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8 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cockle v. Dept. of Labor and Industriesgreen2 sentences2005See Cockle v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801 , 16 P.3d 583 (2001). 2005See Cockle v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801 , 16 P.3d 583 (2001). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2017Relying again on Chavez, Mr. Hanson argues that this court held in that case that Mr. Chavez's motion to withdraw his plea was a critical stage of the proceedings and denial of counsel during a critical stage of proceedings is presumptively prejudicial. 162 Wn. App. at 439 (citing State v. Davis, 125 Wn. App. 59, 63-64 , 104 P.3d 11 (2004)). 2011State v. Davis, 125 Wn. | 2 | 2011–2017 |
Carrick v. Locke
green
2 sentences2006Carrick, 125 Wash.2d at 136 , 882 P.2d 173 . ¶ 21 Chavez's claim raises two potential separation of powers violations. 2006Carrick, 125 Wn.2d at 136 . ¶21 Chavez’s claim raises two potential separation of powers violations. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Chavez
green
1 sentence2017Relying again on Chavez, Mr. Hanson argues that this court held in that case that Mr. Chavez's motion to withdraw his plea was a critical stage of the proceedings and denial of counsel during a critical stage of proceedings is presumptively prejudicial. 162 Wn. App. at 439 (citing State v. Davis, 125 Wn. App. 59, 63-64 , 104 P.3d 11 (2004)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Mickens v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2011All we do know is that in representing that he had a conflict, Mr. Zeigler, as defense counsel, was "in the best position to determine when a [disabling] conflict exists." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 167 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (describing the rationale of the automatic reversal rule of Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), applied where trial court refuses, without inquiry, to accept defense counsel's representation of a conflict). ¶ 16 Mr. Chavez's motion to withdraw his plea was a critical stage of these proceedings and no one con 2011All we do know is that in representing that he had a conflict, Mr. Zeigler, as defense counsel, was "in the best position to determine when a [disabling] conflict exists." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 167 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (describing the rationale of the automatic reversal rule of Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), applied where trial court refuses, without inquiry, to accept defense counsel's representation of a conflict). ¶ 16 Mr. Chavez's motion to withdraw his plea was a critical stage of these proceedings and no one con | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Davis
neutral
1 sentence2011State v. Davis, 125 Wash.App. 59, 63-64 , 104 P.3d 11 (2004) (CrR 4.2(f) presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding for which a defendant has a constitutional right to be represented by counsel). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Holloway v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2011All we do know is that in representing that he had a conflict, Mr. Zeigler, as defense counsel, was "in the best position to determine when a [disabling] conflict exists." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 167 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (describing the rationale of the automatic reversal rule of Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), applied where trial court refuses, without inquiry, to accept defense counsel's representation of a conflict). ¶ 16 Mr. Chavez's motion to withdraw his plea was a critical stage of these proceedings and no one con 2011All we do know is that in representing that he had a conflict, Mr. Zeigler, as defense counsel, was "in the best position to determine when a [disabling] conflict exists." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 167 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (describing the rationale of the automatic reversal rule of Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), applied where trial court refuses, without inquiry, to accept defense counsel's representation of a conflict). ¶ 16 Mr. Chavez's motion to withdraw his plea was a critical stage of these proceedings and no one con | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Chavez
neutral
2 sentences2008Chavez, 134 Wash.App. at 664-65 , 142 P.3d 1110 . ¶ 6 The court also rejected Chavez's claim that even if the bench trial requirement is constitutional in its general application, as applied to him it is not. 2008Chavez, 134 Wash.App. at 664-65 , 142 P.3d 1110 . ¶ 6 The court also rejected Chavez's claim that even if the bench trial requirement is constitutional in its general application, as applied to him it is not. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Chavez
green
2 sentences1995Washington courts use a three-part test for determining when precharging delay violates due process: " '(1) The defendant must show he was prejudiced by the delay; (2) the court must consider the reasons for the delay; and (3) if the State is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake a further balancing of the State’s interest and the prejudice to the accused.’ ” State v. Chavez, 111 Wn.2d 548, 558 , 761 P.2d 607 (1988) (quoting State v. Alvin, 109 Wn.2d 602, 604 , 746 P.2d 807 (1987)). *878 Applying the first prong of the Chavez test, Martinez has not shown he was prejudiced by the 1995Washington courts use a three-part test for determining when precharging delay violates due process: " '(1) The defendant must show he was prejudiced by the delay; (2) the court must consider the reasons for the delay; and (3) if the State is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake a further balancing of the State’s interest and the prejudice to the accused.’ ” State v. Chavez, 111 Wn.2d 548, 558 , 761 P.2d 607 (1988) (quoting State v. Alvin, 109 Wn.2d 602, 604 , 746 P.2d 807 (1987)). *878 Applying the first prong of the Chavez test, Martinez has not shown he was prejudiced by the | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Alvin
green
2 sentences1995Washington courts use a three-part test for determining when precharging delay violates due process: " '(1) The defendant must show he was prejudiced by the delay; (2) the court must consider the reasons for the delay; and (3) if the State is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake a further balancing of the State’s interest and the prejudice to the accused.’ ” State v. Chavez, 111 Wn.2d 548, 558 , 761 P.2d 607 (1988) (quoting State v. Alvin, 109 Wn.2d 602, 604 , 746 P.2d 807 (1987)). *878 Applying the first prong of the Chavez test, Martinez has not shown he was prejudiced by the 1995Washington courts use a three-part test for determining when precharging delay violates due process: " '(1) The defendant must show he was prejudiced by the delay; (2) the court must consider the reasons for the delay; and (3) if the State is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake a further balancing of the State’s interest and the prejudice to the accused.’ ” State v. Chavez, 111 Wn.2d 548, 558 , 761 P.2d 607 (1988) (quoting State v. Alvin, 109 Wn.2d 602, 604 , 746 P.2d 807 (1987)). *878 Applying the first prong of the Chavez test, Martinez has not shown he was prejudiced by the | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.