right to assert privilege in Pennsylvania

2019Additionally, "the right to assert the privilege is that of the client." Commonwealth v. McKenna , 206 Pa.Super. 317 , 213 A.2d 223 , 226 (1965) (citing Appeal of McNulty , 135 Pa. 210 , 19 A. 936 (1890) ).

2019Additionally, "the right to assert the privilege is that of the client." Commonwealth v. McKenna , 206 Pa.Super. 317 , 213 A.2d 223 , 226 (1965) (citing Appeal of McNulty , 135 Pa. 210 , 19 A. 936 (1890) ).

1975Act No. 89 of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, sec. 5(d), 28 P.S. §321 * , provides that counsel shall not be “. . competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client. . . unless ... this privilege be waived upon the trial by the client.” The right to assert the privilege is personal to the client: Estate of John Dowie, 135 Pa. 210 , 19 Atl. 936 (1890); Boyd v. Kilmer, 285 Pa. 533 , 132 Atl. 709 (1926).

1975Act No. 89 of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, sec. 5(d), 28 P.S. §321 * , provides that counsel shall not be “. . competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client. . . unless ... this privilege be waived upon the trial by the client.” The right to assert the privilege is personal to the client: Estate of John Dowie, 135 Pa. 210 , 19 Atl. 936 (1890); Boyd v. Kilmer, 285 Pa. 533 , 132 Atl. 709 (1926).

2018N.Y. 1981), the court held that "disclosure is not a waiver if it is compelled by court order, or made pursuant to a stipulation reserving the right to assert the privilege[.]" Although not explicitly overruled, the concept of limited waiver adopted in Teachers Insurance was abrogated in In re John Doe Corp. , 675 F.2d 482 , 489 (2d Cir.1982), as recognized in Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp. , 161 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.

2018N.Y. 1981), the court held that "disclosure is not a waiver if it is compelled by court order, or made pursuant to a stipulation reserving the right to assert the privilege[.]" Although not explicitly overruled, the concept of limited waiver adopted in Teachers Insurance was abrogated in In re John Doe Corp. , 675 F.2d 482 , 489 (2d Cir.1982), as recognized in Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp. , 161 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.

2015Id.

1993Ruhe v. Kroger Company, 425 Pa. 213 , 228 A.2d 750 (1967).

1993Ruhe v. Kroger Company, 425 Pa. 213 , 228 A.2d 750 (1967).

1980Besides being a somewhat questionable argument in terms of its logic, it is expressly refuted by the appellate Court’s definition of indemnification. *532 Builder’s Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322 , 77 A.2d 368 (1951), p. 370 states: “The right of indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary and the secondary liability of two persons each of whom is made responsible by the law to an injured party.

1980Besides being a somewhat questionable argument in terms of its logic, it is expressly refuted by the appellate Court’s definition of indemnification. *532 Builder’s Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322 , 77 A.2d 368 (1951), p. 370 states: “The right of indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary and the secondary liability of two persons each of whom is made responsible by the law to an injured party.

1953Being a matter which cannot be delayed, and ought not be preceded by unseemly controversy, the law gives the undertaker who performs the service a right to assert his claim, in the first instance, at his election against the estate of the decedent thus providing a means for securing prompt service, by relieving the one called upon to render the same from determining at his peril from what source he must make collection, and of the necessity of possible litigation to exhaust one' before proceeding against another . . .”: Phillips et al. v. Tribbey, et al., 82 Ind. App. 68 , 141 N. E. 262 .

1953Being a matter which cannot be delayed, and ought not be preceded by unseemly controversy, the law gives the undertaker who performs the service a right to assert his claim, in the first instance, at his election against the estate of the decedent thus providing a means for securing prompt service, by relieving the one called upon to render the same from determining at his peril from what source he must make collection, and of the necessity of possible litigation to exhaust one' before proceeding against another . . .”: Phillips et al. v. Tribbey, et al., 82 Ind. App. 68 , 141 N. E. 262 .

1950In Ross v. C. & S. Coal & Clay Co., 350 Pa. 548 , 39 A. 2d 584 , the case upon which defendant chiefly relies, an action for breach of warranty of the contract was upheld where the sale was of a rebuilt and guaranteed second-hand shovel and the price charged was not in excess of the regulations governing the sale of a shovel of that type.

1950In Ross v. C. & S. Coal & Clay Co., 350 Pa. 548 , 39 A. 2d 584 , the case upon which defendant chiefly relies, an action for breach of warranty of the contract was upheld where the sale was of a rebuilt and guaranteed second-hand shovel and the price charged was not in excess of the regulations governing the sale of a shovel of that type.

1944In the case of Roberts et al. v. Messinger et al., 134 Pa. 298, 309 , it was held: “While it is true that administration is the legally-appointed channel through which an absolute title to personal property of an intestate is acquired, it is equally true that the property of such intestate passes at his death to those legally entitled to the succession, subject to the claims of creditors and the laws in force for administering it; but, if there be no debts to pay and no distribution needed, administration is not indispensable to that dominion over the property which is necessary to maintain tr

1919That the undisputed facts would, by force of the covenant first above quoted, constitute a complete defense to this action, in the absence of the incontestability clause, is too clear for argument: Wells v. Insurance Company, 191 Pa. 207 .