8 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Medina v. Californiagreen2 sentences2000The United States Supreme Court’s statement that “while the Due Process Clause affords an incompetent defendant the right not to be tried . . ., we have not said that the Constitution requires the States to recognize the insanity defense,” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992), is not dispositive of the issue whether a 13-year-old juvenile has the right to assert that defense in this Commonwealth. 2000The United States Supreme Court's statement that "while the Due Process Clause affords an incompetent defendant the right not to be tried ..., we have not said that the Constitution requires the States to recognize the insanity defense," Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 , 112 S.Ct. 2572 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), is not dispositive of the issue whether a 13-year-old juvenile has the right to assert that defense in this Commonwealth. | 1 | 1 |
Leland v. Oregongreen2 sentences2000But, as the plurality said, “formulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not eliminate, [the] fruitful experimentation [with different standards], and freeze the developing productive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold.” Id. at 536-37 ; see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952) (adoption of the irresistible impulse test is not “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” because “choice of a test of legal sanity involves not only scientific knowledge but questions of basic policy as to the extent to which that knowledge should determine cri 2000But, as the plurality said, "formulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not eliminate, [the] fruitful experimentation [with different standards], and freeze the developing productive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold." Id. at 536-37 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 ; see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952) (adoption of the irresistible impulse test is not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" because "choice of a test of legal sanity involves not only scientific knowledge but questions of basic policy as to the ext | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Simpkinsgreen2 sentences1987Although we recognize the logic of that argument, see Johnston v. Gill, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 587 , 595 (1876) (dicta); Kesterson v. Hill, 101 Va. 739 , 45 S.E. 288 (1903); Strickland v. Simpkins, 221 Va. 730, 734 , 273 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1981), we need not decide that question. [1] See Code § 8.01-239 ("no action shall be brought for the recovery of any ground rent..."); Code § 8.01-240 ("No suit shall be brought to enforce the lien of any water ... assessment"); Code § 8.01-241 ("No deed of trust ... shall be enforced ..."); Code § 8.01-245 A ("No action shall be brought upon the bond of any fidu 1987Although we recognize the logic of that argument, see Johnston v. Gill, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 587 , 595 (1876) (dicta); Kesterson v. Hill, 101 Va. 739 , 45 S.E. 288 (1903); Strickland v. Simpkins, 221 Va. 730, 734 , 273 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1981), we need not decide that question. [1] See Code § 8.01-239 ("no action shall be brought for the recovery of any ground rent..."); Code § 8.01-240 ("No suit shall be brought to enforce the lien of any water ... assessment"); Code § 8.01-241 ("No deed of trust ... shall be enforced ..."); Code § 8.01-245 A ("No action shall be brought upon the bond of any fidu | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
James v. Jane
green
2 sentences1983We said something quite different, viz., that we did not find the potential increase "to be such a compelling state interest as to justify the denial [to] a patient [of] the right to assert a claim against a physician for negligent treatment." 221 Va. at 54 , 282 S.E.2d at 870 . 1983We said something quite different, viz., that we did not find the potential increase "to be such a compelling state interest as to justify the denial [to] a patient [of] the right to assert a claim against a physician for negligent treatment." 221 Va. at 54 , 282 S.E.2d at 870 . | 3 | 1983–1993 |
Powell v. Texas
green
2 sentences2000Thus, if due process includes the right to assert the defense of insanity, the Supreme Court would “be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms.” Powell, 392 U.S. at 536 . 2000Thus, if due process includes the right to assert the defense of insanity, the Supreme Court would "be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms." Powell, 392 U.S. at 536 , 88 S.Ct. 2145 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Starnes v. Cayouette
green
1 sentence1997Starnes, 244 Va. 202 (1992). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc.
green
1 sentence1989Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, 417 U.S. 467 , 469 n.l (1974); Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Ry. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co.
green
2 sentences1987Gypsum, 229 Va. 596 , 331 S.E.2d 476 (1985). [4] The defendants insist that, even if Code & sect; 8.01-250 is denominated a statute of limitations, once the period of limitations has expired, the right to assert the defense of the statute is a vested right. 1987Gypsum, 229 Va. 596 , 331 S.E.2d 476 (1985). [4] The defendants insist that, even if Code & sect; 8.01-250 is denominated a statute of limitations, once the period of limitations has expired, the right to assert the defense of the statute is a vested right. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Kesterson's Administrator v. Hill
green
2 sentences1987Although we recognize the logic of that argument, see Johnston v. Gill, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 587 , 595 (1876) (dicta); Kesterson v. Hill, 101 Va. 739 , 45 S.E. 288 (1903); Strickland v. Simpkins, 221 Va. 730, 734 , 273 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1981), we need not decide that question. [1] See Code § 8.01-239 ("no action shall be brought for the recovery of any ground rent..."); Code § 8.01-240 ("No suit shall be brought to enforce the lien of any water ... assessment"); Code § 8.01-241 ("No deed of trust ... shall be enforced ..."); Code § 8.01-245 A ("No action shall be brought upon the bond of any fidu 1987Although we recognize the logic of that argument, see Johnston v. Gill, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 587 , 595 (1876) (dicta); Kesterson v. Hill, 101 Va. 739 , 45 S.E. 288 (1903); Strickland v. Simpkins, 221 Va. 730, 734 , 273 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1981), we need not decide that question. [1] See Code § 8.01-239 ("no action shall be brought for the recovery of any ground rent..."); Code § 8.01-240 ("No suit shall be brought to enforce the lien of any water ... assessment"); Code § 8.01-241 ("No deed of trust ... shall be enforced ..."); Code § 8.01-245 A ("No action shall be brought upon the bond of any fidu | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Banks v. Sellers
green
1 sentence1982The court noted that it found "no compelling state interest to justify the denial of a patient the right to assert a claim against a physician for negligent treatment." In its most recent sovereign immunity decision, Banks v. Sellers, 224 Va. 168 (1982), the court held a division superintendent of schools and a school principal were entitled to a plea of sovereign immunity in a negligence action brought by a student stabbed by another student on school premises during school hours. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.