Ward analysis in New York

2015Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a hearing on the issue of whether Ward was properly served under CPLR 308 (2), and for a new determination thereafter of Ward’s motion (see Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v Cao, 105 AD3d at 521-522 ; Sileo v Victor, 104 AD3d at 670 ).

2015Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a hearing on the issue of whether Ward was properly served under CPLR 308 (2), and for a new determination thereafter of Ward’s motion (see Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v Cao, 105 AD3d at 521-522 ; Sileo v Victor, 104 AD3d at 670 ).

2002The duty of the court is to “inquire as to what a reasonable and prudent person would do in the circumstances” (Daly, supra at 88 , citing Matter of Christiansen v Christiansen, 248 Cal App 2d 398, 56 Cal Rptr 505).

2002In response to the Appellate Division’s decision in Matter of Patrick BB. (supra), the petitioners have asked the court for permission to conditionally gift the property to the Commissioner of the State of New York to be held in a “13.29” account. 4 Guardians of developmentally disabled individuals have been allowed to gift property of the ward under the doctrine of substituted judgment (Matter of Daly, 142 Misc 2d 85 ).

1997First, because plaintiff never obtained jurisdiction over Ward’s in the prior action (and in fact made no effort to interpose a claim against that party), CPLR 205 (a) has no application to this case (see, Rayo v State of New York, 882 F Supp 37, 39-40 ; see also, Markoff v South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 NY2d 283 ; Parker v Mack, 61 NY2d 114 ).

1997First, because plaintiff never obtained jurisdiction over Ward’s in the prior action (and in fact made no effort to interpose a claim against that party), CPLR 205 (a) has no application to this case (see, Rayo v State of New York, 882 F Supp 37, 39-40 ; see also, Markoff v South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 NY2d 283 ; Parker v Mack, 61 NY2d 114 ).

1995(United States v Amiel, 995 F2d 367, 369 [2d Cir 1993], citing United States v 38 Whalers Cove Dr., 954 F2d 29 [2d Cir 1992].) Without even turning to Halper and Kurth Ranch (supra), it would seem highly unlikely that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2) (e) (7) would pass even a Ward analysis.

1995(United States v Amiel, 995 F2d 367, 369 [2d Cir 1993], citing United States v 38 Whalers Cove Dr., 954 F2d 29 [2d Cir 1992].) Without even turning to Halper and Kurth Ranch (supra), it would seem highly unlikely that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2) (e) (7) would pass even a Ward analysis.

1995(One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v United States, 409 US 232 [1972] [" '(forfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of fixed or variable sums of money are other sanctions which have been recognized, enforceable by civil proceedings’ ”]; see also, Austin v United States, 509 US 602, 621 [1993] ["the forfeiture of contraband itself may be characterized as remedial because it removes dangerous or illegal items from society”].) To say that the courts have placed a blanket double jeopardy denial on all forfeiture cases would be an exaggeration.

1995(One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v United States, 409 US 232 [1972] [" '(forfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of fixed or variable sums of money are other sanctions which have been recognized, enforceable by civil proceedings’ ”]; see also, Austin v United States, 509 US 602, 621 [1993] ["the forfeiture of contraband itself may be characterized as remedial because it removes dangerous or illegal items from society”].) To say that the courts have placed a blanket double jeopardy denial on all forfeiture cases would be an exaggeration.

1995In reaching this decision, we are mindful that the Dead Man’s Statute is a last vestige of the common-law, general rule which rendered all interested persons and parties incompetent to testify (Matter of Wood, 52 NY2d 139, 143-144 ; 2 Wigmore, Evidence, op. cit.).

1995In reaching this decision, we are mindful that the Dead Man’s Statute is a last vestige of the common-law, general rule which rendered all interested persons and parties incompetent to testify (Matter of Wood, 52 NY2d 139, 143-144 ; 2 Wigmore, Evidence, op. cit.).

1995The two-prong Ward analysis was most visible in United States v One Assortment of 89 Firearms ( 465 US 354 [1984] [hereinafter referred to as Firearms]) in which the Supreme Court concluded that the forfeiture mechanism of the Gun Control Act of 1968 is "not an additional penalty for the commission of a criminal act, but rather is a separate civil sanction, remedial in nature” (supra, at 366) aimed at "[kjeeping potentially dangerous weapons out of the hands of unlicensed [gun] dealers”.

1995The two-prong Ward analysis was most visible in United States v One Assortment of 89 Firearms ( 465 US 354 [1984] [hereinafter referred to as Firearms]) in which the Supreme Court concluded that the forfeiture mechanism of the Gun Control Act of 1968 is "not an additional penalty for the commission of a criminal act, but rather is a separate civil sanction, remedial in nature” (supra, at 366) aimed at "[kjeeping potentially dangerous weapons out of the hands of unlicensed [gun] dealers”.

1990In Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez ( 372 US 144 [1963]), the Supreme Court highlighted the elements to be considered in determining whether the forfeiture contemplated by the statute was too punitive to tolerate civil litigation procedures regardless of the Legislature’s intentions upon enactment.