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8 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blain v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2018The application of the “Innis standard” thus presents a question of law, “requiring [our] determination whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response.” Hilliard v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 659, 674 , 601 S.E.2d 652, 659 (2004) (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 15 , 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988)). 2018The application of the “Innis standard” thus presents a question of law, “requiring [our] determination whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response.” Hilliard v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 659, 674 , 601 S.E.2d 652, 659 (2004) (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 15 , 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988)). | 5 | 7 |
Hilliard v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2018The application of the “Innis standard” thus presents a question of law, “requiring [our] determination whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response.” Hilliard v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 659, 674 , 601 S.E.2d 652, 659 (2004) (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 15 , 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988)). 2018The application of the “Innis standard” thus presents a question of law, “requiring [our] determination whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response.” Hilliard v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 659, 674 , 601 S.E.2d 652, 659 (2004) (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 15 , 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988)). | 2 | 2 |
Timbers v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011In keeping with the Supreme Court’s direction that “[t]he latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police,” id., we have previously held that “ ‘the Innis standard ... requires] a determination of whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response,’ ” Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 196 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 237 (1998) (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 10, 15 , 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988)). 2011In keeping with the Supreme Court’s direction that “[t]he latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police,” id., we have previously held that “ ‘the Innis standard ... requires] a determination of whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response,’ ” Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 196 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 237 (1998) (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 10, 15 , 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2011See State v. Cunningham, 144 Wis.2d 272 , 423 N.W.2d 862, 866 (1988) (explaining that Innis does not dictate a per se rule “that whenever an officer confronts a suspect with incriminating physical evidence, or verbally summarizes the state’s case against the suspect, the officer engages in the functional equivalent of express questioning”). 2011See State v. Cunningham, 144 Wis.2d 272 , 423 N.W.2d 862, 866 (1988) (explaining that Innis does not dictate a per se rule “that whenever an officer confronts a suspect with incriminating physical evidence, or verbally summarizes the state’s case against the suspect, the officer engages in the functional equivalent of express questioning”). | 1 | 1 |
Riddick v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1998In applying the Innis standard, Virginia courts have discussed (1) the subjective intent of the police, see, e.g., Wright v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 743, 746, 348 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1986) (noting “the total absence of any evidence that the questioning here was intended or designed to produce an incriminating response”), (2) the objective likelihood of self-incrimination, see, e.g., Riddick v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 136, 145 , 468 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1996) (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ) (explaining that “police activities reasonably incidental to arrest and custody ... are unlikely 1998In applying the Innis standard, Virginia courts have discussed (1) the subjective intent of the police, see, e.g., Wright v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 743, 746, 348 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1986) (noting “the total absence of any evidence that the questioning here was intended or designed to produce an incriminating response”), (2) the objective likelihood of self-incrimination, see, e.g., Riddick v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 136, 145 , 468 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1996) (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ) (explaining that “police activities reasonably incidental to arrest and custody ... are unlikely | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1998In applying the Innis standard, Virginia courts have discussed (1) the subjective intent of the police, see, e.g., Wright v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 743, 746, 348 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1986) (noting “the total absence of any evidence that the questioning here was intended or designed to produce an incriminating response”), (2) the objective likelihood of self-incrimination, see, e.g., Riddick v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 136, 145 , 468 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1996) (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ) (explaining that “police activities reasonably incidental to arrest and custody ... are unlikely 1998In applying the Innis standard, Virginia courts have discussed (1) the subjective intent of the police, see, e.g., Wright v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 743, 746, 348 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1986) (noting “the total absence of any evidence that the questioning here was intended or designed to produce an incriminating response”), (2) the objective likelihood of self-incrimination, see, e.g., Riddick v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 136, 145 , 468 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1996) (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 ) (explaining that “police activities reasonably incidental to arrest and custody ... are unlikely | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rhode Island v. Innis
green
2 sentences2011In keeping with the Supreme Court’s direction that “[t]he latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police,” id., we have previously held that “ ‘the Innis standard ... requires] a determination of whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response,’ ” Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 196 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 237 (1998) (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 10, 15 , 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988)). 2011In keeping with the Supreme Court’s direction that “[t]he latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police,” id., we have previously held that “ ‘the Innis standard ... requires] a determination of whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response,’ ” Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 187, 196 , 503 S.E.2d 233, 237 (1998) (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 10, 15 , 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988)). | 3 | 1998–2011 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2003Accordingly, we have interpreted the Innis standard "as requiring a determination whether an objective observer would view an officer's words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response." Id. 2003Accordingly, we have interpreted the Innis standard "as requiring a determination whether an objective observer would view an officer's words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response." Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pennsylvania v. Muniz
green
2 sentences1998As previously discussed, we adopted an interpretation of the Innis standard in Blain, 7 Va.App. at 15 , 371 S.E.2d at 841 , which governs our inquiry in this case: “whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response.” In Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 12 (quoting United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180 , 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989))), a four-justice plurality of the Supreme Court 1 reiterated the Innis “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating resp 1998As previously discussed, we adopted an interpretation of the Innis standard in Blain, 7 Va.App. at 15 , 371 S.E.2d at 841 , which governs our inquiry in this case: “whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response.” In Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 12 (quoting United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180 , 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989))), a four-justice plurality of the Supreme Court 1 reiterated the Innis “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating resp | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Derrick Deon Horton, A/K/A Thomas Deon Hill, United States of America v. Derrick Deon Horton, A/K/A Thomas Deon Hill
green
2 sentences1998As previously discussed, we adopted an interpretation of the Innis standard in Blain, 7 Va.App. at 15 , 371 S.E.2d at 841 , which governs our inquiry in this case: “whether an objective observer would view an officer’s words or actions as designed to elicit an incriminating response.” In Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601 , 110 S.Ct. 2638 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 12 (quoting United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180 , 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989))), a four-justice plurality of the Supreme Court 1 reiterated the Innis “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating resp 1998Without obtaining a waiver of the suspect’s Miranda rights, the police may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions.’ ” Id. at 602 n. 14, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae). *199 No Virginia court has addressed the viability or scope of a routine booking question exception in Virginia subsequent to Muniz . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Johnson v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1998See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 425, 430 , 478 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1996) (holding that a decision by one panel of this Court is binding on a subsequent panel unless overruled by this Court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court of Virginia). 1998See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 425, 430 , 478 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1996) (holding that a decision by one panel of this Court is binding on a subsequent panel unless overruled by this Court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court of Virginia). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.