Ward test in Washington

2014As the Enquist court observed when examining the transient offender provisions, although "weekly reporting was inconvenient, inconvenience alone does not make the statute punitive."69 Division Two saw no reason to deviate from Ward's analysis, and it held that 68 See Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 501 . 69 Enquist, 163 Wn.

2011Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 500-11 .

2011App. 272, 278 , 223 P.3d 1262 (2009) (holding that all or nothing strategy was not a legitimate trial tactic where defense counsel did not present sufficient evidence to support acquittal). ¶52 More recently, Division One has retreated from the three-pronged Ward test.

2011App. 272, 278 , 223 P.3d 1262 (2009) (holding that all or nothing strategy was not a legitimate trial tactic where defense counsel did not present sufficient evidence to support acquittal). ¶52 More recently, Division One has retreated from the three-pronged Ward test.

2011Restraint of Crace, 157 Wash.App. 81, 109 , 236 P.3d 914 (2010) (finding all or nothing *1271 strategy to be an unreasonable trial tactic in light of the disparity in potential sentences for the lesser and greater offenses); State v. Breitung, 155 Wash.App. 606, 620 , 230 P.3d 614 (2010) [6] (applying three-part Ward test and finding all or nothing strategy unreasonably risky where evidence fell short of proving greater crime but could not support an acquittal); State v. Smith, 154 Wash.App. 272, 278 , 223 P.3d 1262 (2009) (holding that all or nothing strategy was not a legitimate trial tactic

2011App. 606, 620 , 230 P.3d 614 (2010) 6 (applying three-part Ward test and finding all or nothing strategy unreasonably risky where evidence fell short of proving greater crime but could not support an acquittal); State v. Smith, 154 Wn.

2011Restraint of Crace, 157 Wash.App. 81, 109 , 236 P.3d 914 (2010) (finding all or nothing *1271 strategy to be an unreasonable trial tactic in light of the disparity in potential sentences for the lesser and greater offenses); State v. Breitung, 155 Wash.App. 606, 620 , 230 P.3d 614 (2010) [6] (applying three-part Ward test and finding all or nothing strategy unreasonably risky where evidence fell short of proving greater crime but could not support an acquittal); State v. Smith, 154 Wash.App. 272, 278 , 223 P.3d 1262 (2009) (holding that all or nothing strategy was not a legitimate trial tactic

2011App. 606, 620 , 230 P.3d 614 (2010) 6 (applying three-part Ward test and finding all or nothing strategy unreasonably risky where evidence fell short of proving greater crime but could not support an acquittal); State v. Smith, 154 Wn.

2011Restraint of Crace, 157 Wash.App. 81, 109 , 236 P.3d 914 (2010) (finding all or nothing *1271 strategy to be an unreasonable trial tactic in light of the disparity in potential sentences for the lesser and greater offenses); State v. Breitung, 155 Wash.App. 606, 620 , 230 P.3d 614 (2010) [6] (applying three-part Ward test and finding all or nothing strategy unreasonably risky where evidence fell short of proving greater crime but could not support an acquittal); State v. Smith, 154 Wash.App. 272, 278 , 223 P.3d 1262 (2009) (holding that all or nothing strategy was not a legitimate trial tactic

2011Restraint of Crace, 157 Wash.App. 81, 109 , 236 P.3d 914 (2010) (finding all or nothing *1271 strategy to be an unreasonable trial tactic in light of the disparity in potential sentences for the lesser and greater offenses); State v. Breitung, 155 Wash.App. 606, 620 , 230 P.3d 614 (2010) [6] (applying three-part Ward test and finding all or nothing strategy unreasonably risky where evidence fell short of proving greater crime but could not support an acquittal); State v. Smith, 154 Wash.App. 272, 278 , 223 P.3d 1262 (2009) (holding that all or nothing strategy was not a legitimate trial tactic

2003The Ward rule deals with the enforceability of an attorney’s modification of a fee agreement, not with a client’s attempted modification. 51 Wn.

2003The Ward rule deals with the enforceability of an attorney’s modification of a fee agreement, not with a client’s attempted modification. 51 Wn.

