corresponding federal rule in Alaska

2002Although Eisen refers to Federal Civil Rule 23, and not Alaska Civil Rule 23, we have previously cited United States Supreme Court cases on Civil Rule 23 given "the identity between our Civil Rule 23 and the corresponding federal rule.” Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, Inc., 627 P.2d 1035, 1041 (Alaska 1981). 13 .Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int’l, 452 F.2d 424 , 427 (5th Cir.1971)).

1998We adopted the American Pipe rule “in light of the identity between our Civil Rule 23 and the corresponding federal rule.” Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, Inc., 627 P.2d 1035, 1041 (Alaska 1981). 8 The American Pipe tolling rule represents a compromise between the competing goals of class actions and statutes of limitations.

2025Cir. 1969))); State v. Bakdash, 830 N.W.2d 906, 915 (Minn. App. 2013) (“An amendment of an indictment occurs when the state or the court alters the charging terms of the indictment after the grand jury has finally passed on them.” (quoting State v. Pettee, 538 N.W.2d 126, 131 (Minn. 1995))). 16 Tracy, 573 A.2d at 40 . – 10 – 2797 “[s]uperseding accusatory instruments can contain additional counts not charged in prior instruments” without implicating Rule 7(e).17 There is nothing in the history of our rule that suggests it was intended to govern the filing of new charges.

2025The language of our rule is similar to the corresponding federal rule, and the Ninth Circuit has held that the addition of a new charge is “not tantamount” to an amendment, and 15 Tracy v. State, 573 A.2d 38, 40 (Md. 1990) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Cusmano, 659 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 1981) (“An amendment of the indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by the prosecutor or a court after the grand jury has last passed upon them.” (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C.

2025Cir. 1969))); State v. Bakdash, 830 N.W.2d 906, 915 (Minn. App. 2013) (“An amendment of an indictment occurs when the state or the court alters the charging terms of the indictment after the grand jury has finally passed on them.” (quoting State v. Pettee, 538 N.W.2d 126, 131 (Minn. 1995))). 16 Tracy, 573 A.2d at 40 . – 10 – 2797 “[s]uperseding accusatory instruments can contain additional counts not charged in prior instruments” without implicating Rule 7(e).17 There is nothing in the history of our rule that suggests it was intended to govern the filing of new charges.

2025The language of our rule is similar to the corresponding federal rule, and the Ninth Circuit has held that the addition of a new charge is “not tantamount” to an amendment, and 15 Tracy v. State, 573 A.2d 38, 40 (Md. 1990) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Cusmano, 659 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 1981) (“An amendment of the indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by the prosecutor or a court after the grand jury has last passed upon them.” (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C.

2025The language of our rule is similar to the corresponding federal rule, and the Ninth Circuit has held that the addition of a new charge is “not tantamount” to an amendment, and 15 Tracy v. State, 573 A.2d 38, 40 (Md. 1990) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Cusmano, 659 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 1981) (“An amendment of the indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by the prosecutor or a court after the grand jury has last passed upon them.” (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C.

2025Cir. 1969))); State v. Bakdash, 830 N.W.2d 906, 915 (Minn. App. 2013) (“An amendment of an indictment occurs when the state or the court alters the charging terms of the indictment after the grand jury has finally passed on them.” (quoting State v. Pettee, 538 N.W.2d 126, 131 (Minn. 1995))). 16 Tracy, 573 A.2d at 40 . – 10 – 2797 “[s]uperseding accusatory instruments can contain additional counts not charged in prior instruments” without implicating Rule 7(e).17 There is nothing in the history of our rule that suggests it was intended to govern the filing of new charges.

2008Under the corresponding federal rule, "lif the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471 , 474 (7th Cir.1979) ("[A] federal court, including a court of appeals, must raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion where the parties fail to bring it to the court's attention."); see also State, Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755, 756 (1996) (noting that state supreme court can raise issue of subject matter jurisdiction on its

2008Under the corresponding federal rule, "lif the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471 , 474 (7th Cir.1979) ("[A] federal court, including a court of appeals, must raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion where the parties fail to bring it to the court's attention."); see also State, Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755, 756 (1996) (noting that state supreme court can raise issue of subject matter jurisdiction on its

2008Under the corresponding federal rule, "lif the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471 , 474 (7th Cir.1979) ("[A] federal court, including a court of appeals, must raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion where the parties fail to bring it to the court's attention."); see also State, Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495 , 932 S.W.2d 755, 756 (1996) (noting that state supreme court can raise issue of subject matter jurisdiction on its

2008Bennett v. Bennett, 6 P.3d 724, 726 (Alaska 2000) (holding that superior court's retroactive child support award to father was abuse of discretion because, although father was court-designated custodial parent, mother had de facto custody). .

2006Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 786-87 (Alaska 1974).

1997See Bowers Office Prods., Inc. v. University of Alaska, 755 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Alaska 1988) (Standing "is based on the principle that courts should not resolve abstract questions or issue advisory opinions."); Falcon v. Alaska Pub.

1997See Bowers Office Prods., Inc. v. University of Alaska, 755 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Alaska 1988) (Standing “is based on the principle that courts should not resolve abstract questions or issue advisory opinions.”); Falcon v. Alaska Pub.