10 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schlagenhauf v. Holdergreen2 sentences2004In reviewing a Rule 35 motion, the court must determine whether the moving party has established that the other party’s “physical or mental condition” is “in controversy.” The seminal case is Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), interpreting the same language in the corresponding federal rule. 2004In reviewing a Rule 35 motion, the court must determine whether the moving party has established that the other party’s “physical or mental condition” is “in controversy.” The seminal case is Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), interpreting the same language in the corresponding federal rule. | 1 | 3 |
Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Commission against Discriminationgreen1 sentence2025See Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655 , 677 n.29 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCSgreen1 sentence2004Mass.R.Civ.P. 11(a) requires that the “signature of an attorney to a pleading constitutes a certificate by him that... there is good ground to support it.” Although the Massachusetts rule embodies a subjective standard unlike the corresponding federal rule, “our rule does not excuse an attorney’s ‘wilful ignorance’ of facts and law which would have been known had the attorney simply not consciously disregarded them.” Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A-COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410, 417 (1998) (“The principles enunciated above lead us to conclude that our rule 11(a) authorizes a judge to impose atto | 1 | 1 |
Lugtig v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2004See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 2002 WL 511506 *2 (D.Kan. 2002); Foutz v. Town of Vinton, Va., 211 F.R.D. 292, 293 (W.D.Va. 2002); DeLoach v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 568, 571-72 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Tingley Systems, Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 152 F.Sup.2d 95, 120 (D.Mass. 2001); Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club Inc., 914 F.Sup. 1025, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Piqua Engineering, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 565 (D.Ohio 1993); Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 652 (N.D.Ill. 1981) (not examining the sufficiency, reasonableness, or legitimacy of the reason); Colin v. T | 1 | 1 |
Deloach v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.green1 sentence2004See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 2002 WL 511506 *2 (D.Kan. 2002); Foutz v. Town of Vinton, Va., 211 F.R.D. 292, 293 (W.D.Va. 2002); DeLoach v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 568, 571-72 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Tingley Systems, Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 152 F.Sup.2d 95, 120 (D.Mass. 2001); Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club Inc., 914 F.Sup. 1025, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Piqua Engineering, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 565 (D.Ohio 1993); Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 652 (N.D.Ill. 1981) (not examining the sufficiency, reasonableness, or legitimacy of the reason); Colin v. T | 1 | 1 |
Colin v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2004See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 2002 WL 511506 *2 (D.Kan. 2002); Foutz v. Town of Vinton, Va., 211 F.R.D. 292, 293 (W.D.Va. 2002); DeLoach v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 568, 571-72 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Tingley Systems, Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 152 F.Sup.2d 95, 120 (D.Mass. 2001); Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club Inc., 914 F.Sup. 1025, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Piqua Engineering, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 565 (D.Ohio 1993); Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 652 (N.D.Ill. 1981) (not examining the sufficiency, reasonableness, or legitimacy of the reason); Colin v. T | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sturtivantgreen1 sentence2000In determining whether to admit lay opinion testimony on identification, opinions often turned to the venerable, if somewhat nebulous, test set forth in Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 137 (1875): “The competency of this evidence rests upon two necessary conditions: first, that the subject matter to which the testimony relates cannot be reproduced or described to the jury precisely as it appeared to the witness at the time; and second, that the facts upon which the witness is called to express his opinion, are such as men in general are capable of comprehending and understanding.” P | 1 | 1 |
New England Acceptance Corp. v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences1987Co., 373 Mass. 594, 596 (1977), we may be guided by the construction which Federal courts have given the corresponding Federal rule. 1987Co., 373 Mass. 594, 596 (1977), we may be guided by the construction which Federal courts have given the corresponding Federal rule. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Hallgreen1 sentence1979Martin v. Hall, 369 Mass. 882, 884 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States ex rel. Burch v. Piqua Engineering, Inc.
green
1 sentence2004See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 2002 WL 511506 *2 (D.Kan. 2002); Foutz v. Town of Vinton, Va., 211 F.R.D. 292, 293 (W.D.Va. 2002); DeLoach v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 568, 571-72 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Tingley Systems, Inc. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 152 F.Sup.2d 95, 120 (D.Mass. 2001); Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club Inc., 914 F.Sup. 1025, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Piqua Engineering, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 565 (D.Ohio 1993); Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 652 (N.D.Ill. 1981) (not examining the sufficiency, reasonableness, or legitimacy of the reason); Colin v. T | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Frow v. De La Vega
green
1 sentence1994This rule is identical to the corresponding Federal rule (Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 [c]), and our practice under it is to be guided by that of the Federal courts. 4 There the principle uniformly applied, deriving from the pre-rules decision in Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872), is that “a default judgment may not be entered against one of [two] defendants (1) where the theory of recovery is one of true joint liability, such that, as a matter of law, [neither] defendant may be liable unless [both] are liable, or (2) where the nature of the relief demanded is such that, in order to be effective, it m | 1 | 1994–1994 |
cluster 474208
green
1 sentence1994“Frow stands for the proposition that if at trial facts are proved that exonerate certain defendants and that as a matter of logic preclude the liability of another defendant, the plaintiff should be collaterally es-topped from obtaining a judgment against the latter defendant, even though it failed to participate in the proceeding in which the exculpatory facts were proved.” Farzetta v. Turner & Newell, Ltd., 797 F.2d 151 , 154 (3d Cir. 1986). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.