirez cites our opinion in Lewis v. State, and we interpret his argument to be the same as one discussed there: the “jury charge was erroneous because it allowed the jury to find [the defendant] . . . guilty if two or more acts of sexual abuse occurred 4 during a specific period that was longer than thirty days, regardless of whether the acts occurred at least thirty days apart.” Lewis v. State, No. 06-21-00021-CR, 2022 WL 630288 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 4, 2002, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Smith v. State, 340 S.W.3d 41, 50 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st | 1 | 1 |
Cortez, Damien Hernandezgreen1 sentence2025Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Valentine v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Valentine, 587 S.W.2d at 400–01; Bundy, 280 S.W.3d at 430 ; Rider, 2022 WL 1769116 , at *3. | 1 | 1 |
Usaa Texas Lloyds Company v. Gail Menchacagreen1 sentence2021USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 501 (Tex. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Kirsch, Scott Alangreen1 sentence2020See Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Barrera v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Barrera, 982 S.W.2d at 416 ; see also Gray, 152 S.W.3d at 127-28. | 1 | 1 |
Garcia v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Garcia v. State, 246 S.W.3d 121, 143 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that the same three paragraphs at issue in the present case “did not constitute a definition of reasonable doubt and therefore did not violate Paulson…[and thus] the trial court did not err by including the above language in the charge). | 1 | 1 |
Lopez v. Stategreen1 sentence2014The jury charge contained an instruction limiting its consideration of his prior convictions to whatever measure of credibility they cared to ascribe to his testimony, and instructing the jury not to consider “the same for any other purpose.” See Lopez, 990 S.W.2d at 779 (concluding that error in admission of evidence of prior misdemeanor convictions for impeachment purposes was harmless, due in part to similar limiting instruction in jury charge). | 1 | 1 |
William Gilmore v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Gilmore, 2012 WL 6632920, at *14 . | 1 | 1 |
Renteria v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Renteria v. State , 206 S.W.3d 689, 707 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Arceneaux v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Arceneaux v. State, 803 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) In Arceneaux , the jury charge contained an instruction requiring the jury to find "beyond a reasonable doubt that the exhibit introduced in evidence by the State is cocaine" before the defendant could be convicted. 1997Arceneaux v. State, 803 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) In Arceneaux , the jury charge contained an instruction requiring the jury to find “beyond a reasonable doubt that the exhibit introduced in evidence by the State is cocaine” before the defendant could be convicted. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sakil v. State
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 25 . 2015Id. at 25 . | 5 | 2015–2016 |
Douglas v. State
green
2 sentences2009Id. 2009Id. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Phillip Bundy v. State
green
1 sentence2024See Valentine, 587 S.W.2d at 400–01; Bundy, 280 S.W.3d at 430 ; Rider, 2022 WL 1769116 , at *3. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Taylor v. State
green
2 sentences2022“Errors which result in egregious harm are those that affect the very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right, vitally affect the defensive theory, or make a case for conviction clearly and 13 In Jimenez v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the jury charge contained error because it suggested that the thirty-day statutory requirement was met if the jury found that Jimenez committed two or more acts of sexual abuse during a period of thirty days or more, and not that those acts occurred thirty or more days apart. 14 significantly [more] persuasive.” Id. (citing 2022“Errors which result in egregious harm are those that affect the very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right, vitally affect the defensive theory, or make a case for conviction clearly and 13 In Jimenez v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the jury charge contained error because it suggested that the thirty-day statutory requirement was met if the jury found that Jimenez committed two or more acts of sexual abuse during a period of thirty days or more, and not that those acts occurred thirty or more days apart. 14 significantly [more] persuasive.” Id. (citing | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Wooten, Codiem Renoir
green
1 sentence2019Green, 2015 WL 2265084 , at *4 (citing Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 606 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Malik v. State
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Saenz, Kimberly Clark
green
1 sentence2017Saenz, 451 S.W.3d at 392 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Davis v. State
green
1 sentence1984In Davis v. State, 658 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), the statutory presumption here involved was held unconstitutional because it violated the first amendment of the United States Constitution. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.