2026Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 862 .

2026Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 813 .

2019Ward, citing State v. Mohamed, 186 Wn.2d 235 , 375 P.3d 1068 (2016), now asserts that a new trial is required because Chambers’s criminal history was admissible even though she did not testify.

2019Ward, citing State v. Mohamed, 186 Wn.2d 235 , 375 P.3d 1068 (2016), now asserts that a new trial is required because Chambers’s criminal history was admissible even though she did not testify.

2018Although the trial court did not specifically ask Ward whether his codefendant wife had pressured him to plead guilty, we hold 6 The Williams court held that this error was harmless. 117 Wn.

2018As noted in Williams: Where . . . there is no evidence of any promises or threats to the defendant other than those represented in the written plea agreement, where the defendant signs the written plea agreement acknowledging guilt in his own words, and where the defendant states that no promises were made other than those in the plea agreement, the trial court properly accepts the plea as being the result of the defendant’s own volition and freely and voluntarily made. 117 Wn.

2016Ward also relied on the “overwhelming evidence” it found “that Congress intended to create a penalty civil in all respects and quite weak evidence of any countervailing punitive purpose or effect . . . .” Id. ¶25 On balance, these Ward factors weigh against a holding that board disciplinary actions are sufficiently criminal to trigger a practitioner’s constitutional rights *667 against compelled testimony and evidence production.

2014For the second factor, whether the sanction has historically been regarded as punishment, Smith argues that this court should re-examine Ward's 90 Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1279 . 91 id 92 Ward, 123Wn.2dat502. 21 No. 69621-1-1 (Consolidated with No. 69622-0-l)/22 conclusion "[g]iven the development of the law since Ward was decided and the current regime permitting wide and indiscriminate dissemination of personal information about offenders to the public even when not 'relevant and necessary.'"93 To support his argument, Smith points to two recent cases, Wallace, and Doe v. Department of Public Saf

2014As the Enquist court observed when examining the transient offender provisions, although "weekly reporting was inconvenient, inconvenience alone does not make the statute punitive."69 Division Two saw no reason to deviate from Ward's analysis, and it held that 68 See Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 501 . 69 Enquist, 163 Wn.

2014For the second factor, whether the sanction has historically been regarded as punishment, Smith argues that this court should re-examine Ward's 90 Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1279 . 91 id 92 Ward, 123Wn.2dat502. 21 No. 69621-1-1 (Consolidated with No. 69622-0-l)/22 conclusion "[g]iven the development of the law since Ward was decided and the current regime permitting wide and indiscriminate dissemination of personal information about offenders to the public even when not 'relevant and necessary.'"93 To support his argument, Smith points to two recent cases, Wallace, and Doe v. Department of Public Saf

2011Id. at 646, 208 P.3d 1221 ; see also Ward, 125 Wash.App. at 251 , 104 P.3d 670 (finding that jury's inquiry during deliberations suggested reasonable probability that jury would have selected lesser offense, if given); Pittman, 134 Wash. App. at 390 , 166 P.3d 720 (applying three-part Ward test and finding "reasonable likelihood" that jury would have convicted of lesser offense if given opportunity); In re Pers.

2011Restraint of Crace, 157 Wash.App. 81, 109 , 236 P.3d 914 (2010) (finding all or nothing *1271 strategy to be an unreasonable trial tactic in light of the disparity in potential sentences for the lesser and greater offenses); State v. Breitung, 155 Wash.App. 606, 620 , 230 P.3d 614 (2010) [6] (applying three-part Ward test and finding all or nothing strategy unreasonably risky where evidence fell short of proving greater crime but could not support an acquittal); State v. Smith, 154 Wash.App. 272, 278 , 223 P.3d 1262 (2009) (holding that all or nothing strategy was not a legitimate trial tactic

