8 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Raheem Mooregreen2 sentences2022See State v. Moore, 2015 WI 54, ¶64 , 363 Wis. 2d 376 , 864 N.W.2d 827 . ¶17 Additionally, the trial court observed that while the detectives were “very persistent” in their questioning of Ward, persistence itself “is not inherently coercive.” In fact, the court pointed out that Ward had the ability to “control” when that persistence would stop by exercising his Miranda1 rights. 2022See State v. Moore, 2015 WI 54, ¶64 , 363 Wis. 2d 376 , 864 N.W.2d 827 . ¶17 Additionally, the trial court observed that while the detectives were “very persistent” in their questioning of Ward, persistence itself “is not inherently coercive.” In fact, the court pointed out that Ward had the ability to “control” when that persistence would stop by exercising his Miranda1 rights. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Timothy Pittsgreen2 sentences1998See United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.") The Seventh Circuit has stated that it is reasonable for an issuing magistrate to infer "that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be found where the dealers live." United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 13 1998See United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.") The Seventh Circuit has stated that it is reasonable for an issuing magistrate to infer "that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be found where the dealers live." United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 13 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Danny Lee Andersongreen2 sentences1998See United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.") The Seventh Circuit has stated that it is reasonable for an issuing magistrate to infer "that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be found where the dealers live." United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 13 1998See United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.") The Seventh Circuit has stated that it is reasonable for an issuing magistrate to infer "that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be found where the dealers live." United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 13 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael L. Lamon, Also Known as Michael L. Anthony, Also Known as Michael L. Blackgreen2 sentences1998See United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.") The Seventh Circuit has stated that it is reasonable for an issuing magistrate to infer "that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be found where the dealers live." United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 13 1998See United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.") The Seventh Circuit has stated that it is reasonable for an issuing magistrate to infer "that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be found where the dealers live." United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 13 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Larry F. Singleton, United States of America v. Anthony D. Singleton, United States of America v. Demitress Sanchez Coxgreen2 sentences1998See United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.") The Seventh Circuit has stated that it is reasonable for an issuing magistrate to infer "that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be found where the dealers live." United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 13 1998See United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he nexus between the place to be searched and the items to be seized may be established by the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.") The Seventh Circuit has stated that it is reasonable for an issuing magistrate to infer "that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be found where the dealers live." United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 13 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carpentergreen2 sentences1996See Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 264 ; State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 114 , 369 N.W.2d 145 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985). 1996See Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 264 ; State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 114 , 369 N.W.2d 145 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearmsgreen2 sentences1985Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 . " `"Only the clearest proof" ' that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override [the legislature's] manifest preference for a civil sanction." 89 Firearms, 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (citations omitted). [18] We are not convinced by "clear proof" that the forfeiture here is punitive. *118 In Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585 , a standard was introduced by this court to determine the nature of an action under a municipal ordinance. 1985Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 . " `"Only the clearest proof" ' that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override [the legislature's] manifest preference for a civil sanction." 89 Firearms, 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (citations omitted). [18] We are not convinced by "clear proof" that the forfeiture here is punitive. *118 In Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585 , a standard was introduced by this court to determine the nature of an action under a municipal ordinance. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ward v. Jahnke
green
2 sentences2017"The length of time this arrangement persisted, with undisputed testimony that Ward assumed nearly all of the couple's living expenses, coupled with the fact that Jahnke then made a substantial down payment on a house lends credibility to Ward's claim that this was a shared undertaking." Id. ¶47 However, the court concluded that Ward had failed to satisfy the unjust enrichment standard for the period following the purchase of the home. 2017Ward v. Jahnke, 220 Wis. 2d 539, 544 , 583 N.W.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1998). 20 Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 factor, her testimony as to their financial arrangements shows only that she and Jahnke were cohabitants who divided their household expenses in such a way that it made it easy to maintain separate finances and avoid commingling their individual resources." Id. at 550-51 . ¶40 In so holding, the appeals court stated that it does not read the list of factors outlined in Watts as a checklist, but rather as "requiring a plaintiff to put forth facts which indicate a shared enterprise and some form | 2 | 2002–2017 |
Watts v. Watts
green
2 sentences2017Ward v. Jahnke, 220 Wis. 2d 539, 544 , 583 N.W.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1998). 20 Nos. 2012AP2377 & 2015AP870 factor, her testimony as to their financial arrangements shows only that she and Jahnke were cohabitants who divided their household expenses in such a way that it made it easy to maintain separate finances and avoid commingling their individual resources." Id. at 550-51 . ¶40 In so holding, the appeals court stated that it does not read the list of factors outlined in Watts as a checklist, but rather as "requiring a plaintiff to put forth facts which indicate a shared enterprise and some form 1998Although Jahnke denies having had a specific discussion regarding the accumulation of money for a down payment, he testified that he and Ward became engaged during this time period and that he had asked her "what she's doing for the next sixty years." This portion of Ward's claim satisfies the Watts unjust enrichment criteria — that there was "property acquired through the efforts of both." Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 533 , 405 N.W.2d at 314 . | 2 | 1998–2017 |
Frazier v. Cupp
green
2 sentences2009Therefore, while relevant, Schaepe's omission and Ward's brief deprivation of the right to counsel are "insufficient... to make [ ] otherwise voluntary confession[s] inadmissible." Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739 , 89 S.Ct. 1420 . 2009Therefore, while relevant, Schaepe's omission and Ward's brief deprivation of the right to counsel are "insufficient... to make [] otherwise voluntary confession^] inadmissible." Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Hanson
green
1 sentence2009Id. d. third interview ¶ 56 We now address Ward's challenge to the admissibility of incriminating statements she made at the third interview on the morning of December 2. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Kramsvogel
green
2 sentences1996See Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 264 ; State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 114 , 369 N.W.2d 145 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985). 1996See Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 264 ; State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 114 , 369 N.W.2d 145 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
City of Alcoa v. Myers
green
2 sentences1996See Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 264 ; State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 114 , 369 N.W.2d 145 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985). 1996See Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 264 ; State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 114 , 369 N.W.2d 145 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
United States v. Ward
green
2 sentences1985Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 . " `"Only the clearest proof" ' that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override [the legislature's] manifest preference for a civil sanction." 89 Firearms, 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (citations omitted). [18] We are not convinced by "clear proof" that the forfeiture here is punitive. *118 In Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585 , a standard was introduced by this court to determine the nature of an action under a municipal ordinance. 1985Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 . " `"Only the clearest proof" ' that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override [the legislature's] manifest preference for a civil sanction." 89 Firearms, 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (citations omitted). [18] We are not convinced by "clear proof" that the forfeiture here is punitive. *118 In Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585 , a standard was introduced by this court to determine the nature of an action under a municipal ordinance. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
City of Milwaukee v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1985Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 . " `"Only the clearest proof" ' that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override [the legislature's] manifest preference for a civil sanction." 89 Firearms, 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (citations omitted). [18] We are not convinced by "clear proof" that the forfeiture here is punitive. *118 In Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585 , a standard was introduced by this court to determine the nature of an action under a municipal ordinance. 1985Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 . " `"Only the clearest proof" ' that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override [the legislature's] manifest preference for a civil sanction." 89 Firearms, 104 S.Ct. at 1106 (citations omitted). [18] We are not convinced by "clear proof" that the forfeiture here is punitive. *118 In Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585 , a standard was introduced by this court to determine the nature of an action under a municipal ordinance. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.