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5 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1915–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ingram v. Stategreen1 sentence2023App. 2020) (quoting Ingram v. State, 779 So. 2d 1225, 1258 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Windsor
green
1 sentence2007Cf. Ex parte Windsor, 683 So.2d 1042 (Ala.1996). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Buckner v. City of Huntsville
green
2 sentences1992The court gave the following instruction: "Driving under the influence of alcohol is driving after having consumed alcohol to the extent where it has impaired one's capacity to drive an automobile safely regardless of the degree of influence. " (Emphasis added.) The appellant contends that the underlined portion of the above-quoted instruction violates the Alabama Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Buckner , 549 So.2d 451 (Ala. 1989), that the prosecution must show, for purposes of satisfying § 32-5A-191 (a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975, that the accused " 'consumed such an amount of alcohol as t 1992The court gave the following instruction: "Driving under the influence of alcohol is driving after having consumed alcohol to the extent where it has impaired one's capacity to drive an automobile safely regardless of the degree of influence. " (Emphasis added.) The appellant contends that the underlined portion of the above-quoted instruction violates the Alabama Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Buckner , 549 So.2d 451 (Ala. 1989), that the prosecution must show, for purposes of satisfying § 32-5A-191 (a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975, that the accused " 'consumed such an amount of alcohol as t | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Foster v. Floyd
green
2 sentences1977That arises from the ownership of the vehicle a legal presumption that the driver of the vehicle was operating it as the owner's agent or servant and that the driver was acting within the line and scope of his authority or employment as the owner's agent or servant." It appears this statement was taken from Foster v. Floyd , 276 Ala. 428 , 163 So.2d 213 *Page 181 (1964). 1977That arises from the ownership of the vehicle a legal presumption that the driver of the vehicle was operating it as the owner's agent or servant and that the driver was acting within the line and scope of his authority or employment as the owner's agent or servant." It appears this statement was taken from Foster v. Floyd , 276 Ala. 428 , 163 So.2d 213 *Page 181 (1964). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Burnwell Coal Co. v. Setzer
green
2 sentences1915At the request of the plaintiff the court gave the following instruction to the jury: “I charge you that you cannot find plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence by reason of his remaining in the employment of defendant after knowledge of a defective roof, if you believe from the evidence that the roof was defective, unless it was his duty to remedy such defect.” It is manifest that the effect of giving this instruction to the jury was to eliminate the substance of plea 2 from consideration by the jury, and to deny to defendant the benefit of the matter of the plea in bar of the recovery so 1915At the request of the plaintiff the court gave the following instruction to the jury: “I charge you that you cannot find plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence by reason of his remaining in the employment of defendant after knowledge of a defective roof, if you believe from the evidence that the roof was defective, unless it was his duty to remedy such defect.” It is manifest that the effect of giving this instruction to the jury was to eliminate the substance of plea 2 from consideration by the jury, and to deny to defendant the benefit of the matter of the plea in bar of the recovery so | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Standard Portland Cement Co. v. Thompson
neutral
2 sentences1915At the request of the plaintiff the court gave the following instruction to the jury: “I charge you that you cannot find plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence by reason of his remaining in the employment of defendant after knowledge of a defective roof, if you believe from the evidence that the roof was defective, unless it was his duty to remedy such defect.” It is manifest that the effect of giving this instruction to the jury was to eliminate the substance of plea 2 from consideration by the jury, and to deny to defendant the benefit of the matter of the plea in bar of the recovery so 1915At the request of the plaintiff the court gave the following instruction to the jury: “I charge you that you cannot find plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence by reason of his remaining in the employment of defendant after knowledge of a defective roof, if you believe from the evidence that the roof was defective, unless it was his duty to remedy such defect.” It is manifest that the effect of giving this instruction to the jury was to eliminate the substance of plea 2 from consideration by the jury, and to deny to defendant the benefit of the matter of the plea in bar of the recovery so | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.