2011Restraint of Crace, 157 Wash.App. 81, 109 , 236 P.3d 914 (2010) (finding all or nothing *1271 strategy to be an unreasonable trial tactic in light of the disparity in potential sentences for the lesser and greater offenses); State v. Breitung, 155 Wash.App. 606, 620 , 230 P.3d 614 (2010) [6] (applying three-part Ward test and finding all or nothing strategy unreasonably risky where evidence fell short of proving greater crime but could not support an acquittal); State v. Smith, 154 Wash.App. 272, 278 , 223 P.3d 1262 (2009) (holding that all or nothing strategy was not a legitimate trial tactic

2011Id. at 646, 208 P.3d 1221 ; see also Ward, 125 Wash.App. at 251 , 104 P.3d 670 (finding that jury's inquiry during deliberations suggested reasonable probability that jury would have selected lesser offense, if given); Pittman, 134 Wash. App. at 390 , 166 P.3d 720 (applying three-part Ward test and finding "reasonable likelihood" that jury would have convicted of lesser offense if given opportunity); In re Pers.

2011Id. at 646, 208 P.3d 1221 ; see also Ward, 125 Wash.App. at 251 , 104 P.3d 670 (finding that jury's inquiry during deliberations suggested reasonable probability that jury would have selected lesser offense, if given); Pittman, 134 Wash. App. at 390 , 166 P.3d 720 (applying three-part Ward test and finding "reasonable likelihood" that jury would have convicted of lesser offense if given opportunity); In re Pers.

2011Restraint of Crace, 157 Wash.App. 81, 109 , 236 P.3d 914 (2010) (finding all or nothing *1271 strategy to be an unreasonable trial tactic in light of the disparity in potential sentences for the lesser and greater offenses); State v. Breitung, 155 Wash.App. 606, 620 , 230 P.3d 614 (2010) [6] (applying three-part Ward test and finding all or nothing strategy unreasonably risky where evidence fell short of proving greater crime but could not support an acquittal); State v. Smith, 154 Wash.App. 272, 278 , 223 P.3d 1262 (2009) (holding that all or nothing strategy was not a legitimate trial tactic

2011Restraint of Crace, 157 Wash.App. 81, 109 , 236 P.3d 914 (2010) (finding all or nothing *1271 strategy to be an unreasonable trial tactic in light of the disparity in potential sentences for the lesser and greater offenses); State v. Breitung, 155 Wash.App. 606, 620 , 230 P.3d 614 (2010) [6] (applying three-part Ward test and finding all or nothing strategy unreasonably risky where evidence fell short of proving greater crime but could not support an acquittal); State v. Smith, 154 Wash.App. 272, 278 , 223 P.3d 1262 (2009) (holding that all or nothing strategy was not a legitimate trial tactic

1992Mr. Ward acknowledges a sentence within the standard range may not be appealed; however, he contends State v. Bernhard, 108 Wn.2d 527, 535 , 741 P.2d 1 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds in State v. Shove, 113 Wn.2d 83 , 776 P.2d 132 (1989) gives the sentencing judge authority to impose the exceptional sentence he requested, a drug rehabilitation program in Texas.

1992Mr. Ward acknowledges a sentence within the standard range may not be appealed; however, he contends State v. Bernhard, 108 Wn.2d 527, 535 , 741 P.2d 1 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds in State v. Shove, 113 Wn.2d 83 , 776 P.2d 132 (1989) gives the sentencing judge authority to impose the exceptional sentence he requested, a drug rehabilitation program in Texas.

1992Mr. Ward acknowledges a sentence within the standard range may not be appealed; however, he contends State v. Bernhard, 108 Wn.2d 527, 535 , 741 P.2d 1 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds in State v. Shove, 113 Wn.2d 83 , 776 P.2d 132 (1989) gives the sentencing judge authority to impose the exceptional sentence he requested, a drug rehabilitation program in Texas.

1992Mr. Ward acknowledges a sentence within the standard range may not be appealed; however, he contends State v. Bernhard, 108 Wn.2d 527, 535 , 741 P.2d 1 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds in State v. Shove, 113 Wn.2d 83 , 776 P.2d 132 (1989) gives the sentencing judge authority to impose the exceptional sentence he requested, a drug rehabilitation program in Texas.