first phase doctrine in Washington

1970Shiels v. Purfeerst, 39 Wn.2d 252 , 235 P.2d 161 (1951).

1953As we said in Shiels v. Purfeerst, 39 Wn. (2d) 252, 257, 235 P. (2d) 161 : “He simply failed in his effort to escape the natural results of the emergency created by respondent’s [appellant’s] negligence.” The facts of this case do not justify, as a matter of law, the giving of an instruction upon the first phase of the doctrine of last clear chance.

1970As stated in Radecki, 63 Wn.2d at 536 , The first phase of the doctrine of last clear chance contemplates that one must “actually see the peril” and have sufficient time to appreciate the danger and effectually act. [Citations omitted.] Unless there is a clear opportunity for the defendant to avoid the accident, when interpreting the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, the doctrine does not apply.

1970As stated in Radecki, 63 Wn.2d at 536 , The first phase of the doctrine of last clear chance contemplates that one must “actually see the peril” and have sufficient time to appreciate the danger and effectually act. [Citations omitted.] Unless there is a clear opportunity for the defendant to avoid the accident, when interpreting the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, the doctrine does not apply.

1969Nichols v. Spokane Sand & Gravel Co., supra. Where the defendant testifies that he does not see plaintiff’s peril, the requirement of actual knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence.

1964In Glasper v. Westbo, 59 Wn. (2d) 596, 599, 369 P. (2d) 313 (1962), we said: “The doctrine has two phases as applied in this state.

1964Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn. (2d) 323, 287 P. (2d) 472 (1955); McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wn. (2d) 495, 250 P. (2d) 546 (1952); Bergstrom v. Ove, 39 Wn. (2d) 78, 234 *537 P. (2d) 548 (1951); Tosto v. Seattle, 25 Wn. (2d) 281, 171 P. (2d) 194 (1946); Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182 , 193 Pac. 684 (1920).

1964Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn. (2d) 323, 287 P. (2d) 472 (1955); McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wn. (2d) 495, 250 P. (2d) 546 (1952); Bergstrom v. Ove, 39 Wn. (2d) 78, 234 *537 P. (2d) 548 (1951); Tosto v. Seattle, 25 Wn. (2d) 281, 171 P. (2d) 194 (1946); Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182 , 193 Pac. 684 (1920).

1964Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn. (2d) 323, 287 P. (2d) 472 (1955); McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wn. (2d) 495, 250 P. (2d) 546 (1952); Bergstrom v. Ove, 39 Wn. (2d) 78, 234 *537 P. (2d) 548 (1951); Tosto v. Seattle, 25 Wn. (2d) 281, 171 P. (2d) 194 (1946); Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182 , 193 Pac. 684 (1920).

1964Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn. (2d) 323, 287 P. (2d) 472 (1955); McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wn. (2d) 495, 250 P. (2d) 546 (1952); Bergstrom v. Ove, 39 Wn. (2d) 78, 234 *537 P. (2d) 548 (1951); Tosto v. Seattle, 25 Wn. (2d) 281, 171 P. (2d) 194 (1946); Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182 , 193 Pac. 684 (1920).

1964Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn. (2d) 323, 287 P. (2d) 472 (1955); McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wn. (2d) 495, 250 P. (2d) 546 (1952); Bergstrom v. Ove, 39 Wn. (2d) 78, 234 *537 P. (2d) 548 (1951); Tosto v. Seattle, 25 Wn. (2d) 281, 171 P. (2d) 194 (1946); Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182 , 193 Pac. 684 (1920).

1962Jess v. McNamer (1953), 42 Wn. (2d) 466, 255 P. (2d) 902 ; Coins v. Washington Motor Coach Co. (1949), 34 Wn. (2d) 1, 208 P. (2d) 143 .

1962Jess v. McNamer (1953), 42 Wn. (2d) 466, 255 P. (2d) 902 ; Coins v. Washington Motor Coach Co. (1949), 34 Wn. (2d) 1, 208 P. (2d) 143 .

1962Eight assignments of error raise just two issues: Should instructions have been given on the deceit exception to the right-of-way rule, 1 and the first phase of the doctrine of last clear chance. 2 *681 This case presents, if the disfavored driver be believed by the jury as she obviously was, a classic example of what is meant by a deceived driver in Martin v. Hadenfeldt (1930), 157 Wash. 563, 567 , 289 Pac. 533, 535 .

1962Eight assignments of error raise just two issues: Should instructions have been given on the deceit exception to the right-of-way rule, 1 and the first phase of the doctrine of last clear chance. 2 *681 This case presents, if the disfavored driver be believed by the jury as she obviously was, a classic example of what is meant by a deceived driver in Martin v. Hadenfeldt (1930), 157 Wash. 563, 567 , 289 Pac. 533, 535 .

1962Leftridge v. Seattle, 130 Wash. 541 , 228 Pac. 302 (1924).” (Italics ours.) There is no testimony from which the jury could have found that the man who moved the car either knew or appreciated the danger of the situation; and the first phase of the doctrine is not applicable to the present case.

1962Leftridge v. Seattle, 130 Wash. 541 , 228 Pac. 302 (1924).” (Italics ours.) There is no testimony from which the jury could have found that the man who moved the car either knew or appreciated the danger of the situation; and the first phase of the doctrine is not applicable to the present case.

1950But what we conceive to be the sounder view is this: assuming that a traveler has negligently placed himself in a dangerous situation upon the highway, then, as we have seen, whenever the person in control of such agency actually sees the traveler’s situation and should appreciate his danger, the last chance rule applies, without regard to the continuing negligence of the traveler concurring with that of the operator up to the very instant of the injury.” In Hartley v. Lasater, 96 Wash. 407 , 165 Pac. 106 , an opinion by Chadwick, J., it is said: “Last clear chance implies thought, appreciatio

1950But what we conceive to be the sounder view is this: assuming that a traveler has negligently placed himself in a dangerous situation upon the highway, then, as we have seen, whenever the person in control of such agency actually sees the traveler’s situation and should appreciate his danger, the last chance rule applies, without regard to the continuing negligence of the traveler concurring with that of the operator up to the very instant of the injury.” In Hartley v. Lasater, 96 Wash. 407 , 165 Pac. 106 , an opinion by Chadwick, J., it is said: “Last clear chance implies thought, appreciatio