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8 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. CECIL J.green1 sentence2014Second, the corresponding federal rule of evidence, on which the Idaho rule is based, has been interpreted to refer solely to physical injuries. 3 United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 , 603 n.2 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); see also State v. Cecil J., 913 A.2d 505, 514 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (psychological trauma not recognized as an “injury” for purposes of similar provision of rape shield statute). | 1 | 1 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2013Besaw claims error, basing his argument on Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 , 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174-75 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238, 249-51 (1999), where the United States Supreme Court said that the foundational requirements for scientific testimony laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794-95 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 479-80 (1993), extend not just to scientific knowledge but also to technical and “other specialized” knowledge under the corresponding federal rule of evidence. 2013Besaw claims error, basing his argument on Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 , 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174-75 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238, 249-51 (1999), where the United States Supreme Court said that the foundational requirements for scientific testimony laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794-95 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 479-80 (1993), extend not just to scientific knowledge but also to technical and “other specialized” knowledge under the corresponding federal rule of evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichaelgreen2 sentences2013Besaw claims error, basing his argument on Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 , 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174-75 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238, 249-51 (1999), where the United States Supreme Court said that the foundational requirements for scientific testimony laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794-95 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 479-80 (1993), extend not just to scientific knowledge but also to technical and “other specialized” knowledge under the corresponding federal rule of evidence. 2013Besaw claims error, basing his argument on Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 , 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174-75 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238, 249-51 (1999), where the United States Supreme Court said that the foundational requirements for scientific testimony laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794-95 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 479-80 (1993), extend not just to scientific knowledge but also to technical and “other specialized” knowledge under the corresponding federal rule of evidence. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arch A. Moore, Jr.green1 sentence2012A. The District Court’s Application of the Six Factors from Moore In ruling on May’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court applied the six- factor analysis recognized by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991) in considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the corresponding federal rule. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bautistagreen1 sentence1999See United States v. Bautista 145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847 (9th Cir.1995), cert, denied, Bautista v. United States, 516 U.S. 1029 , 119 S.Ct. 255 , 142 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); McCormick on Evidence § 193 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Crosby v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1994Crosby v. United States, — U.S.-,-, 113 S.Ct. 748, 751 , 122 L.Ed.2d 25, 31 (1993). 1994Crosby v. United States, — U.S.-,-, 113 S.Ct. 748, 751 , 122 L.Ed.2d 25, 31 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pangborn
green
2 sentences2019The corresponding federal rule, Rule 611(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, has often been cited "as giving courts general discretion over the use of demonstrative exhibits during trial." State v. Pangborn , 286 Neb. 363 , 373, 836 N.W.2d 790 , 799 (2013) (citing to cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits). *936 In Pangborn , the Supreme Court of Nebraska performed a lengthy and apt analysis, including an examination of many other jurisdictions, to articulate the rule that "the submission of demonstrative exhibits to the jury during deliberation 2019The corresponding federal rule, Rule 611(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, has often been cited "as giving courts general discretion over the use of demonstrative exhibits during trial." State v. Pangborn , 286 Neb. 363 , 373, 836 N.W.2d 790 , 799 (2013) (citing to cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits). *936 In Pangborn , the Supreme Court of Nebraska performed a lengthy and apt analysis, including an examination of many other jurisdictions, to articulate the rule that "the submission of demonstrative exhibits to the jury during deliberation | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Idaho v. Wright
green
1 sentence2014Second, the corresponding federal rule of evidence, on which the Idaho rule is based, has been interpreted to refer solely to physical injuries. 3 United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 , 603 n.2 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); see also State v. Cecil J., 913 A.2d 505, 514 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (psychological trauma not recognized as an “injury” for purposes of similar provision of rape shield statute). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. James Shaw
green
1 sentence2014Second, the corresponding federal rule of evidence, on which the Idaho rule is based, has been interpreted to refer solely to physical injuries. 3 United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 , 603 n.2 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); see also State v. Cecil J., 913 A.2d 505, 514 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (psychological trauma not recognized as an “injury” for purposes of similar provision of rape shield statute). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Tanner v. United States
green
1 sentence2013Tanner, 483 U.S. at 116-27 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lee v. Knutson
green
1 sentence2002The effect of Rule 26(b)(4) was artfully explained by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in Lee v. Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 105 (N.D.Miss.1986), where the court rejected an argument identical to Clark’s with regard to the corresponding federal rule: There is ample authority for the proposition that an expert witness, such as a treating physician, whose entire testimony will be based upon his own examination and treatment of a party, is not subject to the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Kazandjian v. United States
green
1 sentence1999See United States v. Bautista 145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847 (9th Cir.1995), cert, denied, Bautista v. United States, 516 U.S. 1029 , 119 S.Ct. 255 , 142 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); McCormick on Evidence § 193 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.1992). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
United States v. Ronald Keiser, Jr.
green
1 sentence1999See United States v. Bautista 145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847 (9th Cir.1995), cert, denied, Bautista v. United States, 516 U.S. 1029 , 119 S.Ct. 255 , 142 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); McCormick on Evidence § 193 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.1992). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lovell v. Planters Bank & Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1999See United States v. Bautista 145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847 (9th Cir.1995), cert, denied, Bautista v. United States, 516 U.S. 1029 , 119 S.Ct. 255 , 142 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); McCormick on Evidence § 193 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.1992). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Diaz v. United States
green
2 sentences1994This rule, which is virtually identical to the corresponding federal rule, essentially codifies the constitutional principle enunciated in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. *326 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), that a defendant may waive the right to be present by voluntarily absenting himself during the trial. 1994This rule, which is virtually identical to the corresponding federal rule, essentially codifies the constitutional principle enunciated in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. *326 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), that a defendant may waive the right to be present by voluntarily absenting himself during the trial. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.