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8 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Articgreen2 sentences2026See Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶¶35-37 . ¶23 We pause to note that the Artic court explained that the first two Phillips factors may be implicated when law enforcement officers inform a defendant that they will get a warrant if the defendant does not give consent. 2026State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶33 , 327 Wis. 2d 392 , 786 N.W.2d 430 ; see Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 198-203 . ¶12 The City advances two principal arguments regarding the voluntariness of Fermanich’s consent to the blood draw.6 The City primarily argues 6 The City largely ignores the Phillips factors and instead focuses on the “totality of the circumstances.” See State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 198-203 , 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2026State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶33 , 327 Wis. 2d 392 , 786 N.W.2d 430 ; see Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 198-203 . ¶12 The City advances two principal arguments regarding the voluntariness of Fermanich’s consent to the blood draw.6 The City primarily argues 6 The City largely ignores the Phillips factors and instead focuses on the “totality of the circumstances.” See State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 198-203 , 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). 2026State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶33 , 327 Wis. 2d 392 , 786 N.W.2d 430 ; see Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 198-203 . ¶12 The City advances two principal arguments regarding the voluntariness of Fermanich’s consent to the blood draw.6 The City primarily argues 6 The City largely ignores the Phillips factors and instead focuses on the “totality of the circumstances.” See State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 198-203 , 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marquardtgreen1 sentence2023See Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765 , ¶¶27-31 4 We reject Phillips’s brief suggestion that the State cannot challenge the circuit court’s June 2021 order memorializing the court’s conclusion that the automobile exception does not apply because the State did not directly appeal the June 2021 order and instead appealed the March 2022 order, which was the first order to substantively result in the suppression of evidence. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ronald Tobin, Clifford Roger Ackerson, United States of America v. Ronald Tobingreen1 sentence2009Id., ¶ 18; see also United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991) (holding the agents could reasonably conclude from the defendants' hurried actions and furtive looks that the defendants were either aware or afraid that someone was watching them such that the destruction or removal of some portion of the narcotics was therefore a possibility that justified the warrantless entry into the home based on exigent circumstances). ¶ 15 Because they had probable cause and because exigent circumstances existed | 1 | 1 |
Cramer v. Skinnergreen1 sentence2009Id., ¶ 18; see also United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991) (holding the agents could reasonably conclude from the defendants' hurried actions and furtive looks that the defendants were either aware or afraid that someone was watching them such that the destruction or removal of some portion of the narcotics was therefore a possibility that justified the warrantless entry into the home based on exigent circumstances). ¶ 15 Because they had probable cause and because exigent circumstances existed | 1 | 1 |
Fruhwirth v. Baltimore City Police Departmentgreen2 sentences2009Id., ¶ 18; see also United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991) (holding the agents could reasonably conclude from the defendants' hurried actions and furtive looks that the defendants were either aware or afraid that someone was watching them such that the destruction or removal of some portion of the narcotics was therefore a possibility that justified the warrantless entry into the home based on exigent circumstances). ¶ 15 Because they had probable cause and because exigent circumstances existed 2009Id., ¶ 18; see also United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 299 , 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991) (holding the agents could reasonably conclude from the defendants' hurried actions and furtive looks that the defendants were either aware or afraid that someone was watching them such that the destruction or removal of some portion of the narcotics was therefore a possibility that justified the warrantless entry into the home based on exigent circumstances). ¶ 15 Because they had probable cause and because exigent circumstances existed | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Krueger v. State
green
2 sentences1977While one may be detained by the police and interrogated to secure sufficient evidence to either charge him with a crime or to release him, the police cannot continue to detain an arrested person to “sew up” the case by obtaining or extracting a confession or culpable statements to support the arrest or the guilt. . . .’ “In Krueger v. State (1972), 58 Wis.2d 345, 357 , 192 N.W.2d 880 , this court clarified the Phillips rule against ‘sew-up’ confessions: “ ‘. . . 1975While one may be detained by the police and interrogated to secure sufficient evidence to either charge him with a crime or to release him, the police cannot continue to detain an arrested person to ‘sew up’ the case by obtaining or extracting a confession or culpable statements to support the arrest or the guilt. . . .” In Krueger v. State (1972), 53 Wis. 2d 345, 357 , 192 N. W. 2d 880 , this court clarified the Phillips rule against “sew-up” confessions: “. . . | 2 | 1975–1977 |
California v. Carney
green
1 sentence2023As the State points out, and as our summary above reflects, the court left open resolution of an alternative theory against suppression argued by the State and the court did not resolve all aspects of the suppression issue by order until March 2022, after which the State timely filed a proper notice of appeal. 8 No. 2022AP350-CR (referencing precedent that includes Carney, 471 U.S. 386 ); State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶26 , 345 Wis. 2d 563 , 826 N.W.2d 369 (deeming Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), to be “a hallmark case involving the automobile exception”); see also 3 WAYNE R. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Brereton
green
2 sentences2023As the State points out, and as our summary above reflects, the court left open resolution of an alternative theory against suppression argued by the State and the court did not resolve all aspects of the suppression issue by order until March 2022, after which the State timely filed a proper notice of appeal. 8 No. 2022AP350-CR (referencing precedent that includes Carney, 471 U.S. 386 ); State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶26 , 345 Wis. 2d 563 , 826 N.W.2d 369 (deeming Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), to be “a hallmark case involving the automobile exception”); see also 3 WAYNE R. 2023As the State points out, and as our summary above reflects, the court left open resolution of an alternative theory against suppression argued by the State and the court did not resolve all aspects of the suppression issue by order until March 2022, after which the State timely filed a proper notice of appeal. 8 No. 2022AP350-CR (referencing precedent that includes Carney, 471 U.S. 386 ); State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶26 , 345 Wis. 2d 563 , 826 N.W.2d 369 (deeming Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), to be “a hallmark case involving the automobile exception”); see also 3 WAYNE R. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Chambers v. Maroney
