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8 Virginia opinions name it 8 courts 1989–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Russo v. Whitegreen1 sentence2006According to the Virginia Supreme Court in Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 27 (1991): P]t is insufficient for a defendant to have “acted with'an intent which is tortious or even criminal.” Even if a defendant “has intended to inflict emotional distress,” or his conduct can be “characterized by ’malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort,” the requirement of the second prong [of an emotional distress claim] has not been satisfied. | 1 | 1 |
Bulala v. Boydgreen1 sentence1991The Court went on to state, in dicta, that Naccash was to be "confined to its particular facts." Bulala, 239 Va. at 226, n. 1 . | 1 | 1 |
Hobson v. Richmond Memorial Hospitalgreen1 sentence1990See Hobson v. Richmond Memorial Hospital, 12 Va. Cir. 254, 257 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. McKee Baking Companygreen1 sentence1989In Johnson v. McKee Baking Company, furthermore, the court notes that "as plaintiff’s case fails to pass one phase of the Womack test, the Court need not look to the others." Johnson v. McKee Baking Co., 398 F. Supp. 201, 209 (W.D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Womack v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1999Id. at 342 . 1997In the case of Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338 , 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974), the Supreme Court outlined the elements of the tort known as “outrage” or “intentional infliction of emotional harm.” We adopt the view that a cause of action will lie for emotional distress, unaccompanied by physical injury, provided four elements are shown: One, the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless. | 2 | 1997–1999 |
Hughes v. Moore
green
2 sentences2011Count III: Negligence The church defendants allege that Count III: Negligence is at essence a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because this count seeks damages for “mental anguish and emotional trauma due to Defendants’ negligent taking of their property.” Defendants argue that, under Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27 (1973), plaintiffs have not adequately stated an emotional distress claim in failing to allege a “willful, wanton, and vindictive wrong” resulting in physical injury naturally resulting from fright or shock. 2011Indeed, Hughes v. Moore sets forth the standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress; a plaintiff may recover for “emotional disturbance and physical injury” resulting from a defendant’s negligence if such injuries were the “natural result of fright or shock proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.” Id. at 34 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems Corp.
green
1 sentence1995In Lockhart and in Wright v. Donnelly & Co., 247 Va. 98 (1994), consolidated cases, the Court recognized for the first time in Virginia the right of an employee to present a cause of action for wrongful discharge in employment based on race and sex, respectively. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Kamlar Corp. v. Haley
green
1 sentence1989The court argues that tort damages are awarded both to compensate the plaintiff and protect "the broad interests of social policy." Id. at 706 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.