gave the following instruction in Washington

2020To support his proposed instruction, Helmbreck relied on Re v. Tenney, 56 Wn.

1998You may consider this matter and you may disregard my instructions, but I am instructing you as a matter of law that it is your duty to return a verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment.” 425 F.2d at 185 . 8 Andrew D.

1983In State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 99 , 640 P.2d 1061 (1982), decided after Mr. Daniel's trial, the court held RCW 9A.76.020(1) and (2) unconstitutionally void for vagueness because the statute "fails to give fair notice of what activities are required or forbidden and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic stops and arrests." However, the State argues the troopers are protected by a qualified immunity *65 from liability for false arrest.

1983In State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 99 , 640 P.2d 1061 (1982), decided after Mr. Daniel's trial, the court held RCW 9A.76.020(1) and (2) unconstitutionally void for vagueness because the statute "fails to give fair notice of what activities are required or forbidden and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic stops and arrests." However, the State argues the troopers are protected by a qualified immunity *65 from liability for false arrest.

1944In State v. Mitchell, 32 Wash. 64 , 72 Pac. 707 , a case involving robbery, the court gave the following instruction: “ ‘You are further instructed that it is not necessary to constitute the stealing or carrying away from the immediate presence of the deceased that it should have been done, if done in his immediate view, where he could see it done, and _ if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he had made a violent assault upon the deceased by choking him and causing him to fall upon' the ground and that he then took from his pockets the sum of money as charged in the info

1944In State v. Mitchell, 32 Wash. 64 , 72 Pac. 707 , a case involving robbery, the court gave the following instruction: “ ‘You are further instructed that it is not necessary to constitute the stealing or carrying away from the immediate presence of the deceased that it should have been done, if done in his immediate view, where he could see it done, and _ if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he had made a violent assault upon the deceased by choking him and causing him to fall upon' the ground and that he then took from his pockets the sum of money as charged in the info

1944In State v. Mitchell, 32 Wash. 64 , 72 Pac. 707 , a case involving robbery, the court gave the following instruction: “ ‘You are further instructed that it is not necessary to constitute the stealing or carrying away from the immediate presence of the deceased that it should have been done, if done in his immediate view, where he could see it done, and _ if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he had made a violent assault upon the deceased by choking him and causing him to fall upon' the ground and that he then took from his pockets the sum of money as charged in the info

1944In State v. Mitchell, 32 Wash. 64 , 72 Pac. 707 , a case involving robbery, the court gave the following instruction: “ ‘You are further instructed that it is not necessary to constitute the stealing or carrying away from the immediate presence of the deceased that it should have been done, if done in his immediate view, where he could see it done, and _ if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he had made a violent assault upon the deceased by choking him and causing him to fall upon' the ground and that he then took from his pockets the sum of money as charged in the info

1941The use of the term ‘presumption’ will not, however, be fatal to the instruction if the context shows that it was used in the sense of an inference which the jury were at liberty to draw.” In Rosenstrom v. North Bend Stage Line, 154 Wash. 57 , 280 Pac. 932 , cited by appellant, the court gave the following instruction: “ Whenever it develops in the course of a trial that there are witnesses available to one party or the other who, if called, could testify to material facts favorable to such party, then if such party fails to call such witnesses, or to explain his failure so to do, you are just

1941The use of the term ‘presumption’ will not, however, be fatal to the instruction if the context shows that it was used in the sense of an inference which the jury were at liberty to draw.” In Rosenstrom v. North Bend Stage Line, 154 Wash. 57 , 280 Pac. 932 , cited by appellant, the court gave the following instruction: “ Whenever it develops in the course of a trial that there are witnesses available to one party or the other who, if called, could testify to material facts favorable to such party, then if such party fails to call such witnesses, or to explain his failure so to do, you are just

1925The same question was before us in the recent case of Brammer v. Percival, 133 Wash. 126 , 233 Pac. 311 , wherein we held that the giving of an instruction couched in, the exact language of this one did not constitute reversible error.

1925The same question was before us in the recent case of Brammer v. Percival, 133 Wash. 126 , 233 Pac. 311 , wherein we held that the giving of an instruction couched in, the exact language of this one did not constitute reversible error.