green
1 sentence2023As the State points out, and as our summary above reflects, the court left open resolution of an alternative theory against suppression argued by the State and the court did not resolve all aspects of the suppression issue by order until March 2022, after which the State timely filed a proper notice of appeal. 8 No. 2022AP350-CR (referencing precedent that includes Carney, 471 U.S. 386 ); State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶26 , 345 Wis. 2d 563 , 826 N.W.2d 369 (deeming Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), to be “a hallmark case involving the automobile exception”); see also 3 WAYNE R. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2009However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision affirming the denial of the motion to suppress because I conclude that the officers' decision to approach the home to conduct a knock and talk is relevant, see majority, ¶ 11, and created the exigent circumstances upon which justification for the warrantless entry into Phillips' home was based. ¶ 21 To obtain a warrant, an officer must prepare an affidavit describing facts to establish probable cause for the search or arrest, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person(s) or property to be seized. [1] From the 2009However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision affirming the denial of the motion to suppress because I conclude that the officers' decision to approach the home to conduct a knock and talk is relevant, see majority, ¶ 11, and created the exigent circumstances upon which justification for the warrantless entry into Phillips' home was based. ¶ 21 To obtain a warrant, an officer must prepare an affidavit describing facts to establish probable cause for the search or arrest, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person(s) or property to be seized. [1] From the | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Patton
neutral
2 sentences2009A. The trial court properly denied Phillips' motion to suppress. ¶ 6 "When we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we uphold [its] factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous." State v. Patton, 2006 WI App 235, ¶ 7 , 297 Wis.2d 415 , 724 N.W.2d 347 . 2009A. The trial court properly denied Phillips' motion to suppress. ¶ 6 "When we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we uphold [its] factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous." State v. Patton, 2006 WI App 235, ¶ 7 , 297 Wis.2d 415 , 724 N.W.2d 347 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Jesus Humberto Munoz-Guerra
green
1 sentence2009Id. (emphasis added; citations and footnote omitted). ¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse both the order denying Phillips' motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction and remand for further proceedings. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Sweet v. Berge
green
2 sentences2009Namely, that "police did not create the exigent circumstances as they were in continuous hot pursuit of Phillips when they entered the residence without a warrant" and that "[t]he strong policy of promoting compliance with police orders justified hot pursuit of Phillips after he defied their orders to stop." See Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61, 67 , 334 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1983) (If this court affirms a trial court order based on one ground, it need not address others.). 2009Namely, that "police did not create the exigent circumstances as they were in continuous hot pursuit of Phillips when they entered the residence without a warrant" and that "[t]he strong policy of promoting compliance with police orders justified hot pursuit of Phillips after he defied their orders to stop." See Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61, 67 , 334 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1983) (If this court affirms a trial court order based on one ground, it need not address others.). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Lale
green
2 sentences1990The defendant's argument on this issue then seems to switch from the due process concerns of the Phillips rule to an examination of a possible sixth amendment violation under State v. Lale, 141 Wis. 2d 480 , 415 N.W.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1987). 1990The defendant's argument on this issue then seems to switch from the due process concerns of the Phillips rule to an examination of a possible sixth amendment violation under State v. Lale, 141 Wis. 2d 480 , 415 N.W.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1987). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Reimers v. State
green
2 sentences1975Wis. 2d 682, 684, 148 N. W. 2d 53 , it was said that Phillips v. State, supra, “. . . related to so-called ‘sew-up’ confessions wherein an accused has been interrogated for a long period of time before being brought before a magistrate.” In Reimers v. State (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 457 , 143 N. W. 2d 525 , this court was confronted with a contention that three statements should be excluded under the Phillips rule. 1975Wis. 2d 682, 684, 148 N. W. 2d 53 , it was said that Phillips v. State, supra, “. . . related to so-called ‘sew-up’ confessions wherein an accused has been interrogated for a long period of time before being brought before a magistrate.” In Reimers v. State (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 457 , 143 N. W. 2d 525 , this court was confronted with a contention that three statements should be excluded under the Phillips rule. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences1975Wis. 2d 682, 684, 148 N. W. 2d 53 , it was said that Phillips v. State, supra, “. . . related to so-called ‘sew-up’ confessions wherein an accused has been interrogated for a long period of time before being brought before a magistrate.” In Reimers v. State (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 457 , 143 N. W. 2d 525 , this court was confronted with a contention that three statements should be excluded under the Phillips rule. 1975Wis. 2d 682, 684, 148 N. W. 2d 53 , it was said that Phillips v. State, supra, “. . . related to so-called ‘sew-up’ confessions wherein an accused has been interrogated for a long period of time before being brought before a magistrate.” In Reimers v. State (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 457 , 143 N. W. 2d 525 , this court was confronted with a contention that three statements should be excluded under the Phillips rule. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Parish v. Awschu Properties, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1961“If there is any substantial issue of fact, which entitles plaintiffs to a determination thereof by a jury or the court, the motion for summary judgment must be denied.” Parish v. Awschu Properties (1945), 247 Wis. 166, 174 , 19 N. W. (2d) 276 . 1961“If there is any substantial issue of fact, which entitles plaintiffs to a determination thereof by a jury or the court, the motion for summary judgment must be denied.” Parish v. Awschu Properties (1945), 247 Wis. 166, 174 , 19 N. W. (2d) 276 . | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.