1923Our recent decisions in Coons v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 111 Wash. 677 , 191 Pac. 769 ; Johnson v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 487 , 194 Pac. 417 ; Nabours v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 557 , 194 Pac. 800 ; and Goldsby v. Seattle, 115 Wash. 566 , 197 Pac. 787 , it seems to us axe decisive in favor of Plastino upon the question of whether or not he was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.” In the Plastino case, supra, the court gave the following instruction: “ 'But the failure to look and listen at a street crossing before crossing the street does not constitute negligence as a matter of

1923Our recent decisions in Coons v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 111 Wash. 677 , 191 Pac. 769 ; Johnson v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 487 , 194 Pac. 417 ; Nabours v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 557 , 194 Pac. 800 ; and Goldsby v. Seattle, 115 Wash. 566 , 197 Pac. 787 , it seems to us axe decisive in favor of Plastino upon the question of whether or not he was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.” In the Plastino case, supra, the court gave the following instruction: “ 'But the failure to look and listen at a street crossing before crossing the street does not constitute negligence as a matter of

1923Our recent decisions in Coons v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 111 Wash. 677 , 191 Pac. 769 ; Johnson v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 487 , 194 Pac. 417 ; Nabours v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 557 , 194 Pac. 800 ; and Goldsby v. Seattle, 115 Wash. 566 , 197 Pac. 787 , it seems to us axe decisive in favor of Plastino upon the question of whether or not he was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.” In the Plastino case, supra, the court gave the following instruction: “ 'But the failure to look and listen at a street crossing before crossing the street does not constitute negligence as a matter of

1923Our recent decisions in Coons v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 111 Wash. 677 , 191 Pac. 769 ; Johnson v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 487 , 194 Pac. 417 ; Nabours v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 557 , 194 Pac. 800 ; and Goldsby v. Seattle, 115 Wash. 566 , 197 Pac. 787 , it seems to us axe decisive in favor of Plastino upon the question of whether or not he was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.” In the Plastino case, supra, the court gave the following instruction: “ 'But the failure to look and listen at a street crossing before crossing the street does not constitute negligence as a matter of

1923Our recent decisions in Coons v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 111 Wash. 677 , 191 Pac. 769 ; Johnson v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 487 , 194 Pac. 417 ; Nabours v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 557 , 194 Pac. 800 ; and Goldsby v. Seattle, 115 Wash. 566 , 197 Pac. 787 , it seems to us axe decisive in favor of Plastino upon the question of whether or not he was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.” In the Plastino case, supra, the court gave the following instruction: “ 'But the failure to look and listen at a street crossing before crossing the street does not constitute negligence as a matter of

1923Our recent decisions in Coons v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 111 Wash. 677 , 191 Pac. 769 ; Johnson v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 487 , 194 Pac. 417 ; Nabours v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 557 , 194 Pac. 800 ; and Goldsby v. Seattle, 115 Wash. 566 , 197 Pac. 787 , it seems to us axe decisive in favor of Plastino upon the question of whether or not he was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.” In the Plastino case, supra, the court gave the following instruction: “ 'But the failure to look and listen at a street crossing before crossing the street does not constitute negligence as a matter of

1923Our recent decisions in Coons v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 111 Wash. 677 , 191 Pac. 769 ; Johnson v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 487 , 194 Pac. 417 ; Nabours v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 557 , 194 Pac. 800 ; and Goldsby v. Seattle, 115 Wash. 566 , 197 Pac. 787 , it seems to us axe decisive in favor of Plastino upon the question of whether or not he was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.” In the Plastino case, supra, the court gave the following instruction: “ 'But the failure to look and listen at a street crossing before crossing the street does not constitute negligence as a matter of

1923Our recent decisions in Coons v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 111 Wash. 677 , 191 Pac. 769 ; Johnson v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 487 , 194 Pac. 417 ; Nabours v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 557 , 194 Pac. 800 ; and Goldsby v. Seattle, 115 Wash. 566 , 197 Pac. 787 , it seems to us axe decisive in favor of Plastino upon the question of whether or not he was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.” In the Plastino case, supra, the court gave the following instruction: “ 'But the failure to look and listen at a street crossing before crossing the street does not constitute negligence as a matter of

1909The court gave the following instruction, to which error is assigned: “Now, I want to make clear to you, if I can, this matter of burden of proof. ■ If the testimony in a case were equally balanced, just as much testimony, credible testimony, on one side as on the other, then it is the duty of the court or jury to decide against the person who has the burden upon him, because by the burden means that he must show to the satisfaction, and if it is evenly balanced, then of course the person who has had the burden has not overcome that; so that when I say the burden of proof in the main case of s

1909The court gave the following instruction, to which error is assigned: “Now, I want to make clear to you, if I can, this matter of burden of proof. ■ If the testimony in a case were equally balanced, just as much testimony, credible testimony, on one side as on the other, then it is the duty of the court or jury to decide against the person who has the burden upon him, because by the burden means that he must show to the satisfaction, and if it is evenly balanced, then of course the person who has had the burden has not overcome that; so that when I say the burden of proof in the main case of s

1909Co., 9 Wash. 620 , 38 Pac. 213 , 27 L.

1909Co., 9 Wash. 620 , 38 Pac. 213 , 27 L.